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ABSTRACT
Network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) devices play a crucial role in the realm of
network security. These systems generate alerts for security analysts by performing signaturebased and anomaly-based detection on malicious network traffic. However, there are several
challenges when configuring and fine-tuning these IDS devices for high accuracy and
precision. Machine learning utilizes a variety of algorithms and unique dataset input to
generate models for effective classification. These machine learning techniques can be
applied to IDS devices to classify and filter anomalous network traffic. This combination of
machine learning and network security provides improved automated network defense by
developing highly-optimized IDS models that utilize unique algorithms for enhanced
intrusion detection. Machine learning models can be trained using a combination of machine
learning algorithms, network intrusion datasets, and optimization techniques. This study
sought to identify which variation of these parameters yielded the best-performing network
intrusion detection models, measured by their accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score
metrics. Additionally, this research aimed to validate theoretical models’ metrics by applying
them in a real-world environment to see if they perform as expected. This research utilized a
quantitative experimental study design to organize a two-phase approach to train and test a
series of machine learning models for network intrusion detection by utilizing Python
scripting, the scikit-learn library, and Zeek IDS software. The first phase involved optimizing
and training 105 machine learning models by testing a combination of seven machine learning
algorithms, five network intrusion datasets, and three optimization methods. These 105
models were then fed into the second phase, where the models were applied in a machine
learning IDS pipeline to observe how the models performed in an implemented environment.
The results of this study identify which algorithms, datasets, and optimization methods
generate the best-performing models for network intrusion detection. This research also
showcases the need to utilize various algorithms and datasets since no individual algorithm or
dataset consistently achieved high metric scores independent of other training variables.
Additionally, this research also indicates that optimization during model development is
highly recommended; however, there may not be a need to test for multiple optimization
methods since they did not typically impact the yielded models’ overall categorization of
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success or failure. Lastly, this study’s results strongly indicate that theoretical machine
learning models will most likely perform significantly worse when applied in an implemented
IDS ML pipeline environment. This study can be utilized by other industry professionals and
research academics in the fields of information security and machine learning to generate
better highly-optimized models for their work environments or experimental research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This section introduces the topic of this dissertation on machine learning and network
intrusion detection. This study evaluates a series of machine learning models for network
intrusion detection to identify how the combination of machine learning algorithms, network
intrusion detection datasets, and optimization parameters impacts the final models’ outcome
and performance. Additionally, this research created an intrusion detection system (IDS) with
a machine learning (ML) capabilities pipeline such that trained ML models can be applied and
evaluated in a real-world environment. A quantitative experimental study design effectively
organizes the tests for this research and analyzes their results. This section discusses the
background, goals, and significance of this research and briefly introduces how this study was
designed and conducted.

Background of the Problem
Detecting network anomalies and malicious traffic is a significant concern and
challenge for organizations today. Organizations must adequately protect private data from
external threats; however, attackers continue to develop new techniques to bypass standard
security practices and protocols. Organizations may employ security operation center (SOC)
analysts to review network traffic and alerts to track any potential compromise within the
network to address this ongoing threat (Schinagl, Schoon, & Paans, 2015). Typically, SOC
analysts will review network traffic and system logs whenever they identify an anomaly
within the network (Aijaz, Aslam, & Khalid, 2015). Many of these analysts rely on alerts
from different systems to warn them about potential threats or anomalies found on particular
devices. If a SOC analyst believes a system has been legitimately compromised, they will
likely try to correlate events to establish a complete timeline of how a threat actor obtained
initial access, established persistence, and exfiltrated data (Deyang & Dedong, 2011). This
extensive adversary tracking may require the analyst to verify and correlate logs from
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numerous systems tediously. These analysts may easily miss malicious traffic or related
events while combing through the logs and security alerts between devices, as this process can
be extremely challenging. Experienced threat actors will utilize different tools, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs) to effectively bypass security systems and protection mechanisms.
Several different methods and tools provide obfuscation and evasion capabilities that prevent
detection within networks and devices. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups are highly
technical adversaries that will almost certainly utilize these evasion techniques to effectively
blend into a victim organization’s network traffic to avoid detection over an extended period.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) devices are security systems that monitor the
network for malicious or anomalous activity and generates alerts based on their configuration.
There are two primary detection techniques utilized by IDS devices, misuse detection and
anomaly detection (Nassar, El-Bahnasawy, Ahmed, Saleeb, & El-Samie, 2019). Misuse
detection, also known as signature-based detection, will flag malicious traffic based on a
vendor’s unique signatures. The biggest problem for misuse detection is maintaining an up-todate signature ruleset or database to flag known bad traffic. This type of detection method
struggles to identify unknown, or zero-day, network attacks that have not had signatures
developed. The benefit of misuse detection is that it has a low false alarm rate, meaning that
the alerts are typically very accurate. Anomaly detection will establish a baseline of normal
traffic behavior to identify abnormal traffic behavior based on the normal profile deviation.
Anomaly detection, or behavior-based detection, can strongly generalize traffic, thereby
enabling the capability to flag unknown zero-day attacks. The major challenges for anomaly
detection are the high false alarm rate and inaccuracies. Regardless of either misuse detection
or anomaly detection mode, a fine-tuned IDS should effectively flag malicious and anomalous
traffic while also allowing innocuous traffic to pass through to enable normal business
operations. It should also be noted that open-source IDS software operates by utilizing a
primary detection engine made up of various processes that apply filters to the ingested
network traffic.
An IDS configured for misuse detection will observe traffic and send alerts when
specific network traffic criteria match individual signatures configured on the device. The
rules or signatures on an IDS must be manually set up and regularly maintained by a user who
knows what is considered “bad” traffic and “good” traffic on their network. The challenge for
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these IDS misuse detection configurations is properly defining and maintaining the rules to
alert on network traffic that may be malicious. Over time, threat actors and their attacks
change as more vulnerabilities and exploits for systems become published; thus, many
signature-based IDS devices will not utilize a relevant or up-to-date ruleset to alert against
new attacks unless analysts regularly review and update the IDS alert ruleset (Sopan,
Berninger, Mulakaluri, & Katakam, 2018).
An IDS configured for anomaly detection will require both setup and tuning. In a twophase process, the IDS must be trained to build a normal behavior profile of the network and
then tested to compare the current traffic to the previously generated normal behavior profile
(Anson, 2020). Historically, many IDS devices and software used strict statistical models to
analyze deviations from the normal traffic profile to determine if a piece of traffic is
anomalous. Newer techniques for anomaly detection incorporate artificial intelligence and
machine learning techniques, which will be further discussed later in this paper. An anomalybased IDS device aims to flag anomalous traffic while maintaining a low degree of false
positives false negatives. This type of configuration’s primary benefit is the potential to detect
unknown, or zero-day, network attacks before vendors even have published signatures. The
issue is that current anomaly detection techniques employed by most IDS devices do not
utilize ML classification algorithms to categorize pieces of traffic. A poorly tuned anomalybased IDS will generate numerous false alarms until a network security analyst decides to
ignore specific alerts due to the low confidence levels in the mismanaged IDS device or
software.
There are numerous ways to set up and configure an IDS on a network. One of the
first decisions that must be made when installing an IDS is where to set up the device on the
network (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2014). IDS devices can be installed inline on the
network, where live network traffic must pass through the system to reach the next device.
The benefit of an inline setup is live traffic monitoring analysis; a potential challenge with this
setup is traffic disruption due to excessive analysis on the device, thereby resulting in traffic
queues. Alternatively, IDS devices can be setup on a mirror or span port, a dedicated port on a
networking device configured to forward network traffic or logs. The benefit of this
configuration is the lack of potential traffic flow disruption; however, since the network
analysis is not live, threats may reach vulnerable devices on the network by the time the IDS
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alert goes off. There are also hardware-based and software-based IDS setups. Hardware-based
IDS devices are physical systems that provide dedicated machines and processing power for
traffic analysis. Software-based IDS devices can be installed on a system that enables the
device to perform IDS capabilities in addition to its original function; administrators may
install IDS plugins onto existing networking systems or may stand up dedicated virtualized
devices with IDS software to act as a dedicated virtual IDS device. Lastly, it should be
mentioned that an Intrusion Detection System is closely related and commonly installed
alongside an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). IDS devices are dedicated systems intended
to alert if specific network traffic patterns are detected on the network; IPS devices can be
used to drop malicious packets or alter security configurations or rules on systems (such as
routers or switches) if a threat is detected on the network. IPS devices can be set up just like
IDS devices but are meant to react to malicious threats on the network rather than just alert
(Johansen, 2020). IPS devices can be potent systems; however, these devices’ primary
concern is the potential disruption of innocuous traffic. IPS devices may identify a “threat”
and close critical ports or restrict communication between segmented networks, thereby
disrupting standard business operations. This automatic network reconfiguration could cost
the organization with the IPS a significant amount of money and reputation due to downtime
of communications between critical systems. It is even more challenging to properly
configure an IPS to identify and react based on a static ruleset due to the potential risk of
business downtime. Many organizations use a well-configured IDS to send alerts to security
analysts, who then manually investigate the alerts to determine if the threat was legitimate.
While there are several different IDS hardware and software solutions, they all contain
a similar syntax for IDS rules. Each IDS rule will have a set of fields configured to perform a
particular action when identifying specific network criteria (Collins, 2014). For example, an
IDS rule will contain specific fields to filter network packets such as a source IP, destination
IP, direction of traffic, source port, destination port, and protocol. These rules can become
even more granular by filtering packets based on fields unique to the protocol of the traffic or
even other layers in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. In addition to these filter
criteria, IDS rules will also be configured with specific rule actions (such as an alert or log if
the criteria are identified in a packet), rule numbers, rule priority, rule revision, and rule
classification. IDS rules can be highly specialized or extremely broad; it is up to the analyst to
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finetune the IDS to properly configure these rules to alert on legitimate threats to the network
correctly, or else the IDS will alert on innocuous traffic.
IDS devices can be highly effective security systems that alert on threats within a
network. However, it can be an arduous and tedious process to keep the IDS ruleset updated
regularly. When initially setting up an IDS, it may take weeks or sometimes months to train
an IDS to create a proper baseline for the system to identify “normal” traffic (Bejtlich, 2013).
However, even after the initial baseline training, security analysts will need to continuously
review the network to identify typical traffic and then manually update the IDS rules to match
what they find. A misconfigured IDS ruleset can result in an overly sensitive IDS that
generates excessive alerts (incorporating both true positives and false positives); similarly, a
misconfigured IDS can also be configured with a loose ruleset that will not alert on legitimate
malicious traffic (involving false negatives and true negatives). It can take several months for
a security analyst to set up and adequately fine-tune an IDS, and even after it has been
configured, someone will still need to monitor the network traffic to generate up-to-date IDS
configurations continuously. In an ideal world, there would be a way to automate this process
of analyzing the network traffic to determine what is considered “normal” traffic and then
generate an effective IDS ruleset that alerts anomalous and malicious traffic while
maintaining a high level of true positive and true negative alerting.
Machine learning (ML) may provide a solution to this ongoing effort to detect new
malicious traffic. Machine learning uses algorithms and statistical models to analyze or learn
from training data to make decisions or predictions observed in other ingested datasets. There
are several different ML algorithm types along with numerous optimization techniques to best
train the ML model. ML algorithms can be categorized in different ways. There are
unsupervised learning, supervised learning, and semi-supervised learning techniques (Maseer,
Yusof, Bahaman, Mostafa, & Foozy, 2021). Unsupervised learning occurs when an algorithm
is given an unlabeled dataset and will attempt to identify patterns or structures within the data.
Human experts will label a portion of the semi-supervised learning dataset to assist the
algorithm in identifying patterns better. If a dataset is completely labeled, then this can be
used for supervised learning algorithms to identify a function or model that explains the data.
Additionally, ML algorithms can be grouped between shallow learning methods and deep
learning methods, which will be discussed later. These numerous ML learning techniques and
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classification models will be further discussed in the Literature Review section. With the
adequately selected ML algorithm and training dataset, a machine learning IDS device can be
configured to automate the process of detecting anomalous network traffic through the use of
misuse or anomaly detection. This type of IDS with ML capabilities will potentially automate
detecting emerging threats and zero-day attacks utilized by attackers before the signatures are
published by vendors. However, there are several challenges with the proposed IDS devices
with ML capabilities due to the wide variety of possible ML algorithms and network intrusion
detection datasets’ quality. These variables will need to be tested and evaluated to identify the
best and most effective IDS ML configuration that produces the highest true positive
detection rate while keeping false positive alerts at a minimum.
Datasets are required to train and test ML algorithms. In the network intrusion
detection realm, the datasets can consist of three primary types of data that make up the
network traffic dataset (Ring, Wunderlich, Scheuring, Landes, & Hotho, 2019). First is
packet-based data; this is commonly obtained in a standard packet capture format and
contains full packet headers, fields, payloads, and associated metadata. The second is flowbased data; this is a more condensed format which stripes out unique packet properties and
primarily maintains packet metadata. This type of data aggregates packets that share specific
properties within a given time window into a single flow and does not contain payload
information. Lastly, there is a hybrid category of network data; this data contains a mixture of
both packet-based and flow-based data. An example of this hybrid traffic would be flowbased data that has been enriched to contain specific packet-based fields such as payloads and
unique header information. Additional details and examples of these types of datasets will
appear in the literature review of this paper.
Several evaluation metrics can be applied to machine learning algorithm results that
enable researchers to compare and contrast the models’ results. Before getting into these
unique metrics, the four base metrics used to classify sets of labeled data are true positive
(TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP) or a statistical type I error, and false negative
(FN) or a statistical type II error (Vinayakumar et al., 2019). True positive data are correctly
labeled positive results; true negative data are correctly labeled false results; false-positive
data are incorrectly labeled positive results; false-negative data are incorrectly labeled
negative results. Machine learning researchers commonly utilize the following evaluation
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metrics to compare the effectiveness of ML classification models: accuracy or proportion
correct [(TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)], positive predictive value [TP / (TP + FP)],
sensitivity or recall or true positive rate or probability of detection or detection rate [TP / (TP
+ FN)], negative predictive value [TN / (TN + FN)], specificity or TN rate [TN / (TN + FP)],
and false alarm rate or false positive rate or fall-out [FP / (TN + FP)] (Chiba, 2019). These
terms and metrics will appear across several papers in the Literature Review section and will
be utilized to analyze this study’s results.
Deep learning (DL) is a subset of machine learning that analyses successive and
meaningful layers of representations from the original data input. The “deep” in deep learning
refers to the layers, or depth, of the modeled data. Modern deep learning models may
incorporate hundreds or even thousands of layers, whereas other learning models (such as
typical machine learning models) may only utilize one or two layers, which is sometimes
called shallow learning (Thapa, Liu, Kc, Gokaraju, & Roy, 2020). These layered
representations of data are typically referred to as a neural network (NN). Each layer in the
NN represents the original input data in an increasingly altered and informative perspective.
Applied weights, also referred to as parameters, modify the data representations at each NN
layer to slightly transform the data (Akashdeep, Manzoor, & Kumar, 2017). There can be
millions of parameters at each layer, and learning, in this context, actually means finding the
desired values for the weights applied in the NN. Next, after all the layers have transformed
the original data and produced a final result, a loss function, or objective function, is used to
take the output of the NN along with the true target value (the desired outcome) to calculate
the distance score, or loss score, to see how far off the NN was from the true target value.
Once this distance score has been calculated, a feedback signal, called an optimizer, is used to
implement a backpropagation algorithm to adjust the NN weights and hopefully lower the loss
score. This process will repeat several times; the weights are initially random values, but each
iteration of the NN will modify the parameter values and minimize the loss value. This
training loop process repeats a sufficient number of times until NN yields a minimal loss
value.
Data processing and optimization are additional significant factors when training
machine learning models. There are numerous data transformation steps required to properly
format the data such that it can be appropriately ingested while training an ML model (Buczak
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& Guven, 2016). Additionally, each machine learning algorithm contains a series of highly
configurable parameters that can be fine-tuned to optimize the trained model to yield the
highest performance within a particular scoring method. As a result, models can be better
optimized for particular scoring methods, such as accuracy over precision or vice versa. The
optimization of ML models can dramatically change and affect the outcome of trained
models. Optimizing a model for a particular scoring method may yield higher results in that
specific metric; however, it may also severely impact the other evaluation metrics, both
positively and negatively. It is crucial to consider the impact of optimizing a particular scoring
method as it may dramatically affect the performance and other metrics of the model.
Artificial intelligence and machine learning are the future for several professional
fields. The research and integration of these automation techniques into different professions
are occurring now and are only bound to increase as time progresses. Properly trained ML
models will identify anomalies, outliers, patterns, and trends much better than humans. This
type of analysis will save organizations time, human resources, and money. The integration of
ML into IDS network environments is only a small subset and implementation of the whole
topic of ML. However, this research seeks to assist organizations that utilize IDS devices on
their network. This research reviews different ML classification models using a series of
network intrusion datasets to identify which ML algorithms most effectively identify network
traffic anomalous activity. Additionally, this research develops a proof of concept of an IDS
and Python scripting pipeline that applies the previously trained ML models to unseen
network traffic for evaluation. The machine learning models selected for this research will
include Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest (RT), Ada Boost (AB),
Bagging Classifier (BC), Logistic Regression (LR), and Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD).
The datasets used to train and test each of these ML algorithms will include the KDD 99,
NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB 15, CICIDS 2017, and CIDDS-001 network traffic datasets.
Additionally, each model will be optimized for the following scoring methods: accuracy,
precision, and F1 score. These ML algorithms, network datasets, and scoring methods will be
further discussed later. Organizations can use this study’s results to implement highly
effective IDS pipelines by utilizing basic scripting with ML capabilities along with standard
IDS logging to enable strong automated network defenses against various threat actors and
attacks.
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Statement of the Problem
The problems addressed by this study are the inefficiencies of current IDS
configurations (Sopan et al., 2018). One of the biggest challenges for managing an IDS is
investigating false positive alerts. With a properly configured IDS, every alert from the
system should be thoroughly investigated by an analyst. When there is a false positive alert,
this causes an organization to waste valuable time and money on analysts investigating an
innocuous event; additionally, there is also a huge opportunity cost to this alert because it also
delays time-sensitive investigations on true positive alerts. IDS devices can be extremely
challenging to set up and maintain. When an IDS is configured for misuse detection, it can be
difficult for analysts to maintain an up-to-date database of signatures. Security analysts will
still need to monitor the network and manually enter IDS rules to refine further the
configurations to match any network changes. Additionally, when an IDS is configured for
anomaly detection, creating a baseline profile of regular traffic can take an excessive amount
of time. The typical anomaly detection engine only applies fundamental statistical analysis to
the data to identify deviations from the normal traffic profile. Even after tuning the IDS for
misuse detection or anomaly detection, security analysts will need to ensure that the IDS
ruleset is not too strict or too loose as either option will result in over-alerting or underalerting. Machine learning provides a solution to these IDS challenges as it can automate the
process of training, configuring, and maintaining an IDS device with a high level of
confidence for identifying anomalous traffic (Dangi et al., 2020).
An organization should better identify malicious network attacks by utilizing an
intelligent IDS with ML capabilities. An IDS with ML capabilities will still generate alerts for
security analysts to review. However, this system will correlate and identify minute anomalies
found in the network traffic at a much more in-depth level than any individual. This
implementation of ML techniques for IDS devices should maintain a high degree of
confidence for detecting legitimate threats or anomalies within the network. Additionally,
machine learning models for network intrusion detection observed in the literature have not
been adequately trained and tested against multiple datasets in a standardized and repeatable
test environment. Evaluating the machine learning models and datasets in these controlled
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experimental settings is extremely important to determine the most effective way to detect
malicious traffic. This research has the potential to impact any organization that utilizes IDS
devices to secure its networks. This study’s results can be used by organizations to identify
which ML classification models are the most effective at intrusion detection and then
implement an IDS device with ML capabilities to create a highly efficient detection engine.
This implementation within organizations will enable higher levels of anomaly and malware
detection across the network while requiring significantly less workforce to maintain the IDS
and investigate alerts. Additionally, this study’s results could affect the future development
and implementation of IDS devices or software worldwide. Developing a machine learning,
or intelligent, IDS that applies ML classification techniques for network intrusions will
significantly improve IDS alerts’ reliability and reduce the human resources necessary to
maintain proper IDS devices and rulesets within organizations. Over time and with proper
refinement, these types of intelligent IDS ML pipelines could potentially flag zero-day attacks
before vendors even publish signatures.

Objectives of the Project
This research compares multiple machine learning algorithms against a series of
datasets associated with network intrusion detection and different optimization methods to
determine which classification models are the most effective for detecting network attacks. In
addition to this goal, this research also created an IDS pipeline to apply the machine learning
techniques for intrusion detection on unseen network traffic. The first phase of this research
involved training multiple ML models by utilizing a series of machine learning algorithms,
multiple training datasets, and different optimization methods to evaluate each models’
different properties. The datasets used in this research are taken from multiple organizations
that have produced popular datasets and are used for academic papers and research within the
machine learning and network security communities. A common trend later seen in the
literature review of ML intrusion detection techniques is a lack of consistent experimentation
and critical analysis due to the researchers’ selection of ML models and the datasets. It is later
observed in the literature review that several researchers implement their custom ML
algorithm and training dataset to highlight their own techniques’ effectiveness. Using multiple
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datasets across a series of controlled and repeatable experiments that evaluate ML algorithms
and intrusion detection datasets provides a fair comparison to determine which IDS ML
implementation is the most effective.
This study includes each experiments’ results and analysis, which evaluate each ML
model’s selected metrics. Each experiment for the first phase involved developing a series of
ML models that combine different ML classification algorithms, networking datasets, and
scoring techniques. The results of these tests were collected and analyzed to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of each ML model. Additionally, this research investigated the
feasibility of applying trained ML models on unseen network traffic and flagging malicious
traffic. The research deliverables include an in-depth analysis comparing and contrasting the
ML models and results and applying them to new traffic. Several evaluation metrics are
discussed in the literature review. However, this research primarily focuses on accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1 score as evaluation metrics. This research aims to create a better
anomaly detection IDS that utilizes machine learning over statistical analysis. Additionally,
this study identifies which combination of ML classification algorithms, IDS training datasets,
and different optimization methods generate the highest performing ML models based on the
selected evaluation metrics. This research also showcases the need to utilize various
algorithms, datasets, and optimization methods during ML model development. Another goal
of this study was to validate the ML models from other researchers, as seen throughout the
literature review. Lastly, a major goal of this study was to test the theoretical ML models in an
applied environment to validate their theoretical accuracy for identifying malicious content on
previously unseen network traffic.

Nature of the Study
This research study compared multiple ML models to determine which combination
most effectively identifies anomalous or malicious network behavior to be implemented into
an applied IDS environment with ML augmentation. The ML algorithm experiments consist
of training an ML classification algorithm against a series of network intrusion detection
datasets and scoring methods. The ML classification algorithms selected for this research
include Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF), Ada Boost (AB),
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Bagging Classifier (BC), Logistic Regression (LR), and Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD).
Additionally, the datasets selected to train and test each of these ML models include the KDD
99, NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB 15, CICIDS 2017, and CIDDS-001 datasets. Lastly, the
optimization methods used for each of these models include accuracy, precision, and F1
score. These ML models, IDS datasets, and scoring techniques were selected based on the
research experiments, field surveys, and authors’ recommendations found in the Literature
Review section. These ML experiments were conducted through Python’s scikit-learn library
and utilized the same system resources within a virtual environment ("scikit-learn," 2020). A
significant priority for this research was to maintain consistent testing and resource utilization
between each experiment. This research seeks to achieve reliable and repeatable results where
others can utilize the same ML algorithms, datasets, and scoring techniques to generate the
same models. Once the ML models were generated and analyzed with a set of evaluation
metrics, the next step in this research was to apply the trained models in an IDS pipeline
environment to see if the models’ metrics hold up in an applied network environment filtering
previously unseen traffic. The IDS software selected for this research was Zeek, a popular
open-source IDS software ("zeek," 2020).
This study sought to achieve repeatability and consistency between each ML model
experiment. Additionally, this study strived to identify the most practical and efficient IDS
implementation that utilizes ML techniques for anomaly detection on network traffic. Several
researchers have conducted ML experiments to showcase the efficiency of their proposed
algorithm. Many of these research papers, seen later in the literature review, select a single
dataset, typically the KDD 99 or NSL-KDD dataset, and between one to five popular ML
algorithms to compare their results and highlight their newly proposed ML algorithm. There
have been several issues identified with the KDD 99 and NSL-KDD datasets despite being the
most popular datasets in this field of ML and network intrusion detection (Creech & Jiankun,
2013). The KDD 99 dataset was initially produced in 1999 as part of a data mining
competition and provided the community with an acceptable IDS training dataset. This dataset
is still used today as it provides several essential proofs of concept found in various
networking techniques and applications. However, despite its popularity, researchers have
found that the KDD 99 dataset contains several issues (Haider, 2017). Some of these issues
include redundant records that skew ML algorithms’ training, imbalanced attack categories
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and distribution, poorly defined attack categories and techniques, old and impractical network
traffic, and nonstandard or hybrid data that consists of flow-based network traffic that has
been manually enriched with payloads. The NSL-KDD dataset was built on the KDD 99
dataset. This updated dataset addressed some of these issues, but some of the core problems
persisted. Certain researchers have strongly encouraged others in this field to utilize multiple
network intrusion datasets, especially ones that have been recently produced, to evaluate ML
classification algorithms effectively (Ring et al., 2019). Over the past few years, numerous
organizations have produced robust datasets intended to be used for ML training and IDS
evaluation. The Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC), based out of the University of
New Brunswick (UNB) in Fredericton, has produced multiple IDS evaluation datasets
intended to be reliable ML test and validation datasets for academic research. CIC also
created the NSL-KDD dataset, which patched some of the significant issues with the dataset.
Additionally, in Germany, Coburg University has been producing and updating the Coburg
Intrusion Detection Data Sets (CIDDS) repository, which contains multiple ML datasets
designed for network intrusion detection research. The University of South Wales in Australia
produced an intrusion detection dataset in 2015 that was also well accepted by the ML and
network security communities. These datasets are all public and provide a highly needed
update for network intrusion datasets. The KDD 99 and NSL-KDD datasets are still
considered the most popular. However, the datasets produced by these schools and
organizations provide the academic community stronger datasets that contain well-balanced
and adequately distributed network attacks, modern network traffic and attacks, and properly
labeled data. Again, this research utilizes the KDD 99, NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB 15, CICIDS
2017, and CIDDS-001 datasets for consistent analysis between ML models. These datasets
provide an extensive and unique comparison between each tested ML model experiment since
each dataset consists of different data types (packet-based, flow-based, hybrid), network
traffic, and attack techniques. Ideally, this study’s results show other professionals in the ML
and network security communities the need to utilize multiple datasets as a standard best
practice for future ML IDS research and evaluations. There will never be a “perfect” intrusion
detection dataset that will always be the best dataset to train a particular model. Multiple
datasets should be used to compare and identify the ideal dataset for an ML algorithm. This
research finds multiple options to implement an IDS with ML capabilities. This study applies
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the trained ML models from the previous experiments to see if the same results are observed
in the detection models’ applied implementations. The following section’s Literature Review
reveals that many academic researchers only evaluate ML algorithms using a single dataset,
yielding purely proof of concept or theoretical detection results. Most researchers fail to apply
their ML models in a real-world scenario to validate the results they obtained. This research
sought to validate the theoretical results by implementing an ML IDS and comparing those
results with the previous ML experimental results.
While this research can benefit numerous industry organizations and academia’s
security development, this study also has several significant limitations. The largest limitation
of this research is that, while a primary goal is to maintain consistency between ML datasets,
each organizations’ network will consist of highly unique traffic. These variations of networks
mean that even though the testing and validation phases in this research may yield effective
detection results, that does not necessarily mean this type of IDS with ML capabilities can be
easily implemented into another network with different network traffic and maintain its
results without finetuning and training multiple ML models. Additionally, even if an
organization successfully implements an IDS with ML augmentation like this research,
security analysts will still be required. This type of ML IDS environment benefits from the
high confidence of automated IDS alerts and anomaly detection. This high confidence IDS
configuration means that organizations will not need to hire and maintain as many SOC
analysts. However, some analysts will still be required to investigate the alerts further, update
or modify the ML models, and check the IDS ruleset regularly. In theory, this should require
significantly fewer analysts, thereby saving organizations a substantial amount of manpower
and money on an automated IDS with ML capabilities. It should also be noted that this
research focuses on utilizing only supervised machine learning techniques that require labeled
datasets. That means that all other machine learning methods, including deep learning
techniques, a major field of research, are not incorporated into this particular research. There
are extensive research and funding in the subset field of deep learning; however, this is
excluded from this research due to the intense resource and time requirements to develop and
configure deep learning models properly.
This concludes the Introduction section of this paper, which reviewed the background,
goals, significance, and study implementation. This study evaluates the effectiveness of
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multiple ML models when trained using various ML algorithms, IDS datasets, and
optimization techniques. Additionally, this study identifies multiple ways to apply trained IDS
ML models. This research performs an in-depth quantitative analysis of ML models’
outcomes and performance across two primary research phases. This study highlights the need
for researchers to utilize multiple algorithms, datasets, and optimization methods during ML
model development. Additionally, this study’s results identify which combination of ML
algorithms, datasets, and scoring methods yields the best evaluation metrics in terms of
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score. Academic researchers and industry professionals can
use this research to implement highly effective and autonomous ML IDS environments that
utilize the most effective ML classification models to identify anomalies and threats on their
unique networks. The next section of this paper will provide a literature review for the
existing research conducted in network security and machine learning.

Terms and Definitions
•

Intrusion Detection System (IDS) – Device or software that monitors systems for
malicious activities and generates alerts if anomalous traffic is detected

•

Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) – Device or software that changes network or host
behavior or security rules if anomalous traffic is identified

•

IDS Ruleset – A series of IDS rules that are used for signature detection; each rule
contains a set of filter criteria to alert on certain observed traffic or behaviors

•

Misuse detection / Signature-based detection – IDS detection technique that requires
the utilization of an IDS ruleset database to alert based on strict rule criteria; usually
highly accurate, but suffers from successful zero-day attack detection

•

Anomaly detection / Behavior-based detection – IDS detection technique that requires
proper baselining of normal network traffic to identify anomalies, typical IDS engines
will utilize statistical standard deviation detection to identify anomalous behavior;
more capable of detecting zero-day attacks but suffers from inaccurate or low
detection
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•

Hybrid detection – utilizes both signature-based and behavior-based detection methods
to provide enhanced detection; both of these methods can be implemented at the same
time on the same IDS

•

Flow-based datasets – condensed packets that are grouped based on different header
field information or network protocols; no payloads are included in network flows

•

Packet-based datasets – entire IP packets that include full header information and
payloads

•

Hybrid/Other NID datasets – enriched network packet capture that contain both flowbased and packet-based data, typically requires manual alteration of the data

•

Machine learning (ML) – algorithms that can perform a task by producing a model
and inferring future data without the need for explicit instructions

•

Dataset features – unique properties or attributes belonging to a dataset; these unique
features can be identified and labeled for ML algorithms

•

Supervised learning – a type of ML algorithm that ingests fully labeled datasets

•

Unsupervised learning – a type of ML algorithm that can ingest unlabeled datasets

•

Semi-supervised learning – a type of ML algorithm that ingests partially labeled
datasets

•

Shallow learning – typical machine learning algorithms that only utilize a single layer
or round of analysis on ingested data; typically considered supervised learning that
utilizes labeled datasets

•

Deep learning – machine learning algorithms that perform a series of transformations
or analysis on ingested data across multiple layers or rounds; typically considered
unsupervised or semi-supervised learning that utilizes unlabeled or partially labeled
datasets

•

Training set – a subset of a full dataset used for training the ML models

•

Testing set – a subset of a full dataset dedicated for testing and validating the
previously produced ML models

•

Type I error = FP

•

Type II error = FN

•

Accuracy / Portion correct = 𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁

17
𝑇𝑃

•

Precision / Positive predictive value = 𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

•

Recall / Sensitivity / True positive rate / Probability of detection / Detection rate =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑁

•

Negative predictive value = 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁

•

Specificity / TN rate = 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

•

False alarm rate / False positive rate / Fall-out = 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

•

F1 Score = 2 (

𝑇𝑁

𝐹𝑃

𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙

𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙

)
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There have been significant developments in machine learning techniques for network
intrusion detection in recent years. Several researchers worldwide have conducted valuable
experiments and produced exciting papers that perform a critical analysis of their results.
There are several essential literature pieces to review in this research field to understand
modern machine learning capabilities and limitations. This section will review impactful
conference proceedings and articles in the fields of machine learning and network intrusion
detection.

Network Intrusion Detection Datasets
A dataset is required before the selection of any machine learning model. A machine
learning algorithm cannot do anything unless it has multiple datasets to train, validate, and
test the models. Every research paper covered in the upcoming subsection will utilize a
dataset to input into a particular machine learning algorithm. This subsection will cover the
most popular datasets used for training machine learning algorithms focused on network
intrusion detection. Over the years, there have been individual datasets have become more
prominent than others.
The paper titled “A survey of network-based intrusion detection data sets” provides an
extremely comprehensive literature review of 34 datasets used for ML algorithms and
network intrusion detection (Ring et al., 2019). The authors of this paper begin by introducing
network attacks and network intrusion detection systems. They then review a series of other
papers that have analyzed network intrusion detection datasets and highlight the need for a
more thorough review of available datasets. The authors then discuss the type of data that
makes up certain NID datasets. Packet-based data is commonly obtained in a packet capture
format and contains payloads and associated metadata depending on the protocols utilized.
Next, flow-based data is a more condensed format and primarily contains meta-information
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about network connections. Flow-based data aggregates packets that share certain properties
within a time window into an individual flow and does not contain payload information. The
authors categorize the last set of data as “other data,” which incorporates all datasets that are
neither purely packet-based nor flow-based. An example of these datasets may include flowbased data enriched with additional information from packet-based data or host-based log
files. The authors state that the well-known KDD CUP 1999 dataset falls under this “other”
data category because each data point contains both network-based attributes as well as
enriched host-based attributes. Next, the authors identify a set of properties to compare and
contrast datasets. Each of the 15 properties can be grouped into one of five categories. The
authors identified the following properties in datasets: general information (year of creation,
public availability, normal user behavior, and attack traffic), nature of data (metadata, format,
and anonymity), data volume (count and duration), recording environment (kind of traffic,
type of network, and complete network), and evaluation (predefined splits, balanced, and
labeled). The researchers describe each of the properties and then display a three-page long
table that displays 34 datasets associated with network intrusion detection and their 15
properties. They also have another large table in the paper that lists the 34 datasets and
information about whether they are labeled and the data format (packet, flow, or other). There
is another table that also lists all the datasets and describes the attacks contained within each.
Lastly, the authors list another figure that shows certain relationships between associated
datasets. After reviewing each dataset’s properties, the authors then move into the bulk of
their paper, which briefly describes each dataset. Next, they review each of the data sources
that may have generated certain datasets and different traffic generator programs that could
have also been used to generate synthetic traffic data in certain datasets. The researchers then
provide a series of observations and recommendations based on their comprehensive
comparative analysis of collected datasets. They state that the perfect dataset does not exist
and probably never will be created. Rather, they suggest researchers utilize multiple datasets
to prevent overfitting with a single particular dataset, reduce the influence of artificial artifacts
within a certain dataset, and evaluate the ML algorithm methods in a more general context.
They also recommend using CICIDS 2017, CIDDS-001, UGR’16, and UNSWNB15 datasets
as they may be suitable for evaluation settings due to their wide variety of attacks and data
formats. They also recommend for researchers to make use of predefined subsets. Many ML
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and data mining methods often use 10-fold cross-validation, which divides the dataset into ten
equal subsets. One subset is used for testing, and the other nine are used for training; this
procedure is repeated ten times such that every subset has been used once for testing. In an
IDS evaluation dataset, this splitting technique would cause each attack to appear in the
training data set, resulting in an improper generalization of attacks since they should detect
previously unseen threats. This paper’s researchers recommend creating meaningful training
and test splits to facilitate comparisons of different approaches evaluated on the same data set.
The authors also call for a closer collaboration of the security community to create and better
new intrusion detection datasets. The community could benefit from a single generally
accepted platform for sharing intrusion detection datasets without access restrictions. The
authors also state that all the mentioned datasets and repositories mentioned in this paper can
be found on the researchers’ websites and future datasets. Next, the researchers found that
most NIDS require standard input data formats and cannot handle preprocessed (enriched)
data, and it is unclear if datasets from the “other” datatype category can be calculated in realtime. They recommend the community generating network-based datasets in standard packetbased or flow-based formats as they can be captured in real network environments. However,
if researchers still produce “other” datatypes, the authors of this paper recommend publishing
both the network-based data in a standard format as well as the scripts for transforming the
dataset to another format. Lastly, the authors call for further anonymization of data within
datasets and the publication of all future datasets so that other parties can utilize and validate
them. This paper was one of the best sources for reviewing datasets associated with network
intrusion detection. The authors conducted an extensive and comprehensive survey of public
and private datasets and presented all 34 datasets in apparent formats for researchers to easily
pick and choose the datasets that will work best for their research.
In his 2000 publication, researcher and author McHugh conducts an extremely indepth analysis of the popular 1998 and 1999 DARPA datasets used for network intrusion
detection and identifies a series of flaws associated with them (McHugh, 2000). This
particular publication is the most referenced document by other authors and researchers in this
literature review. At the time, the most comprehensive evaluation of research on intrusion
detection systems was performed by MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory and sponsored by DARPA.
The author claims that while the research conducted contains many flaws, it was only a large-
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scale attempt at evaluating IDS devices at that time, and it provides a basis for comparing
other systems and datasets. This paper also primarily focuses on the 1998 evaluation and only
briefly discusses the 1999 evaluation. The author then reviews other similar evaluation and
dataset generation attempts conducted by other organizations and researchers. Next, he then
moves into the actual evaluation of the dataset. The background and the attack data within the
dataset were heavily synthesized. This generated data was intended to simulate data for
present and future traffic, and as a result, this may have caused a bias towards unrealistic
expectations for IDS devices. The data generated for the 1998 evaluation consists of two
parts, background data that is supposed to be regular noise traffic and attack data that is
intended to consist purely of attack scenarios. These two individual subsets of data were then
further discussed, and the author reviewed the impracticality of each of these sets of traffic
due to a large amount of synthesized data generation. He also mentions a severe lack of
validation of the experiments and observed traffic for both the background and attack
datasets. Much of the background and attack data were generated from scripts and programs
collected from several sources, and there was no attempt to distribute the synthetic attacks in
the background noise realistically. The simulated background data was supposed to represent
the network traffic found in a typical Air Force Base. However, Lincoln Labs’ information
seems to differ based on the observed hosts within the traffic. The author states that it is
unclear if the actual complexity of the network devices matters. He explains that the burden is
typically on the researchers conducting the experiments to prove that the artificial
environment did not affect the outcome by typically performing a controlled pilot study. The
Lincoln Lab evaluators never conducted this type of controlled validation study. The
experiment evaluators prepared datasets for training and testing. The training set consisted of
seven weeks of data covering 22 hours per day, five days per week. The author then reviews
the taxonomy of the attacks performed in this dataset, including denial of service, remote to
user, user to superuser, and surveillance/probing attacks. Additionally, these attacks were
further characterized by certain mechanisms used, including masquerading, abuse of a feature,
implementation bug, system misconfiguration, and social engineering. The author then
explains that this taxonomy describes the kinds of attacks that can be conducted on systems or
networks, but it is not useful in describing what an IDS might see. This attacker-centric
taxonomy creates a highly unrealistic evaluation bias. The author proposes alternative

22
taxonomies for future researchers where attacks could be classified at the protocol layer. This
type of approach will lead to a better understanding of what one must do to detect attacks on a
network. He also proposes another approach to classify attacks based on whether a completed
protocol handshake is necessary out the attack. This classification technique will separate
attacks into two distinct classes, one that may reveal a spoofed address or something that
requires the attacker to reveal an actual location on the internal network. The author discusses
how the Lincoln Lab evaluators’ attacker-centric taxonomy results in unclear attack scenarios
within the network. For example, a packet that causes a buffer overflow may not necessarily
be an intentional attack. Next, the author discusses the evaluation of the 1998 dataset. He
explains that the dataset consists of raw TCPdump data collected from a sniffer device within
the network. He also explains that this tool’s usage could also be problematic because it can
become overloaded and drop packets; however, this is not a major concern for this evaluation
because of the low data rates within this experiment. The Lincoln Lab team used a scoring
metric referred to as the Receiver Operating Curve or Relative Operating Characteristic
(ROC) method to present their results. The author explains this metric and states that it is
commonly used for measuring signal-to-noise and alarm detection. He also reviews and
critiques a series of other metrics used by the Lincoln Labs team to evaluate their
experiments. The author then briefly reviewed the 1999 evaluation dataset; however, he did
not go into much detail because the preliminary results were just released, and he did not have
time to review the data before this publication. He states that the scoring method for
constructing ROC curves, used for the 1998 and 1999 datasets, is inappropriate due to the
detection process used by many IDS devices. He also states that the scanning/probing
scenarios should not always be associated with attacks nor always labeled as intrusions. The
author concludes this paper by restating that the Lincoln Lab IDS evaluation program was a
major and impressive undertaking, but it still contained several experimental flaws, and the
results remain unclear. He states that several other researchers attribute their success to this
IDS evaluation publication, whereas other researchers believe this evaluation harmed their
research efforts. The 1999 and 1998 evaluations demonstrate that IDS devices, at the time, are
inferior at detecting new attacks. The author and an anonymous review state that DARPA
could have obtained the same results with much less effort and resources than what was
dedicated to this research. DARPA failed to obtain significant IDS results and breakthroughs
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with this research. However, the author hopes that this critique will lead to a rethinking of the
evaluation process and a recreation of its form to help DARPA reach its future IDS
development goals.
In the year 2000, researchers McHugh, Christie, and Allen publish a paper that
reviews IDS devices in-depth and includes an extensive discussion of why, how, and where
they are utilized in an enterprise organization (McHugh, Christie, & Allen, 2000).
Additionally, the authors discuss the two primary intrusion detection methods consisting of
signature-based and anomaly-based detection techniques. They review each technique’s pros
and cons and discuss how IDS tools can be configured to operate at the network-level or hostlevel. After this in-depth discussion of IDS devices, they then discuss organizations’ resources
to set up and configure these systems correctly and their role as part of an overarching
defense-in-depth strategy. The IDS lifecycle includes evaluation and selection, deployment,
operation and use, and maintenance. The authors then review popular IDS tools and review
intrusion detection experiments conducted by different organizations. The authors state that,
at the time, the most comprehensive evaluations of IDS devices were conducted in 1998 and
1999 and performed by MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. These IDS evaluation experiments were
funded by DARPA and had researchers utilize a packet capture of sniffed network traffic
containing simulated (virtualized) and physical machines that were launching attacks. The
attacks were divided into four categories: denial of service, remote to local, user to root, and
probing/surveillance. In the 1998 evaluation of select IDS devices, the best IDS could only
detect 75% of the attacks and generated multiple false alarms. The 1999 IDS evaluation
produced slightly better results for detection and false alarm rates for the tested devices. The
1998 and 1999 evaluations indicated that IDS devices, at the time, were only moderately
successful at identifying known intrusions or attack patterns and were much less successful at
identifying previously unseen attacks. The authors conclude this paper by stating that new
intrusion detection techniques and systems are being heavily researched, and they anticipate
positive improvements for IDS devices in terms of enhanced detection and false alarm
performance in the future.
In the paper titled “A Detailed Analysis of the KDD CUP 99 Data Set,” the authors
review one of the most popular datasets used for evaluating ML intrusion detection methods
(Tavallaee, Bagheri, Wei, & Ghorbani, 2009). This dataset is the most commonly selected
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dataset for testing, as seen throughout this literature review. The paper introduces the
KDDCUP’99 dataset and how other researchers have used it to develop and evaluate machine
learning methods to obtain a high detection rate while maintaining a low false alarm rate. The
authors of this paper identify two primary issues with this KDDCUP’99 dataset. The first
problem they identify is that the KDD dataset has many redundant records, which causes
learning algorithms to become biased towards more frequent records during the training
phase. Additionally, the authors identify another issue with the dataset: labeling the KDD
dataset records. They found that even when using straightforward machine learning methods,
there will be a minimum classification rate of 86% for properly labeling records meaning that
the comparison of IDS devices will always be between 86% and 100% when using this
dataset. The authors then propose a solution to the two identified problems. Developing a new
dataset made up of selected records from the KDDCUP’99 dataset; they call this new dataset
NSL-KDD. The authors then review the KDD dataset and discuss the type of content within
the dataset. The KDDCUP’99 dataset contains attacks that fall into the following categories:
Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks, User to Root (U2R) Attacks, Remote to Local (R2L)
Attacks, and Probing Attacks. DoS attacks are when an attacker disrupts or denies system
resources to legitimate users. U2R attacks are a form of privilege escalation where the
attacker starts as a regular user with standard permissions and can exploit a vulnerability to
gain root access on a device. R2L attacks occur when the attacker can send packets to a target
device and exploits the system to gain access. Lastly, probing attacks are a way to gather
information about a network or system. Additionally, the KDD dataset contains three primary
features: basic, traffic, and content features. Basic features incorporate all attributes that can
be extracted from a TCP/IP connection. Traffic features are time-based and are generated
within a certain window timeframe from a specific host or service, and content features are
individual events or unique fields that occur across the network or individual connection. The
authors explain some of the existing issues that remain in both the KDDCUP’99 and
DARPA’98 datasets, both of which are popular datasets for evaluating intrusion detection
techniques. The first issue they identify in the datasets is the amount of synthesized data,
which does not correctly reflect traffic observed in the real networks. The second issue is the
traffic collection tools used to collect these datasets can be overloaded and dropping packets,
and there was no work done to check the possibility of dropped packets. The third issue is the
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lack of exact definitions for the attacks performed in the network traffic. The authors then
review the two primary issues they want to address with their new dataset: redundant records
and the level of difficulty for classification. The authors provided a solution to these problems
by removing all the redundant records to remove the bias towards frequent records. They also
randomly sample records from each difficulty-level group, such as the selected records are
inversely proportional to the percentage of records in the original KDD dataset. This sampled
selection of records enables the classification rates of machine learning methods to vary in a
broader range and have a more accurate evaluation of learning techniques. This paper
provided the most comprehensive analysis and valuable commentary on the KDDCUP’99
dataset. The KDD’99 and NSL-KDD datasets proposed by these authors will be observed in
several upcoming experiments and research papers.

Machine Learning Research Surveys
The following publications consist of surveys or reviews that compare machine
learning techniques used for network intrusion detection. The authors of these surveys do not
conduct any experiments that produce results, but rather, they extract the results from several
other publications and analyze that data. Some of these surveys are more comprehensive than
others, but they do a great job showcasing the most popular machine learning techniques and
network intrusion detection datasets.
The research paper titled “A Survey of Data Mining and Machine Learning Methods
for Cyber Security Intrusion Detection” provides an extremely in-depth analysis of the
available machine learning models and datasets used for network intrusion detection (Buczak
& Guven, 2016). This comprehensive paper first reviews three main types of detection
analytics used by IDS devices: misuse-based (or signature-based), anomaly-based, and hybrid.
The researchers then introduce machine learning and data mining (DM) and how they relate
to the field of cybersecurity. They also discuss several processes for implementing machine
learning and data mining techniques. They identify certain metrics used to evaluate binary
classification models: accuracy or proportion correct [(TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)],
positive predictive value [TP / (TP + FP)], sensitivity or recall or true positive rate or
probability of detection or detection rate [TP / (TP + FN)], negative predictive value [TN /
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(TN + FN)], specificity or TN rate [TN / (TN + FP)], and FAR or FP rate or fall-out [FP / (TN
+ FP)]. The researchers also identify certain metrics used for multi-classification models:
overall accuracy (exemplars classified correctly, all exemplars), class detection rate
(exemplars from a given class classified correctly, all exemplars from a given class), and class
FAR or class FP rate (exemplars from a given class classified incorrectly, all exemplars not
from a given class). Next, the researchers briefly review the available cybersecurity datasets
used for ML; this includes packet-level data, NetFlow data, and public datasets. Packet-level
data includes the 144 Internet Protocols listed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
and incorporates all data across all OSI model layers stored within an individual packet.
NetFlow data was introduced by Cisco and contained compressed and preprocessed data of
actual network packets. The public dataset section mentions the DARPA 1998 and 1999
datasets, KDD 1999 dataset, and NSL-KDD dataset. MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory created the
DARPA 1998 and 1999 sets and contained a mixture of simulated and real network traffic,
systems, and attacks. The DARPA 1998 data were collected for nine weeks, the first seven
weeks assigned as the training set and the last two assigned as the testing set. The DARPA
1999 dataset was collected for five weeks, with the first three weeks assigned as the training
set and the last two assigned as the testing set. The KDD 1999 dataset was created for the
KDD Cup challenge in 1999 and is based on the DARPA 1998 dataset. The KDD 1999
dataset was found to have limitations, including synthesized network and attack data (due to
actual traffic sampling), an unknown number of dropped packets, vague attack definitions,
and a huge amount of redundant records. The NSL-KDD dataset builds off the KDD 1999
dataset and consists of selected records to address some of the issues identified. All three of
these datasets contain four types of attacks as defined by DARPA, denial of service (DoS),
user to root (U2R), remote to local (R2L), and probe or scan attacks. DoS attacks attempt to
deny or disrupt systems or resources, U2R attacks grant privileged access to an attacker, R2L
attacks grant local network access to an attacker, and scan attacks collect information about
the network resources. The next section of the paper reviews ML and DM methods used for
cybersecurity. The authors provide an extensive explanation of how the following methods
operate: artificial neural networks, association rules and fuzzy association rules, Bayesian
network, clustering, decision trees, ensemble learning, evolutionary computation, hidden
Markov models, inductive learning, Naïve Bayes, sequential pattern mining, and support
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vector machine. Within each of the descriptions for these ML methods, the authors also cite
two to three sources that utilize the technique for misuse, anomaly, and hybrid detection.
Artificial neural networks are composed of interconnected artificial neurons that are capable
of certain computations on their inputs. Each layer passes its output to the next layer.
Additionally, each layer performs a series of intrusions or computations on the input data such
that it is slightly transformed layer to layer. Association rules describe a relationship among
different attributes found among the data. Association rule mining attempts to discover
previously unknown associate rules from the input data. A Bayesian network is a
probabilistic, acyclic graphical model representing the variables and associated relationships
from input data. Clustering is a set of techniques for finding patterns in unlabeled data. This
method is considered unsupervised pattern discovery, where the input data are group together
based on a similarity measure. There are several different approaches and algorithms for
clustering input data, including connectivity models, distribution models, density models, and
graph models. A decision tree is a tree-like structure that has leaves and branches. The leaves
represent classifications, and the branches represent the conjunctions of features that lead to
those classifications. Data input is labeled (classified) by testing its feature (attribute) values
against the decision tree’s nodes. According to this author, the best-known methods for
automatically building decision trees are the ID3 and C4.5 algorithms. Ensemble learning
methods combine the output of multiple weak learner models to form a stronger learner.
There are several ensemble methods to develop and pick a strong learning output. Adaptive
boosting (AdaBoost), bagging (or bootstrap aggregating), and random forests are all ensemble
techniques that choose the best output developed from a series of weaker models.
Evolutionary computation encompasses genetic algorithms, genetic programming, evaluation
strategy, particle swarm optimization, ant colony optimization, and artificial immune systems.
Evolution computation builds models based on systems observed in nature. Genetic
algorithms and genetic programming algorithms are the two most widely used evolutionary
computation methods. These algorithms are based on the principle of survival of the fittest.
They operate on a population of individuals or chromosomes, which are evolved using certain
operators. Markov chains and hidden Markov models are within the same category. A Markov
chain is a set of states interconnected through transition probabilities that determine the
model’s topology. A hidden Markov model is a statistical model where the system is assumed
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to be a Markov process with unknown parameters, and the goal is to identify the hidden
parameters derived from the observable parameters. Inductive learning starts with specific
observations and measurements, begins detecting patterns and regularities, formulates a
tentative hypothesis to explore, and develops some general conclusions, theories, or models.
Several ML algorithms are inductive, but researchers typically refer to Repeated Incremental
Pruning to Product Error Reduction (RIPPER) and quasi-optimal (AQ) when discussing
inductive learning. Naïve Bayes classifiers are probabilistic classifiers where input features
are assumed to be independent, and the conditional probabilities form the classifier model.
This model assigns classification labels to the input data features. Sequential pattern mining is
a data mining method associated with transactional databases where each transaction has a
temporal ID, a user ID, and an itemset. An itemset is a set of distinct items purchased in a
transaction, and a sequence is an ordered list of itemset values. The length of a sequence is
defined as the number of itemset values within the sequence. Additionally, the time ID
determines the order. A sequence is considered maximal in sequences if it is not contained in
any other sequence. A support vector machine is a classifier based on separating a hyperplane
in the feature space between two classes so that the distance between the hyperplane and the
closest data points of each class is maximized. This technique is based on a minimized
classification risk rather than an optimal classification. After this discussion of ML
techniques, the author then analyzes and charts the collected sources to generate figures that
depict the ML method, listed paper/author, intrusion detection technique (misuse, anomaly, or
hybrid), and the dataset utilized by the researchers. The researchers for this research survey
did a wonderful job identifying the datasets and ML techniques available for network
intrusion detection. This published research is one of the most comprehensive papers that
categorizes and explains ML methods in addition to collecting, categorizing, and charting
numerous other research papers related to ML network intrusion detection.
In their 2018 paper, researchers Shashank and Balachandra collect and analyze various
research publications based on ML intrusion detection techniques (Shashank & Balachandra,
2018). They begin their paper by discussing types of machine learning algorithms and divide
them into supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and semi-supervised learning
techniques. They then discuss the exact ML algorithms selected for the research: Bayesian
network, SVM classifier, K nearest neighbor, Naïve Bayes, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithm,
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decision tree, random forest, and artificial neural network. They also briefly discuss a set of
optimization techniques used within neural networks, including particle swarm optimization,
backpropagation, and adaptive moment optimizer. The researchers then discuss three primary
intrusion detection datasets: KDD DataCup 1999, GureKDDcup, and NSL-KDD. They also
discuss the metrics they use to measure and evaluate ML techniques, including accuracy,
detection rate, and false alarms. The authors then present a table containing the ML methods,
authors who utilized the specified method in a published paper, the dataset selected, and the
ML method results. This paper’s authors could have conducted an additional analysis
comparing and contrasting the experiments and results between each of the ML methods
taken from author researchers’ published work.
Researchers Liu and Lang conduct a thorough review of modern machine learning and
deep learning models for intrusion detection while discussing their strengths and weaknesses
in their 2019 publication (Liu & Lang, 2019). The authors begin the paper by discussing IDS
devices and their limitations, such as high false alarm rates and inability to detect unknown
attacks. They then explain how machine and deep learning can provide a solution to these
problems. The researchers then develop a clear graphic that displays the components that
make up an IDS. This figure included different detection methods like anomaly detection and
misuse detection and also sources of data such as log-based detection for host-based IDS
devices and packet-based, flow-based, and session-based detection for network-based IDS
devices. The authors discuss the differences between misuse detection and anomaly detection.
They compared the detection performance, detection efficiency, dependence on domain
knowledge, interpretation, and unknown attack detection factors in their comparison.
Additionally, they review the differences between host-based IDS and network-based IDS by
discussing the source of data, deployment, detection efficiency, intrusion traceability, and
limitations. The authors then move on to the bulk of their survey, the machine learning
algorithms used for network intrusion detection. The researchers developed a well-made
graphic that reviews several models they discuss in the paper; this figure divided machine
learning models into two groups, shallow models and deep learning models, and then further
divided that by discussing supervised and unsupervised learning models. The authors create
another chart that reviews the pros and cons of several shallow models used for intrusion
detection; their table compared the algorithm, advantages, disadvantages, and improvement
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measures. They discussed shallow models, including artificial neural networks, support vector
machine, K nearest neighbor, Naïve Bayes, logistic regression, decision tree, and K-means.
The authors then further discuss each of these algorithms and how they operate. Next, they
compare various deep learning models, also presented in a chart. This figure included the
algorithm, suitable data types, supervised or unsupervised, and functions. The deep learning
models discussed in this section include autoencoder, restricted Boltzmann machine, deep
brief network, deep neural network, convolution neural network, recurrent neural network,
and generative adversarial network. The researchers also identify five major differences
between shallow and deep models; this includes the running time, number of parameters,
feature representation, learning capacity, and interpretability. Next, they identify a series of
metrics used to evaluate machine learning models; this includes accuracy, precision, recall, Fmeasure, false negative rate, and false positive rate. They then move on to briefly discuss the
datasets they found in their literature review for their survey. They review the DARPA 1998,
KDD99, NSL-KDD, and UNSW-NB15 datasets. Additionally, they discuss the traffic and
attacks within these datasets and how IDS devices can detect them, another major focus of
this survey paper. They start by discussing packet-based attack detection (consisting of packet
parsing-based detection and payload analysis-based detection), flow-based attack detection
(consisting of feature engineering-based detection, deep learning-based detection, and traffic
grouping-based detection), session-based attack detection (consisting of statistic-based feature
detection methods and sequence feature-based detection), and log-based attack detection
(consisting of rule and machine learning-based hybrid methods, log feature extraction-based
detection, and text analysis-based detection). They then display a large table that compares the
methods and papers on machine learning IDS devices; the categories in this table included the
methods, papers, data sources, machine learning algorithms, and datasets. The authors then
move on to discuss the challenges and future direction of machine learning-based IDS
devices. They state that there is a lack of available datasets (and there are several problems
with the KDD99 dataset, which is the most widespread), there is inferior detection accuracy in
actual environments, and there is low efficiency for implemented machine learning-based IDS
devices to detect attacks in real-time. Their reviewed papers identify three major IDS research
trends: utilizing domain knowledge, improving machine learning algorithms, and developing
practical models. This paper concludes by stating that deep learning models are becoming
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more popular in IDS research. Deep learning models can improve IDS devices’ performance
and, compared to shallow learning models, deep learning models generate stronger fitting and
generalization abilities. Additionally, deep learning algorithms do not require manual feature
engineering or domain knowledge, giving deep learning a huge advantage over shallow
learning methods. However, the authors also state that the biggest downside for deep learning
models is the required running time, which is often too long to meet the real-time requirement
of implemented IDS devices. This survey paper also did a fantastic job extensively reviewing
and charting several machine learning and deep learning techniques. The authors also did a
wonderful job reviewing the defensive detection methods employed by IDS devices to
identify attacks, which many other researchers do not discuss.
Researchers discuss popular machine learning techniques and available datasets for
network intrusion detection in the paper “A Review of Machine Learning Methodologies for
Network Intrusion Detection” (Phadke, Kulkarni, Bhawalkar, & Bhattad, 2019). The
researchers begin the paper by introducing the rise of cyberattacks and explain how networkbased and host-based IDS devices can be used to assist this problem. They then introduce ML
and then explain that algorithms can be classified into supervised learning, unsupervised
learning, or semi-supervised learning models. They then introduce several ML methodologies
that can be used for network intrusion detection. This section is the bulk of the paper where
the authors list out and explain the following algorithms: support vector machine, an unnamed
algorithm (proposed by another author that seems to build upon SVM), min-max k-means
clustering, intelligent intrusion detection system (also proposed by another author and makes
use of random forest and clustering techniques), artificial neural networks, and back
propagation neural network. They then briefly discuss the three datasets used by other
researchers, including the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, the UNSW-NB15 dataset, and the custommade dataset to showcase their ANN. This paper’s authors then compare each algorithm’s
accuracy and false positive rate and their selected dataset. The authors could have done a
much more thorough analysis of the extracted results and incorporated several other papers
and ML methodologies. It seems like the authors of this paper handpicked particular research
publications and did not cover a wide range of available ML algorithms or datasets used for
network intrusion detection.
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Machine Learning Research Experiments
This section reviews paper publications that focused on developing ML models
utilizing datasets for network intrusion detection. These papers’ researchers had designed
custom experiments, evaluation metrics, test results, and analysis. The experiments and results
from these publications should be repeatable and consistent. While each paper is unique,
specific ML algorithms, metrics, terms, and trends that appear across each of these
experiments were incorporated into this dissertation research.
In a 2013 paper, authors Thaseen and Kumar evaluate several different tree-based
classification algorithms using the NSL-KDD 99 dataset (Thaseen & Kumar, 2013). The
algorithms selected for the experiments include ADTree, C4.5, LADTree, NBTree,
RandomTree, RandomForest, and REPTree. The researchers also utilize a series of classifier
performance metrics, which include the following: true positives, false positives, true
negatives, false negatives, accuracy, precision, recall, and F-measures. Error metrics, such as
Mean Absolute Error, Root Mean Squared Error, and Kappa Statistics. The experiments’
results indicate that the RandomTree, RandomForest, and REPTree models achieved the most
effective accuracy scores.
Researchers for another publication, titled “Performance Comparison of Support
Vector Machine, Random Forest, and Extreme Learning Machine for Intrusion Detection,”
perform a comparative analysis between three types of machine learning methods using the
NSL-KDD dataset (Ahmad, Basheri, Iqbal, & Rahim, 2018). The researchers first discuss the
type of dataset that fits the needs of this research. They choose to use the NSL-KDD dataset,
perform data pre-processing, select a set of ML classifiers (SVM, RF, and ELM) for testing,
and then evaluate the results using specific metrics (accuracy, precision, and recall) and
dataset sample size (full NSL-KDD dataset, half dataset, or one-fourth dataset). The results
show that ELM (or hidden layer feedforward neural networks) outperform the other machine
learning techniques in every measured metric category (accuracy, precision, and recall) when
using the entire dataset.
Researchers Choudhury and Bhowal published a paper in 2015 where they conduct
several experiments by selecting various ML classification algorithms trained using the NSLKDD dataset (Choudhury & Bhowal, 2015). The paper begins by mentioning network-based
and host-based IDS devices along with their associated anomaly-based and signature-based
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detection classifiers. The authors then transition into data mining and machine learning by
discussing the WEKA tool and several ML classifiers (Bayes, function, lazy, meta, mi, misc,
rules, and trees classifier), classification algorithms (BayesNet, logistic, IBK, JRip, PART,
J48, random forest, random tree, and REPTree), and ensemble algorithms (AdaBoost,
bagging, and stacking). The authors conduct experiments on all the mentioned classification
algorithms and the ensemble algorithms using the NSL-KDD dataset and WEKA tool. They
also mention their performance metrics for this research, which includes true positive, false
negative, false positive, true negative, receiver operating characteristics (ROC), sensitivity,
specificity, precision, accuracy, kappa, mean absolute error, F1 score, false positive rate, false
discovery rate, negative predictive rate, and training time. The researchers then review their
classification tests and ensemble tests, which indicate that random forest, BayesNet, and
boosting algorithms are the most efficient for intrusion detection.
The researchers who published “Machine-Learning-Based Feature Selection
Techniques for Large-Scale Network Intrusion Detection” propose novel feature selection
techniques and compare their results against three other well-known ML feature sets using the
NSL-KDD dataset (Al-Jarrah et al., 2014). The authors start the paper by discussing ML
methods and the challenges of feature selection; they propose two custom ensemble methods
using the Random Forest algorithm and compare their technique with other well-known ML
techniques. They also introduce the idea of big data IDS environments and their associated
challenges: large volumes of IDS data require efficient data storage methods, big data flows at
high velocity, which requires expensive storage and processing systems, and big data has
various types of structures and different sources. The researchers then explain their ensemble
algorithm using Random Forest and discuss the experiments conducted for this research. They
start by discussing the KDD 99 dataset explain why they chose the NSL-KDD dataset. The
authors pre-process the dataset by removing redundant records and then enumerating,
normalizing, discretizing, and balancing them. They then discuss feature selection and state its
significant impact on intrusion detection system performance since it reduces computation
costs, removed data redundancy, increases the detection algorithm’s accuracy, facilitates data
understanding, and improves generalization. The standard feature selection process includes
subset generation, evaluation, and validation. Different feature selection models are also
categorized into three groups based on the evaluation criteria: filter model, wrapper model,
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and hybrid model. The authors then discuss their ML model selection and explain that
ensemble classifiers combine multiple models to generate a single model with better
prediction accuracy. They state that several popular ML classifier algorithms can be used for
an ensemble classifier, but they selected Random Forest (RF) for their research. They also
discuss their evaluation metrics for their experiments, including detection rate or sensitivity,
accuracy, training time, Mathew’s correction coefficient, and false alarm rate. The researchers
then review their conducted experiments using their Random Forest – Forward Selection
Ranking and Random Forest – Backward Elimination Ranking ensemble models and compare
their results to other researchers’ ensemble classifier results.
Researchers conduct a comparative analysis of five ML algorithms while using the
KDD Cup 99 dataset in the paper “Intrusion Detection in Computer Networks via Machine
Learning Algorithms” (Ertam, Kilinçer, & Yaman, 2017). The authors briefly introduce IDS
devices and five ML algorithms selected for this research, including Naïve Bayes, Bayes
NET, random forest, multilayer perception, and sequential minimal optimization. The authors
never explain how each of their selected ML classifiers operates. They then introduce the
KDD Cup 99 dataset and state how other researchers have used it in their experiments. They
also discuss the four attack categories and distribution within the dataset. Next, the authors
discuss their evaluation metrics for this study: true positive, false positive, false negative, true
negative, false positive rate, precision, recall, f-measure, and accuracy. They also state the
physical machine resources used to perform their experiments and their usage of the WEKA
data mining tool to classify the data. The authors then display and discuss their results. Each
experiment was broken up by the attack class category and the ML classifier algorithm based
on the tables. The results were highly distributed across each selected ML algorithm and
attack category.
In 2018, researchers Maniriho and Ahmad published a paper where they compared the
results of four ML classification algorithms used in conjunction with two different feature
selection techniques while utilizing the NSL-KDD dataset (Maniriho & Ahmad, 2018). The
paper begins by introducing the topics of network IDS devices and machine learning
techniques. The authors also briefly discuss the NSL-KDD dataset and why it was used for
these experiments. They also state that they selected four ML algorithms that were a part of
the WEKA data mining tool. The four ML algorithms selected for this research are random
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forest, decision stump, Naïve Bayes, and stochastic gradient descent combined with two
different feature selection techniques (correlation ranking filter and gain ratio feature
evaluator). This research’s performance evaluation metrics include accuracy, detection error,
true positive rate, true negative rate, precision, recall, and f-measure. The experiments
showcase the dramatically varying results between each ML algorithm and feature selection
test.
In the 2011 paper, researcher Yu-Xin conducts tests on three ML algorithms utilizing
the KDD Cup 1999 dataset and WEKA data mining tool (Yu-Xin, 2011). The author
introduces NIDS and their two primary classification categories of misuse detection and
anomaly detection. The author then discusses how ML can assist network intrusion detection
categorization and introduces the three ML techniques selected for their research experiments,
including neural networks, support vector machines, and decision trees. The KDD 1999
dataset is selected for this research because it showcases the purpose of this research on
network intrusion detection and machine learning. This research also introduces feature
selection and reviews three attribute evaluation methods and four search methods
implemented in the experiments. The evaluation methods are: CfsSubsetEval,
InfoGainAttributeEval, and GainRatioAttributeEval; the search methods include: BestFirst,
GreedyStepwise, Ranker, and GeneticSearch. Next, the author reviews the exact setup for
each experiment and explains that the RBF network is used as the neural network algorithm,
SMO is used as the SVM algorithm, and J48 is used as the decision tree algorithm. Each of
these selected algorithms is used in conjunction with selected feature selection evaluation
methods and search methods. The author then reviews these tests’ results and explains how
these ML classifiers and feature selection techniques showcase ML schemes’ challenges in
intrusion detection. The key challenges identified are fluctuant capability, false alarm rate,
and difficulties in training. The results between each experiment vary or fluctuate
dramatically based on the selected ML algorithm and feature selection technique and, because
of these variations, the false alarm rate results are also affected. Training ML models is also a
challenge because more precise detection results require larger training datasets. However,
proper ML training becomes hard to achieve because the required training datasets will need
to be so enormous that they require too many system resources to store and process. The
author admits that their tests only include a small amount of ML algorithms and feature
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selection techniques, but they wanted to showcase certain key challenges found in other ML
intrusion detection environments and research.
The research paper “Machine Learning Algorithms In Context of Intrusion Detection”
selects four supervised ML algorithms to detect anomalies found in the KDD99 dataset
(Mehmood & Rais, 2016). The authors begin the paper by introducing host-based and
network-based intrusion detection along with the two primary intrusion detection
classifications of signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection. They then introduce
ML and explain how it can assist the classification process of network intrusion detection.
This research’s four ML algorithms are support vector machine, Naïve Bayes, J.48 (decision
tree), and decision table. The researchers select the KDD99 dataset to compare their four ML
classification algorithms. They briefly mention the KDD99 attack classes: root to local, denial
of service, probe, user to root, and normal. They also explain that they utilize the WEKA data
mining tool to implement their selected ML algorithms and compare the true positive and
false positive rate values as evaluation metrics between tests. The results indicate that each
ML algorithm had varying results for each KDD 99 dataset’s attack classes. The researchers
state that feature selection algorithms will help generate better results for future work.
Researchers Rahat and Ahsan conduct a comparative study of five ML classifier
algorithms using the KDDCUP ‘99 dataset to analyze classification metrics in their 2015
paper (Rahat & Ahsan, 2015). The paper starts by introducing the topic of network intrusion
detection and how machine learning techniques can assist with this challenge. The authors
review a series of publications that discuss different ML classification techniques used for
network intrusion detection. They also mention class imbalance and feature selection as
challenging issues found within ML algorithms. Class imbalance is caused when there is an
unequal sample distribution within datasets. The authors review other researchers’ work and
how they went about trying to resolve the challenges of class imbalance and feature selection.
After this literature review, the authors discuss their performance metrics for this research,
including true positive, true negative, false positive, false negative, accuracy, precision, and
recall. They also briefly discuss the KDD’99 dataset, which contains 23 labels for different
attack types and 41 labeled features to detect network intrusions. Next, the researchers discuss
the methodology for their experiments. They first discuss two data sample methods that are
used to remove the class imbalance in the dataset. The researchers then perform feature set
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reduction to find the minimum number of features that can effectively represent the data in a
classification problem. They utilize five ranking methods in conjunction with ranker search to
reduce the feature set. The ranking methods they use are PCA, information gain, gain ratio,
chi square, and filtered attribute. Lastly, they discuss the five ML classifiers used for their
experiments, including J48 (decision tree), Naïve Bayes, AdaBoost, bagging, and nearest
neighbor. Lastly, they note the four different experiment scenarios where they mix and match
the process of data sampling, feature selection, and ML classifiers. Scenario 1 only uses the
classifiers that are applied, scenario 2 performs feature reduction followed by applied
classifiers, scenario 3 performs feature reduction followed by data sampling and then
classifiers, and scenario 4 performs data sampling followed by applied classifiers. The
researchers then display and discuss their experiments, which were highly variable based on
each selected scenario, ML classifier, and evaluation metric.
In the paper titled “Class Imbalance Problem in the Network Intrusion Detection
Systems,” researchers compare four ML classification algorithms and use the NSL-KDD
dataset to showcase the class imbalance problem found within the popular dataset (Rodda &
Erothi, 2016). The authors briefly introduce IDS devices and explain that ML techniques can
assist with classification. Several research publications and ML techniques have been
developed to create an effective intrusion detection system; however, there is a class
imbalance problem found in the most popular datasets. The class imbalance problem occurs
when the size of a specific class or category within a particular dataset is too small or too
large and thereby not adequately represented. They conduct a very brief literature review that
discusses ML research and experiments conducted on the NSL-KDD or KDD 99 datasets
performed by other researchers. The researchers explain why they selected the NSL-KDD
dataset and discuss the attack categories and their distribution. The authors then immediately
discuss their results without explaining how they set up each experiment or their evaluation
metrics. The ML algorithms evaluated for this research included Naïve Bayes, Bayes Net,
J48, and Random Forest. The results and analysis section indicate that the authors only really
compared the accuracy metric between each experiment. These results still showcase their
primary argument that the class imbalance problem because all of the ML classification
algorithms seemed to fail on the user to root attacks due to the minimal amount of U2R traffic
found within the NSL-KDD dataset.
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CHAPTER 3
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section reviews the selected research methodology and design for this study. This
research performed a quantitative research study, which consisted of two primary phases. The
first phase involved developing machine learning models based on machine learning
classification algorithms and intrusion detection datasets. The second phase then attempted to
implement an ML IDS pipeline environment by applying the ML detection models from the
first phase to unseen network traffic fed through Zeek IDS software. The results gathered
from the second phase tests were then compared against the first phase results to determine if
the ML models operated differently between the theoretical and applied environments. Both
phases incorporated quantitative research methodologies, results, and analysis.

Purpose Statement
One purpose of this research was to showcase the need to utilize multiple intrusion
detection datasets. The large majority of researchers only selected a single dataset for
developing their ML models, typically incorporating the KDD 99 or NSL-KDD datasets.
Additionally, this research sought to help identify which ML classification algorithms are the
most effective at network intrusion detection in applied environments. This research study
implements an IDS ML pipeline that augments IDS logs with trained ML models to validate
the theoretical best ML algorithms, datasets, and optimization methods. This research benefits
both academic researchers as well as industry security professionals. As seen in the previous
Literature Review section, many academic researchers fail to train their ML algorithms using
multiple datasets. Numerous public datasets are associated with network intrusion detection,
each of which is unique and comes with associated pros and cons. Due to the wide variety of
intrusion detection datasets, it is best practice to train and evaluate ML algorithms using
multiple datasets (Ring et al., 2019). This research achieves and verifies this best practice by
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conducting numerous research experiments that train multiple ML algorithms using multiple
datasets.
Additionally, as seen in the previous Literature Review section, most ML researchers
never design or explain practical implementations to validate their models in a real-world
environment. This research implements a live IDS ML pipeline and then compares each ML
model’s evaluation metric results in both the theoretical and implemented environments.
Additionally, this research documents the creation of an IDS with ML classification
capabilities. This research could greatly benefit security professionals because they can use
this as a guide to set up a highly effective IDS ML environment. There are very few guides or
papers online that document the process of configuring the IDS anomaly detection engine
utilizing ML techniques. An IDS with ML capabilities should incorporate anomaly detection
and standard signature detection using a single application for enhanced detection.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1
How does the selection of a single network intrusion dataset impact machine learning models’
outcomes and performance when trained using multiple machine learning algorithms and
optimization methods?

Hypothesis 1
Not all machine learning models will achieve high accuracy when trained using any network
intrusion dataset.

Research Question 2
How does the selection of a single machine learning algorithm impact machine learning
models’ outcomes and performance when trained using multiple network intrusion datasets
and optimization methods?
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Hypothesis 2
Not all machine learning models will achieve high accuracy when trained using any machine
learning algorithm.

Research Question 3
How does the selection of a single optimization method impact machine learning models’
outcomes and performance when trained using multiple network intrusion datasets and
machine learning algorithms?

Hypothesis 3
Not all machine learning models will achieve high respective performance metrics when
trained using any optimization method.

Research Question 4
How does the performance of theoretical machine learning models change when tested in an
applied environment?

Hypothesis 4
The accuracy of theoretical machine learning models will perform significantly worse in an
applied environment.

Quantitative Method – Experimental Study Design
Design
This study was divided into two quantitative research phases. The first phase focused
on testing and quantitatively evaluating each of the selected ML algorithms, network intrusion
datasets, and optimization methods by producing a series of models. The machine learning
algorithms selected for this research include Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Tree (DT), Random
Forest (RF), Ada Boost (AB), Bagging Classifier (BC), Logistic Regression (LR), and
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Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). All of these algorithms are considered supervised
learning algorithms, which means they require fully labeled datasets.
These ML algorithms were identified and selected due to a few reasons. One part of
their selection was due to their popularity throughout the literature review. Individual
algorithms and entire algorithm categories were tallied during the literature review, and these
particular algorithms were selected due to their regular appearances throughout the research.
Additionally, these algorithms were selected based on their availability within the Python
scikit-learn library. The scikit-learn library is a publicly available Python module that contains
a wide variety of machine learning models and functions (Garreta, Moncecchi, Hauck, &
Hackeling, 2017). Lastly, the resource requirements and speed at which the algorithms
generate their models were considered factors. These algorithms’ speed and resource
requirements were major considerations due to the number of tests conducted for this study.
Certain algorithms were removed from this research if they took longer than three days to
produce a single model.
The Naïve Bayes (NB) algorithm belongs to its own Naïve Bayes category and is a
probabilistic classifier that applies Bayes’ theorem between features (Tsai, Hsu, Lin, & Lin,
2009). This classifier assumes strong or naïve independence between data features and
calculates conditional probabilities for different classes, then used to label the data.

Figure 1: Naïve Bayes Algorithm Example
The Classification and Regression Trees (CART) algorithm falls under the decision tree
category and develops tree-like structures where the leaves represent classifications and
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branches represent conjunctions of features that lead to classifications (Tsai et al., 2009). This
algorithm is unique to scikit-learn as it is a type of decision tree algorithm based on the popular
C4.5 decision tree algorithm with very slight alterations.

Figure 2: Classification and Regression Trees Algorithm Example
The Random Forest (RF) algorithm belongs to the ensemble learning category
(Aburomman & Reaz, 2017). Ensemble learning constructs several models and then selects the
best model based on majority or weighted voting. This algorithm combines decision trees and
ensemble learning to produce several decision trees that use randomly selected data features or
attributes as their input, such that a forest is generated with trees with controlled variance.

Figure 3: Random Forest Algorithm Example
Adaptive Boosting, or AdaBoost (AB), is another type of machine learning algorithm
that falls under ensemble learning (Aburomman & Reaz, 2017). Boosting is a form of
machine learning ensemble algorithm where models are sequentially added, and later models
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in this sequence can correct the predictions made by earlier models. The AdaBoost algorithm
is considered adaptive because it combines, or adapts, multiple weak classifiers into a single
strong classifier while boosting the sequence of models. As a result, this algorithm is
considered quite sensitive to noisy data and outliers. Additionally, this ensemble learning
technique makes the algorithm less susceptible to overfitting algorithms since it reduces
variance.

Figure 4: Adaptive Boosting Algorithm Example
Bagging Classifier (BC) is another machine learning algorithm that belongs to the
ensemble learning category (Aburomman & Reaz, 2017). Bagging, also known as bootstrap
aggregating, is another type of machine learning ensemble algorithm that generates subsets of
the original dataset through sampling. Bagging Classifier fits base classifiers (such as
Decision Tree) on random subsets of the original dataset and then aggregates their
predictions, by voting or averaging, to create a final model and prediction. Similar to the other
ensemble learning methods, this ensemble technique reduces variance and thereby helps avoid
overfitting.
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Figure 5: Bagging Classifier Algorithm Example
The Logistic Regression (LR) algorithm is a well-known algorithm in machine
learning and falls under the linear regression category (Yihunie, Abdelfattah, & Regmi,
2019). Logistic regression applies a statistical model that uses the logistic function to model
binary dependent variables. After ingesting data, this algorithm calculates a particular
threshold coefficient to make classifications and predictions thereby.

Figure 6: Logistic Regression Algorithm Example
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) is another form of linear regression. This
algorithm may also be known as a stochastic approximation of gradient descent optimization
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(Yihunie et al., 2019). Gradient descent optimization is an iterative optimization algorithm
used for identifying the local minimum, or lowest point, on a function by taking repeated
steps in the opposite direction of the gradient. The term “stochastic” is another word for
“random.” As a result, SGD applies randomness in the gradient descent algorithm by selecting
a single random data point out of the whole dataset for each iteration of gradient descent
optimization. This random selection of data points dramatically reduces the necessary
computation.

Figure 7: Stochastic Gradient Descent Algorithm Example
Numerous machine learning algorithms were tested and discarded while investigating
a variety of algorithms for this research. In addition to the algorithms officially selected, the
following algorithms were tested and removed from this study: Bayesian Network, K-Nearest
Neighbor, Support Vector Machine (Linear, Radial Basis Function, and Sigmoid), Ridge
Classifier, One-Class SVM, Isolation Forest, and Local Outlier Factor. These algorithms were
considered and tested due to their popularity and success seen throughout the literature
review. The Bayesian Network algorithm was removed due to its absence within the scikitlearn library, whereas all the other listed algorithms were discarded due to their intense
resource and time requirements. Many of these algorithms are extremely sensitive to feature
input, and each new feature exponentially increases the amount of time to develop a model
(Lee, 2019). These algorithms may have had difficulties ingesting the datasets due to their
immense size, especially when considering the high number of labeled features and the total
number of packets. If any of these algorithms took longer than three days to generate a single
model in the online virtual environment, they were discarded. Many of these algorithms may
have produced a highly successful machine learning model after several days of development.
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However, it was decided to remove these intense algorithms due to the high number of
models required for this research. Using a single selected algorithm, 15 models (one
algorithm, five datasets, and three optimization methods) would need to be developed to be
adequately analyzed for this study. This considerable time and resource requirement for
developing these particular models did not fit this study’s proposed timeline.
Towards the end of investigating machine learning algorithms to include in this
research, a focus on the inclusion of novelty and outlier detection algorithm categories was
heavily considered. These two machine learning categories were considered due to their
extreme outlier sensitivity and success with anomaly detection ("scikit-learn," 2020). The
outlier detection category operates by identifying regions within the dataset observed as far or
different from other regions. The algorithms that fall under this outlier detection category
include Isolation Forest, Local Outlier Factor, and One-Class SVM. All of these algorithms
were tested for this study. However, they were all dropped due to their high resource and time
requirements. The outlier detection estimators fit the regions where the data is most
concentrated, thereby ignoring deviant observations. The category of novelty detection
operates by treating none of the training data as outliers and determining if new observations
are considered an outlier, or rather, a novelty. The One-Class SVM and Local Outlier Factor
algorithms could be configured to operate under this category of novelty detection but still
belong under the outlier detection category. Again, both these algorithms were tested and
dropped due to their requirements; they took longer than three days to develop a single model.
With more time and more robust computational resources, these algorithms may have
generated the most effective anomaly detection models for this study.
The datasets used to train and test each of these ML algorithms include the KDD 99,
NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB 15, CICIDS 2017, and CIDDS-001 datasets. The KDD 99 and NSLKDD datasets were selected because of their popularity in the literature review. Nearly all of
the literature utilized at least one of these datasets. The UNSW-NB 15, CICIDS 2017, and
CIDDS-001 datasets were selected at the recommendation of a comprehensive intrusion
detection datasets survey paper where the authors suggested these particular datasets due to
their wide variety of attack categories and network traffic composition (Ring et al., 2019).
Each experiment in this first phase of research applied a combination of machine learning
models, network intrusion datasets, and optimization methods.
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The KDD 99 dataset was created as part of the International Knowledge Discovery
and Data Mining Competition (KDD) Cup in 1999. This dataset was based on the DARPA
1998 dataset, produced by MIT’s Lincoln Labs. This dataset is the most popular dataset for
network intrusion detection despite its several flaws previously discussed in the literature
review (Creech & Jiankun, 2013). The NSL-KDD dataset was created at the University of
New Brunswick in Fredericton, Canada, in 2009. This dataset essentially updated the KDD 99
dataset by purging many redundant records and improperly distributed attacks (Tavallaee et
al., 2009). The UNSW-NB15 dataset was produced at the University of New South Wales in
Sydney, Australia, in 2015. The CICIDS2017 dataset was also produced at the University of
New Brunswick, Fredericton, Canada, in 2017. This university is partnered with the Canada
Institute for Cybersecurity. The CIDDS-001 dataset was developed at the Coburg University
of Applied Sciences in Coburg, Germany, in 2017. Each of these datasets is fully labeled,
meaning that they can operate with supervised learning algorithms properly. These datasets
provide various data format types (packet-based, flow-based, hybrid/other), metadata, size,
attack scenarios, and features. A comparison of these selected datasets can be found in Tables
1 and 2. These tables were taken and modified from the previously referenced academic
research survey of available network intrusion datasets (Ring et al., 2019).
The second phase of research focused on modifying the Zeek anomaly detection
engine to enable ML classifications of network traffic ("zeek," 2020). This second phase
aimed to apply the ML models initially trained and tested in the first phase to a real-world
application of an IDS with ML capabilities. The implemented IDS ML pipeline results were
quantitatively analyzed and compared to the previous phase results to determine if there was a
difference in evaluation metrics between conceptual and applied environments.

49

General Information
Dataset
KDD 99
NSL-KDD
UNSW-NB15
CICIDS2017
CIDDS-001

Year Created
1998
1998 (2009)
2015
2017
2017

Public
Availability
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Nature of the Data

Normal
Traffic
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Attack
Traffic
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Metadata
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Format
Hybrid/other
Hybrid/other
Packet, Hybrid/other
Packet, Flow (bi)
Flow (uni.)

Anonymity
None
None
None
Yes (IPs)
None

Table 1: Dataset Comparison – General Information and Nature of the Data

Data Volume

Dataset
KDD 99
NSL-KDD
UNSW-NB15
CICIDS2017
CIDDS-001

Count
5M points
150K points
2M points
3.1M flows
32M flows

Duration
Not specified
Not specified
31 hours
5 days
28 days

Recording Environment

Kind of Traffic
Emulated
Emulated
Emulated
Emulated
Emulated and real

Type of Network
Small enterprise
Small enterprise
Small enterprise
Small enterprise
Small enterprise

Table 2: Dataset Comparison – Data Volume, Recording Environment, and Evaluation

Evaluation
Complete
Network
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Predefined
Splits
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

Balanced
No
No
No
No
No

Labeled
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Instruments and Tools
The first phase of this study was conducted using five cloned Ubuntu 20.04 virtual
machines (VMs) in the DSU Information Assurance (IA) Lab, an online virtual environment.
Each VM utilized 24 cores with a 2.30 GHz processing speed, 100 GB of RAM, and 500 GB
of hard disk space. These five VMs were labeled after the five datasets selected for this
research. This study utilized several free and open-source tools. Ubuntu was selected as the
underlying operating system on each VM due to its lightweight and open-source availability
("Ubuntu," 2021). Additionally, Ubuntu comes with a series of preinstalled tools that were
used for this research. One primary tool requirement necessary for this study was Python
version 3. Python is a very well documented and popular high-level scripting language with a
large community of supporters ("Python," 2021). This study also used the Anaconda suite, a
free platform-agnostic package, and environment manager ("Anaconda," 2021). The
Anaconda suite provided access to the Scientific Python Development Environment, or
Spyder Integrated Development Environment (IDE). Spyder is a free and open-source IDE
specializing in advanced data analytics and debugging ("Spyder," 2020). Anaconda was
utilized as a simple package manager for updating tools and libraries, including Python,
Spyder, and scikit-learn. The scikit-learn module can be imported into Python and contains
various machine learning capabilities and analytics ("scikit-learn," 2020). Scikit-learn
successfully trained, tested, and evaluated each of the ML models in this research. Each of the
previously mentioned datasets was downloaded from the developer organizations’ website for
free and were successfully ingested within the Python environment and scikit-learn functions.
Additionally, scikit-learn provides standardized measuring techniques for evaluating the
results of each ML experiment. The evaluation metrics analyzed between each ML
experiment included accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score. Additionally, it should be noted
that during the development of the Python scripts for this research, several different online
resources were utilized. Numerous technical books were referenced during code development
through the use of the O’Reilly Online Learning library, which was previously known as
Safari Books Online ("O’Reilly," 2021). The second phase of this study was conducted using
the same set of online VMs. One of the five online VMs had Zeek installed, which acted as
the open-source IDS for this research. The prediction dataset and associated raw PCAPs
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selected for the second phase of research were fed into this Zeek IDS to produce standardized
Zeek connection logs of the ingested traffic ("zeek," 2020). The Wireshark tool called
mergecap was also utilized in the second phase of research and combined multiple raw
PCAPs into a single PCAP format for Zeek ingestion ("mergecap," 2021).
Some alternative tools were considered to be used in conjunction with or possibly
replace previously mentioned tools. Some other online virtual environments that were
considered include Amazon Web Services (AWS), Google Cloud Platform (GCP), or Digital
Ocean (DO). It should also be noted that VMware Workstation was a considered tool for this
research as it would allow for virtualization on a host desktop; however, it was not utilized
due to the intense resource requirements and the high number of experiments for this research
study. Additionally, the previously mentioned open-source IDS software, Zeek (previously
known as Bro), was just one open-source IDS option; Suricata or Snort was also considered.
A handful of other ML algorithms, intrusion detection datasets, or evaluation metrics were
removed or replaced while conducting this research.

Procedures
The first phase of this study involved developing a Python script that imports the
scikit-learn module and associated datasets to produce a series of ML models. The Python
script was configured to optimize and create a series of models based on the combination of
ML models, network datasets, and scoring methods. Additionally, this Phase One script
would first optimize each model to tune each of them to the highest associated metric score
based on the selected optimization method. This Phase One script was distributed to each of
the five VMs in the DSU Information Assurance (IA) Lab virtual environment. This first
phase trained 105 models based on seven ML algorithms, five datasets, and three scoring
methods. Each of these models, or experiments, utilized parameter optimization for each
algorithm to then develop fully trained and optimized models. The selected evaluation metrics
were used to compare each model effectively and consistently. A series of data
transformations are applied to each of the imported datasets. The steps involved in conducting
these transformations include label extraction and grouping, feature mapping and dropping,
feature encoding and standardization, feature scaling and normalization, subset creation, and
feature reduction. Additionally, a complete walkthrough of the Phase One Python script is
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included in a later subsection. Essentially though, this phase’s goal was to develop a series of
highly optimized models that yield high evaluation metrics.
The second phase of this research involved applying the previously trained models to
filter through unseen network traffic and identify malicious behavior. This process involved
taking the raw PCAPs of the CICIDS 2017 dataset and feeding them through the Zeek IDS to
produce connection logs. This PCAP merging and Zeek ingestion were performed using just
one of the five available online VMs. These Zeek connection logs and the previously trained
models were then fed into a new Python script that applied the models and yielded each
model’s detection output. The Phase Two Python script was downloaded and executed on
each online VM, and the Zeek connection log output was generated from the raw PCAPs of
CICIDS 2017. This entire process could be considered an IDS ML pipeline environment with
additional scripts that push the necessary data between each script continuously. Below is a
diagram that shows the overall procedures and flow of data between each phase of this
research.

53

Figure 8: Phase One and Phase Two Python Scripts – Flowchart

Data Analysis and Interpretation of Results
The first phase of quantitative research produced a series of trained ML models with
associated evaluation metrics. The evaluation metrics included in Phase One include
accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, and training time. These metrics were included due to
their appearance throughout the literature review and their availability within the scikit-learn
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library. Accuracy measures the fraction of correct predictions (true positives and false
positives) out of the total results (true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false
negatives). Precision measures the amount of true positive results over the actual results (true
positives and false negatives), whereas recall measures the amount of true positive results
over the model’s predicted results (true positive and false negative). Perfect precision
corresponds to no false positives (Type I errors); meanwhile, perfect recall corresponds to no
false negatives (Type II errors). Additionally, precision and recall considered inverses of each
other; if precision increases, recall decreases and vice-versa. The F1 score metric is
considered to be the harmonic mean between these precision and recall metrics.
This research primarily focuses on the accuracy metric due to this study’s research
questions and hypotheses. Ideally, each trained model’s goal was to achieve 95% or higher in
each of these metric categories. This 95% threshold was selected because, while the realm of
network security seeks to achieve 100% detection of attacks, the realm of machine learning
must tolerate lower metrics to create an acceptable model depending on the problem at hand.
The 95% threshold of success for evaluation metrics provides a robust network intrusion
detection model. The second phase of this study involved applying the models and only
reviewing each model’s accuracy metric. The true values of the CICIDS 2017 detection rate
(normal or malicious) were extracted from the CICIDS 2017 CSV data. The goal of each
trained model in Phase Two was to match, as closely as possible, the same detection rate as
dictated by the true values observed in the CICIDS 2017 CSV dataset. This study aimed to
showcase the need for utilizing multiple datasets and testing models in an applied
environment. The focus of this research will be the comparison of ML models’ results
between each of the phases to determine how the models operate between theoretical
environments and implemented environments.
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
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𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐹1 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 2 ∗

𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙

Limitations and Challenges
A primary goal for this research was actually to create and implement a real-world
IDS with ML capabilities. There are very few guides and papers that review this process, so a
significant hurdle for this study was investigating this task’s feasibility. There were only three
identified options for feasibly creating an IDS with ML capabilities. The first option was to
create a pipeline that takes the IDS output and feeds it into an ML processing script. A second
option was to modify the preprocessors of the IDS detection engine. However, after
investigating this option, it was determined that this route might take too long for this
proposed research timeline. Lastly, a third option was to create an IDS plugin using the
appropriate programming language. However, the biggest reason why the IDS preprocessor
modification and IDS plugin creation options were not utilized in this research is that both of
these methods required writing in the native language of the IDS. Some IDS software is
written in programming languages with very limited support for machine learning libraries,
meaning that machine learning algorithms would have to be manually coded, which was
outside the scope of this research. Several other significant challenges and limitations for this
research are further discussed in-depth in Chapter 5.

Python Scripts – Commentary Walkthrough
Two Pythons scripts were created for each phase of research. This subsection will
include a walkthrough of the scripts and review the significant coding choices. While extremely
enlightening, there were several challenges encountered while developing these scripts. Below
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are pseudocode walkthroughs of the two primary Python scripts developed for each phase of
research. The entirety of each of these two scripts is included in the Appendices. The Phase
One Python Script is found in Appendix A, and the Phase Two Python Script is included in
Appendix B. Additionally, the following subsection will review certain significant decisions
made while developing and testing these Python scripts.

Phase One – Python Script
Python Script 1 Walkthrough
1.

Import libraries

2.

Loop through datasets
a.

Import dataset (CSV format with labels)

b.

Apply label extraction and grouping

c.

Rename and drop features

d.

Apply appropriate data transformations
i. Convert dataset to str/object
ii. Identify and save unique values via fullset.values.ravel() - saved as *_unique.joblib
iii. Encode dataset via LabelEncoder() - saved as *_encoder.joblib
iv. Scale dataset via StandardScaler() - saved as *_scaler.joblib
v. Create subsets via train_test_split() - returns X_train, X_test, Y_train, and Y_test
1.

The CICIDS-001 dataset is unique in that train_test_splt() is performed twice to
only utilize only 10% of the total dataset

vi. Perform feature reduction via PCA() - saved as *_pca.joblib
e.

Return transformed X_train, X_test, Y_train, and Y_test subsets

f.

Optimize models - First run-through
i. Configure optimizations settings
1.

Set scoring methods- accuracy, precision_macro, and f1_macro

2.

Set classifiers/algorithms to optimize - Decision Tree, Random Forest, Ada
Boost, Bagging Classifier, Logistic Regression, Stochastic Gradient Descent

3.

Set parameter grid for each algorithm (unique parameters for each classifier)

ii. Loop through scoring methods and classifiers
1.

Optimize models via GridSearchCV, which will perform an exhaustive search
based on the provided classifiers and parameter grids, which will be optimized
for maximum scores based on the selected scoring methods

2.

Save output with best scores and parameters to CSV (this was just for recording
purposes - these optimized parameters were manually inputted back into the
Python script)
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g.

Model production - Second run-through
i. Set scoring parameters again - accuracy, precision_macro, f1_macro
ii. Loop through scoring methods
1.

Obtain the optimized parameters for each algorithm

2.

Loop through each algorithm
a.

Produce official models via clf.predict() while utilizing the optimized
parameters for different ML algorithms, different scoring methods, and
selected dataset

3.

Save output with produced models and evaluation metrics (accuracy, precision,
recall, and F1 score) to CSV

Phase Two – Python Script
Python Script 2 Walkthrough
1.

Import libraries

2.

Loop through datasets
a.

Import the prediction dataset (merged raw PCAPs of CICIDS 2017)

b.

Store the dataset in a CSV format with the same matching columns/features as the other
trained models and their corresponding datasets

c.

Based on the selected dataset, transform the prediction set in the same exact procedure the
previous model was trained
i. Load the *_unique.joblib, *_encoder.joblib, *_scaler.joblib, and *_pca.joblib to the
prediction set
ii. Add “-” to the encoder schema (a default value in case an unseen value is in the
prediction set)
iii. Convert dataset to str/object
iv. Identify and save unique values via predictionset.values.ravel() - loaded and applied
via *_unique.joblib
v. Iterate through the encoder schema and replace any unseen values with “-” (all the
values in the new unseen data must exist in the previously trained encoder schema)
vi. Encode dataset via LabelEncoder() - loaded and applied via *_encoder.joblib
vii. Scale dataset via StandardScaler() - loaded and applied via *_scaler.joblib
viii. Create subsets via train_test_split() - returns X_train, X_test, Y_train, and Y_test
ix. Perform feature reduction via PCA() - loaded and applied via *_pca.joblib

d.

Set the scoring methods (accuracy, prevision_macro, and f1_macro) and classifiers/algorithms
(NB, DT, RF, AB, BC, LR, and SGD)

e.

Iterate through the scoring methods and classifiers
i. Utilize the clf.prediction() function to predict malicious traffic in the unseen data
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ii. Perform computations to determine the accuracy of the predicted value
iii. Store and save the output of the prediction values in a CSV

Major Development Decisions
Consistent Experimentation
A major goal of this research was to maintain consistency and repeatability. In Phase
One, a combination of machine learning classification algorithm, network dataset, and
optimization went through the same exact data transformation process except for a few items
taken from the datasets. The major difference between each dataset was the inclusion of
certain features. Features are unique labeled properties belonging to each dataset; the list of
features included for each of the datasets used in this study were various packet or NetFlow
fields. This study attempted to map as many Zeek IDS Connection Log fields to features
identified within each dataset. This mapping meant that specific datasets had as little as six
features mapped to the Zeek log fields when performing feature reduction, whereas other
datasets had as many as twelve features mapped. The complete list of features from each
dataset and Zeek connection log fields can be seen in Appendix C. There is a table below
containing each of the fully mapped features. The only mapped feature dropped was the
connection state (conn_state) field because each dataset had its own nonstandard format for
that particular attribute. In addition to this initial feature reduction, some more features may
have been dropped when conducting automated dimensionality reduction via the PCA
function. The only other distinction between the data transformations was reducing the size of
the CIDDS-001 dataset. Only 10% of the total CIDDS-001 was ingested due to its immense
size. When reading in the entire CIDDS-001 dataset, the Python script would crash due to
limited memory capacity despite the 100 GB of dedicated RAM for the VM. Aside from these
two unique data transformations of selective feature mapping and CIDDS-001 size reduction,
all the ML models went through the exact data ingestion and transformation process.

Zeek Conn Log

KDD 99

NSL-KDD

UNSW-NB15

CICIDS 2017

CIDDS-001

id.orig_h

srcip

Src IP Addr

id.orig_p

sport

Src Pt

id.resp_h

dstip

Dst IP Addr
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id.resp_p

dsport

DestinationPort

Dst Pt

proto

protocol_type

protocol_type

proto

Proto

conn_state*

flag

flag

state

Flags

duration

duration

duration

dur

FlowDuration

Duration

orig_ip_bytes

src_bytes

src_bytes

sbytes

TotalLengthofFwdPackets

Bytes

resp_ip_bytes

dst_bytes

dst_bytes

dbytes

TotalLengthofBwdPackets

service

service

service

service

orig_pkts

Spkts

TotalFwdPackets

resp_pkts

Dpkts

TotalBackwardPackets

Packets

Table 3: Mapped Features – Dataset Features to Zeek Connection Log Fields

Data Transformation Process
Several significant decisions were made while determining the transformations of data
imported into the Python scripts for this research. There are numerous steps involved in
machine learning to transform data into a proper ingestible format (Gron, 2017). A series of
steps are taken whenever a dataset is read into the scripts to perform a consistent data
transformation.

Data Preprocessing
1. Label extraction and grouping
2. Feature mapping and dropping
3. Feature encoding
4. Feature scaling
5. Subset creation and cross-validation
6. Automated feature reduction

The transformation process’s first steps involve the labels that classify the associated
packet as either malicious or innocuous. Many datasets have numerous subsets of malicious
traffic and classify packets as a particular type of attack. A decision was made to group all
these types of network attacks as only “malicious” since they are all unwanted network traffic
forms. This decision dramatically increased metric evaluation results during testing.
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The next step in the transformation process involves dataset features. With the labels
in the previous step successfully extracted and grouped, the rest of each dataset’s unique
features are transformed. First, the applicable features’ names are mapped and modified to
match those belonging to the corresponding Zeek connection log fields. With the names of the
features changed to match the Zeek logs, the rest of the features are then dropped since they
will not be used. A significant decision here was to map as many features as possible between
each unique dataset and the Zeek logs. Specific datasets only mapped six features, whereas
others mapped as many as ten features.
Next, the feature data is then encoded. Feature encoding is vital to machine learning as
it is used to create a simple dictionary of sorts. This encoding schema is used to standardize
and parse through the feature data (Chio & Freeman, 2018). There are numerous encoding
methods available within the scikit-learn module; however, the well-known and standard
LabelEncoder function was selected for this step.
Feature scaling and regularization of the data is the next major data transformation.
This transformation step takes the encoded data and scales it in a particular way such that the
feature data is normalized (Albon, 2018). Regularization will scale the data such that each
feature and individual value is scaled and thereby have a fixed and proportional weight.
Similar to encoding, there are also several scaling methods available within the scikit-learn
library. The StandardScaler function is a popular option and was selected for this step.
Another scaler that was heavily considered was the MinMaxScaler. Both the StandardScaler
and MinMaxScaler functions are relatively sensitive to outlier data, which is essential since
many network attacks and anomalous traffic are typically considered infrequent, thereby
considered outlier packets.
The next transformation of data involved splitting the dataset into subsets for crossvalidation. Cross-validation takes the original full dataset and divides it into a series of
multiple subsets to be used for training and testing, or validation (Sarkar & Natarajan, 2019).
One type of cross-validation technique is called Leave-One-Out-Cross-Validation (LOOCV).
One widespread implementation of the LOOCV scheme is k-fold cross-validation, where the
original data is split into k equal-sized folds and, over a series of rounds, each fold becomes
the testing set and the rest act as the training set. This k-fold cross-validation process is
repeated k times, with each fold acting as the designated testing set once. This study utilized
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the train_test_split function, which performed 10-fold cross-validation and outputs the
dedicated training and testing subsets. This function has several configurable parameters, and
one of the major decisions was to perform a 90/10 split, where 90% of the original data was
used for training, and 10% of the original data was split off as a dedicated test set.
Additionally, the parameters were also configured to incorporate the same proportion of
unique feature data between the training and testing datasets.
Feature reduction is the final data transformation step in this process. Feature
reduction is also crucial in machine learning as it removes the features deemed unhelpful for
categorization (Chollet, 2017). There are several different feature reduction methods;
however, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) function was selected for this
transformation step. The utilization of PCA for feature reduction was a significant step
because it allowed for automated feature reduction, which was decided by the function. The
selection of PCA and automated feature reduction allowed for consistency between each
unique dataset, rather than applying highly unique and configured reduction methods.

Model Optimization
The optimization process was a significant step during the development of models for Phase
One. This stage involved the usage of scikit-learn’s GridSearchCV function, which performs
an exhaustive search for the best scoring models developed by a cross-validated grid-search
over a submitted parameter grid (Gron, 2017). This function will develop numerous models
based on each combination of parameters to identify which parameters yield the best models
with the highest scoring metrics. This optimization process is applied while developing
machine learning models to create models with ideal parameters and yield the highest possible
performance. Each of the algorithms selected for this study had a series of configurable
parameters that could drastically alter the models’ outcome. This optimization process was
identified which set of parameters were best suited for each combination of datasets and
algorithms. It should be noted that different models using different optimization methods may
select the same algorithm parameters, thereby leading to the same models with identical
metric scores; this is later seen in the results of this study. It should also be noted again that
the Naïve Bayes algorithm is the only algorithm in this study that cannot be optimized since it
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does not have any optimizable parameters. Each algorithm and its corresponding parameter
grid can be seen below or in the Phase One Python Script in Appendix A.
•

Decision Tree - criterion: [gini, entropy], max_features: [auto, sqrt, log2]

•

Random Forest - n_estimators: [100, 1000, 3000, 5000], criterion: [gini, entropy],
max_features: [auto, sqrt, log2]

•

Ada Boost - n_estimators: [100, 1000, 3000, 5000], learning_rate: [0.5, 1, 1.5]

•

Bagging Classifier - n_estimators: [100, 1000, 3000, 5000], max_features: [0.5, 1, 5],
max_samples: [0.1, 0.5, 1]

•

Logistic Regression - penalty: [l2, l1, elasticnet], C: [0.1, 1, 10], max_iter: [2500,
5000, 7500, 10000]

•

Stochastic Gradient Descent - alpha: [5, 10, 15], penalty: [l2, l1, elasticnet], max_iter:
[100, 1000, 3000, 5000]

Overfitting and Underfitting Avoidance
When training ML models, two major concerns are to avoid overfitting and
underfitting the models (Kumar, 2019). Overfitting means that that produced model is overtailored for the particular training data. Overfit models perform well during the training and
testing phase; however, they severely underperform when ingesting new data. Underfitting is
the exact opposite problem of overfitting, meaning that models have not been trained enough.
Underfit models poorly perform during the testing phase as well as when ingesting new data.
It is typically much easier to detect underfitting because the ML models will yield poor metric
results during the testing phase.
Numerous experiments were conducted with various selected and discarded
algorithms, datasets, and optimization parameters. It can be seen later in the Results and
Discussion section that underfitting was never really a problem since the large majority of
trained ML models from Phase One were highly optimized with very positive metric results.
However, as a result, one primary concern for this study was overfitting due to the genuine
possibility of excessive model optimization.
When reviewing Phase One results, it could be argued that the models were overfit
based on how they performed when predicting malicious traffic in Phase Two. However, there
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are some techniques to avoid or reduce the potential for overfitting. These overfitting
reduction techniques were considered and applied when initially training the ML models.
The first method to reduce overfitting is to apply more training data (Ameisen, 2020).
The more training data utilized, the harder it is for a model to learn too much from a single
small dataset. The size of all five of the datasets for this study was quite large and diverse.
Only 10% of the total CIDDS-001 dataset was utilized because the total dataset size was
causing the VM to exceed its 100 GB of RAM and crash the Python script for excessive
memory allocation.
The second technique to reduce overfitting is to apply regularization, also known as
normalization or scaling (Patterson & Gibson, 2017). Regularizing the ingested data while
training a model will scale the data such that each feature and individual value is scaled and
thereby have a fixed and proportional weight. Many different regularization methods can
cause the resulting ML models to be more sensitive or resistant to outlier data. This study
utilized the StandardScaler regularization method, which is considered reasonably sensitive to
outlier data input.
The third method for overfitting reduction is applying cross-validation when training
models (Bonaccorso, 2020). Cross-validation splits the original full dataset and divides it into
dedicated subsets for training, testing, or validation. Cross-validation helps reduce variability,
thereby limiting overfitting. This study applied 10-fold cross-validation techniques when
initially training the ML models by utilizing the train_test_split function in scikit-learn and
splitting each dataset into ten equal-sized folds, with nine folds used for training and one fold
used for validation.
The fourth method for overfitting avoidance is feature selection and dimensionality
reduction (Halder & Ozdemir, 2018). High-dimensional data, or data with several features, is
computationally expensive and prone to overfitting due to higher complexity. Feature
selection picks a particular subset of features as the most influential properties of the dataset
that more accurately correlates to the best classification of new data, reducing the total
number of features, overall complexity, and potential for overfitting. This research performed
dimensionality reduction two times when training ML models. First, a set of attributes found
in Zeek IDS logs were used to filter the available features found in each dataset; this initial
manual feature reduction removed the greatest number of features from each dataset. Second,
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the Principal Component Analysis function was also applied to each dataset, which
automatically dropped features that did not directly correlate to the network traffic’s overall
categorization. Overall, the combination of these four overfitting avoidance techniques was
applied to reduce the potential for overfitting. The results of Phase Two may still indicate that
the ML models from Phase One were still overfitted. However, the overfitting avoidance
precautions were still taken nonetheless.

Prediction Dataset Selection and Development
The second phase of this research involved applying the trained models to predict
malicious traffic on unseen datasets. However, to verify the predicted values’ effectiveness
and accuracy, the research required labeled information about the prediction dataset to know
what portion of the traffic was considered malicious versus innocuous. Due to this verification
requirement, the second phase of research utilized one of the previously selected datasets for
training and applied it as a labeled prediction and verification dataset. This prediction dataset
utilized the raw PCAP files fed into the Zeek IDS to produce connection logs. These IDS logs
were then merged into a single PCAP and fed into the Phase Two Python script with the
trained models to make predictions of malicious traffic based on the parsed logs. It should be
noted that this Phase Two Python script utilized a custom Python package called
parsezeeklogs which was installed from the Python Package Index (PyPI) repository
("parsezeeklogs 2.0.1," 2019). This package is just a lightweight utility for reading Zeek IDS
log files and outputting them into CSV format. Everything else in the Phase One and Phase
Two scripts utilizes public Python libraries and includes custom-written code for this
research. The Phase Two script’s prediction values were compared to the CSV files’ labels
from the same prediction dataset.
The initial dataset selected as the prediction and verification dataset was the UNSWNB15 dataset. This dataset was selected because it includes publicly available labeled CSV
data as well as raw PCAPs. The UNSW-NB15 dataset contains roughly 100 GB of PCAP
files. However, there were numerous errors while merging the PCAP files to then feed into
the Zeek IDS. These errors may be due to synthetic packets produced by particular tools for
the UNSW-NB15 dataset during its development. Initially, the mergecap tool was utilized to
combine the PCAPs ("mergecap," 2021). However, while this tool is preinstalled on Ubuntu
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and several other Linux systems, it has very poor error handling. While using mergecap, the
tool would crash due to malformed packets and would not produce any single PCAP output if
encountering an error. As a result, another public tool was identified called joincap, available
on GitHub (assafmo, 2020). This tool is very similar to mergecap; however, it focuses on
graceful error handling and will skip over malformed packets when combining PCAP files.
Through joincap, the 100 GB of PCAPs were joined together into a single 60 GB PCAP. Due
to the extreme loss of raw PCAP files when merging the files, the UNSW-NB15 dataset was
not selected for prediction and verification.
The final and officially selected dataset utilized for prediction comparison was the
CICIDS 2017 dataset. This dataset is publicly available online and includes both labeled CSV
files as well as raw PCAP files. The PCAPs were fed through the mergecap tool and
successfully produced a single PCAP file with no errors ("mergecap," 2021). Additionally, the
combined PCAP was the same size as the total split individual PCAP files, indicating an
entirely successful merge. As a result, the CICIDS 2017 was selected as the prediction and
verification dataset for Phase Two of this research. This dataset acted as a form of control
group since it was used in both research phases. The CICIDS 2017 dataset was utilized in the
first phase of research in the form of labeled CSV data as one of the five datasets to train the
105 ML models. Additionally, the raw PCAP files of the CICIDS 2017 dataset were utilized
for the second phase of research to be ingested into Zeek IDS to produce Zeek connection
logs and be ingested into the Phase Two Python script.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section will review each phase of the research results and explain the different
experiments’ outcomes. As a quick review, this dissertation’s research utilized the
quantitative experimental study design, which was divided into two primary phases. The first
phase of this research involved generating ML models based on a series of datasets, ML
algorithms, and scoring methods. The first ML models are trained and evaluated on labeled
data and then fed into the second research phase. This second phase of research applies the
previously trained models on unseen network traffic to observe if the theoretical detection
rates still apply when scanning for malicious traffic in new network data.

Phase One – Results
For the first phase of research, a Python script was utilized to read in datasets and then
trained a series of ML models based on a combination of ML algorithms, datasets, and
scoring methods. The first time the script was executed, the algorithms were initially
optimized for specific scoring methods – accuracy, precision, and F1 score. The Grid Search
Cross-Validation function (GridSearchCV) operates by testing a series of parameters and
values to identify which parameters yield the best score based on the selected scoring method.
Note that the Naïve Bayes algorithm cannot be optimized due to its nature and the lack of
parameter options. After optimizing the parameters, the script was rerun and produced a total
of 105 models. The script output contained a series of CSV files, which contained the
evaluation metrics of each model.

5 datasets * 7 ML algorithms * 3 scoring optimization methods = 105 total trained models
Datasets – KDD 99, NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, CICIDS 2017, and CICIDS-001
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ML algorithms – Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest, Ada Boost, Bagging
Classifier, Logistic Regression, and Stochastic Gradient Descent
Scoring (optimization) methods – accuracy, precision_macro (precision), and f1_macro (F1
score)
Evaluation metrics – accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score
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Phase One – Parameter Optimization

Score Method

Algorithm

Best Parameters

Best Score Train Time

accuracy

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'

0.99796

0.48292

accuracy

Random Forest

criterion='gini', max_features='log2', n_estimators=100

0.99806

210.16277

accuracy

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99793

814.39637

accuracy

Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000 0.99801

243.03303

accuracy

Logistic Regression

C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.96866

0.95317

accuracy

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=1000, penalty='l2'

0.83157

1.83523

precision_macro Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'

0.99572

0.49719

precision_macro Random Forest

criterion='gini', max_features='log2', n_estimators=100

0.99577

213.23284

precision_macro Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99557

790.43513

precision_macro Bagging Classifier

max_features=5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99566

256.45741

precision_macro Logistic Regression

C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.96980

1.27933

precision_macro Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=1000, penalty='l2'

0.59331

2.53445

f1_macro

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'

0.99682

0.48747

f1_macro

Random Forest

criterion='gini', max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=100

0.99695

214.75251

f1_macro

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99676

796.15304

f1_macro

Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=100

0.99689

246.88263

f1_macro

Logistic Regression

C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.94873

1.28646

f1_macro

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=1000, penalty='l2'

0.53052

2.66449

Table 4: Phase One – KDD 99 Models – Parameter Optimization
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Score Method

Algorithm

Best Parameters

Best Score Train Time

accuracy

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'

0.98169

0.02364

accuracy

Random Forest

criterion='gini', max_features='log2', n_estimators=5000

0.98371

33.80612

accuracy

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=3000

0.97926

21.86760

accuracy

Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000

0.98243

40.31787

accuracy

Logistic Regression

C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.90567

0.05589

accuracy

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=5, max_iter=1000, penalty='l2'

0.56294

0.06785

0.98071

0.02837

precision_macro Decision Tree

criterion='gini', max_features='auto'

precision_macro Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=100 0.98384

32.76877

precision_macro Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=3000

0.97929

21.31620

precision_macro Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=3000

0.98285

40.37516

precision_macro Logistic Regression

C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.90559

0.06648

precision_macro Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=5, max_iter=3000, penalty='l2'

0.73119

0.08599

f1_macro

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'

0.98161

0.03075

f1_macro

Random Forest

criterion='gini', max_features='log2', n_estimators=1000

0.98376

33.18701

f1_macro

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=3000

0.97924

21.55623

f1_macro

Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000

0.98261

40.31422

f1_macro

Logistic Regression

C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.90562

0.06172

f1_macro

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=5, max_iter=5000, penalty='l2'

0.44130

0.08950

Table 5: Phase One – NSL-KDD Models – Parameter Optimization
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Score Method

Algorithm

Best Parameters

Best Score Train Time

accuracy

Decision Tree

criterion='gini', max_features='sqrt'

0.98941

0.43377

accuracy

Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='log2', n_estimators=100

0.99123

247.63014

accuracy

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1, n_estimators=3000

0.98921

605.48672

accuracy

Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000

0.99115

189.27455

accuracy

Logistic Regression

C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.97423

0.66619

accuracy

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=100, penalty='l2'

0.87683

0.98321

0.97708

0.35475

precision_macro Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt'

precision_macro Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000 0.98003

253.54329

precision_macro Ada Boost

learning_rate=1, n_estimators=5000

0.97499

631.19595

precision_macro Bagging Classifier

max_features=1, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=100

0.98453

185.29858

precision_macro Logistic Regression

C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.94536

0.82141

precision_macro Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=10, max_iter=100, penalty='l2'

0.53703

1.35347

f1_macro

Decision Tree

criterion='gini', max_features='log2'

0.97607

0.40691

f1_macro

Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto', n_estimators=100

0.98013

251.29138

f1_macro

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1, n_estimators=3000

0.97550

613.18410

f1_macro

Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=3000

0.97984

188.67667

f1_macro

Logistic Regression

C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.94090

0.79907

f1_macro

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=1000, penalty='l2'

0.48656

1.22815

Table 6: Phase One – UNSW-NB15 Models – Parameter Optimization
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Score Method

Algorithm

Best Parameters

Best Score Train Time

accuracy

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt'

0.98867

0.51552

accuracy

Random Forest

criterion='gini', max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000

0.99160

364.72154

accuracy

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.92834

552.42350

accuracy

Bagging Classifier

max_features=5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99115

257.60872

accuracy

Logistic Regression

C=1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.84413

0.48867

accuracy

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=3000, penalty='l2'

0.80258

0.94233

precision_macro Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'

0.98147

0.45460

precision_macro Random Forest

criterion='gini', max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000

0.98662

366.67431

precision_macro Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.89797

558.84882

precision_macro Bagging Classifier

max_features=5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000

0.98653

260.66536

precision_macro Logistic Regression

C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.77686

0.65171

precision_macro Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=1000, penalty='l2'

0.47620

1.42750

f1_macro

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'

0.98226

0.46069

f1_macro

Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto', n_estimators=1000 0.98678

371.29855

f1_macro

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.88283

560.62389

f1_macro

Bagging Classifier

max_features=5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=3000

0.98603

256.17446

f1_macro

Logistic Regression

C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.69967

0.64171

f1_macro

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=15, max_iter=1000, penalty='l2'

0.46995

1.31777

Table 7: Phase One – CICIDS 2017 Models – Parameter Optimization
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Score Method

Algorithm

Best Parameters

Best Score Train Time

accuracy

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt'

0.99882

0.49638

accuracy

Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000

0.99927

259.87577

accuracy

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99836

779.99958

accuracy

Bagging Classifier

max_features=5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000

0.99910

223.35500

accuracy

Logistic Regression

C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.94686

0.74863

accuracy

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=5, max_iter=100, penalty='l2'

0.89727

1.12009

0.99703

0.46554

precision_macro Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'

precision_macro Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='log2', n_estimators=3000 0.99817

264.88818

precision_macro Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99516

769.69732

precision_macro Bagging Classifier

max_features=0.5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000

0.99821

228.25839

precision_macro Logistic Regression

C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.89943

0.95949

precision_macro Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=5, max_iter=100, penalty='l2'

0.44863

1.55976

f1_macro

Decision Tree

criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'

0.99690

0.47622

f1_macro

Random Forest

criterion='entropy', max_features='auto', n_estimators=3000

0.99801

265.96089

f1_macro

Ada Boost

learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000

0.99549

785.13437

f1_macro

Bagging Classifier

max_features=5, max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000

0.99756

225.29216

f1_macro

Logistic Regression

C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'

0.83344

0.95891

f1_macro

Stochastic Gradient Descent alpha=5, max_iter=100, penalty='l2'

0.47293

1.63497

Table 8: Phase One – CIDDS-001 Models – Parameter Optimization
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Phase One – KDD 99 Dataset Results

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19895

Decision Tree

0.99816

0.99600

0.99824

0.99712

0.36601

Random Forest

0.99819

0.99603

0.99831

0.99716

2.47200

Ada Boost

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

949.45873

Bagging Classifier

0.99816

0.99592

0.99831

0.99711

33.93054

Logistic Regression

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.43249

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80108

0.64298

0.50011

0.44508

0.67686

Table 9: Phase One – KDD 99 Models – Accuracy Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19037

Decision Tree

0.99812

0.99598

0.99814

0.99706

0.32635

Random Forest

0.99818

0.99602

0.99830

0.99715

2.49991

Ada Boost

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

966.79733

Bagging Classifier

0.99816

0.99598

0.99829

0.99713

70.83681

Logistic Regression

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.35421

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.19012

Table 10: Phase One – KDD 99 Models – Precision Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.15929

Decision Tree

0.99816

0.99602

0.99822

0.99712

0.20516

Random Forest

0.99818

0.99602

0.99830

0.99715

1.78166

Ada Boost

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

943.96914

Bagging Classifier

0.99814

0.99589

0.99830

0.99709

1.05218

Logistic Regression

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.42434

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.18991

Table 11: Phase One – KDD 99 Models – F1 Score Optimization
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Phase One – NSL-KDD Dataset Results

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00726

Decision Tree

0.98613

0.98608

0.98616

0.98612

0.01268

Random Forest

0.98828

0.98831

0.98824

0.98827

3.80120

Ada Boost

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.72710

Bagging Classifier

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.58591

Logistic Regression

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.01096

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00446

Table 12: Phase One – NSL-KDD Models – Accuracy Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00478

Decision Tree

0.98741

0.98739

0.98741

0.98740

0.00858

Random Forest

0.98815

0.98817

0.98811

0.98814

0.05314

Ada Boost

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61126

Bagging Classifier

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.87895

Logistic Regression

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00951

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00392

Table 13: Phase One – NSL-KDD Models – Precision Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00491

Decision Tree

0.98647

0.98643

0.98649

0.98646

0.01002

Random Forest

0.98822

0.98825

0.98817

0.98821

0.81297

Ada Boost

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61979

Bagging Classifier

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.63036

Logistic Regression

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00933

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.54612

0.71213

0.55799

0.45311

0.00573

Table 14: Phase One – NSL-KDD Models – F1 Score Optimization
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Phase One – UNSW-NB15 Dataset Results

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08435

Decision Tree

0.99170

0.98080

0.98154

0.98117

0.37921

Random Forest

0.99306

0.98372

0.98481

0.98426

1.49134

Ada Boost

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

466.55119

Bagging Classifier

0.99317

0.98403

0.98496

0.98449

19.65784

Logistic Regression

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35886

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08537

Table 15: Phase One – UNSW-NB15 Models – Accuracy Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08946

Decision Tree

0.99187

0.98118

0.98195

0.98156

0.29828

Random Forest

0.99303

0.98386

0.98449

0.98418

12.24554

Ada Boost

0.98989

0.97491

0.97942

0.97715

778.32787

Bagging Classifier

0.97446

0.98575

0.89864

0.93638

1.08145

Logistic Regression

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35494

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08048

Table 16: Phase One – UNSW-NB15 Models – Precision Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08273

Decision Tree

0.99126

0.97967

0.98066

0.98016

0.25876

Random Forest

0.99305

0.98386

0.98459

0.98422

1.38001

Ada Boost

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

480.33834

Bagging Classifier

0.99318

0.98397

0.98507

0.98452

54.13052

Logistic Regression

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.52767

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.09553

Table 17: Phase One – UNSW-NB15 Models – F1 Score Optimization
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Phase One – CICIDS 2017 Dataset Results

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09344

Decision Tree

0.99318

0.98845

0.99007

0.98926

0.42589

Random Forest

0.99415

0.99032

0.99124

0.99078

20.96378

Ada Boost

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

723.04974

Bagging Classifier

0.99440

0.99115

0.99117

0.99116

176.10695

Logistic Regression

0.84409

0.77625

0.67020

0.70009

0.19176

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.12037

Table 18: Phase One – CICIDS 2017 Models – Accuracy Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09795

Decision Tree

0.99309

0.98826

0.98997

0.98911

0.47588

Random Forest

0.99415

0.99033

0.99122

0.99077

20.17999

Ada Boost

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

734.92824

Bagging Classifier

0.99440

0.99113

0.99121

0.99117

171.72592

Logistic Regression

0.84409

0.77625

0.67020

0.70009

0.16185

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.27912

Table 19: Phase One – CICIDS 2017 Models – Precision Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.08759

Decision Tree

0.99318

0.98842

0.99010

0.98926

0.41032

Random Forest

0.99416

0.99029

0.99132

0.99080

18.56984

Ada Boost

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

735.96754

Bagging Classifier

0.99440

0.99116

0.99119

0.99117

107.24517

Logistic Regression

0.84409

0.77625

0.67020

0.70009

0.18086

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.08245

Table 20: Phase One – CICIDS 2017 Models – F1 Score Optimization
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Phase One – CIDDS-001 Dataset Results

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.16439

Decision Tree

0.99951

0.99877

0.99855

0.99866

0.50578

Random Forest

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.99900

14.92514

Ada Boost

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1203.30446

Bagging Classifier

0.99959

0.99904

0.99872

0.99888

22.60481

Logistic Regression

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.37160

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.14127

Table 21: Phase One – CIDDS-001 Models – Accuracy Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.15782

Decision Tree

0.99948

0.99869

0.99847

0.99858

0.37718

Random Forest

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.99900

40.93319

Ada Boost

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1116.44332

Bagging Classifier

0.99956

0.99909

0.99851

0.99880

15.54522

Logistic Regression

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.35591

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13498

Table 22: Phase One – CIDDS-001 Models – Precision Optimization

Model

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.13131

Decision Tree

0.99950

0.99873

0.99853

0.99863

0.31852

Random Forest

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.99900

39.92271

Ada Boost

0.99852

0.99569

0.99627

0.99598

1051.30573

Bagging Classifier

0.99959

0.99903

0.99877

0.99890

22.53338

Logistic Regression

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.36495

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13185

Table 23: Phase One – CIDDS-001 Models – F1 Score Optimization
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Phase One – Discussion
Parameter Optimization
The first time the script was executed, the goal was to identify optimized parameters
for each model. It should be noted that the Naïve Bayes algorithm cannot be optimized due to
the nature of the algorithm and a lack of parameters available. Additionally, when reviewing
the parameter optimization scores, it can be seen that some of the ideal parameters remain
consistent between different tests. The impact of these same selected and optimized
parameters can be better seen when reviewing the actual trained models’ evaluation metrics as
they yield consistent evaluation metric scores.
Many of the models were considered highly optimized as most of them were able to
obtain roughly 99% within their specified scoring method. Out of the 90 total trained models
(Naïve Bayes cannot be optimized), only 30 were considered poorly optimized. Regarding
this phase’s goals, anything lower than a 95% score within the respective scoring method is
considered poorly optimized. There was a noticeable trend identified by reviewing the results.
All the algorithms produced highly optimized models and scores except for three particular
algorithms. The Stochastic Gradient Descent, Logistic Regression, and Ada Boost algorithms
and associated models consistently underperformed.
The worst performing algorithm was the Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm,
which consistently failed to reach a score higher than 95% across every single test, regardless
of the particular dataset or scoring method. The second worst performing algorithm was the
Logistic Regression algorithm. This algorithm consistently failed to reach a proper
optimization score across each dataset when the specified scoring method was set to
f1_macro. Additionally, there were multiple instances where the Logistic Regression
algorithm failed to optimize appropriately and yielded inconsistent metrics. Lastly, the only
other algorithm that failed to reach proper optimization was the Ada Boost algorithm. This
algorithm only failed when interacting with the CICIDS 2017 dataset. However, it failed all
three scoring methods.
Model Production
Similar to the parameter optimization phase, the actual production of the models
yielded promising results. The large majority of models obtained 95% or better scores across
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each evaluation metric, including accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score. It should be noted
that some of the different scoring methods utilized the same parameter configurations. The
reusing of the same function parameters caused some of the models to yield remarkably
similar, if not exact, metrics between tests with different scoring methods.
The only algorithm that yielded consistently low evaluation metrics was Stochastic
Gradient Descent. Across every test, regardless of dataset or scoring method, the SGD models
always produced evaluation metrics that were well below the 95% threshold. There were large
fluctuations of metric scores when trained using the KDD 99 and NSL-KDD datasets.
However, the UNSW-NB15, CICIDS 2017, and CIDDS-001 datasets yielded consistently low
metric scores.
Additionally, another interesting observation of these results indicates that the
differing scoring or optimization methods did not generate significantly different results. Each
model produced using different scoring methods generated slightly different metrics.
However, the models never caused the metrics to change enough to cross the threshold
between success (>95%) and failure (<95%). There were some instances where the
optimization method caused significant fluctuations, as seen in the tests involving the
Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm and the KDD 99 and NSL-KDD datasets. Therefore,
while the differing scoring methods may have produced better respective metrics, they were
still not impactful enough to change the score’s overall category (success or failure).
While reviewing the models trained using the KDD 99 dataset, it appears that the
Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest, Ada Boost, and Bagging Classifier algorithms
maintained consistent metric scores greater than 95% across all the different scoring methods.
The Logistic Regression algorithm achieved high scores (>95%) in accuracy or precision
across all scoring methods; however, the algorithm also produced low scores (<95%) in recall
and f1 values across all scoring methods.
When trained using the NSL-KDD dataset, the Decision Tree, Random Forest, Ada
Boost, and Bagging Classifier algorithms produced positive metrics of >95% regardless of the
scoring method. The Naïve Bayes and Logistic Regression algorithms yielded consistently
below 95% across each scoring method.
The models trained off the UNSW-NB15 dataset produced highly consistent metrics
with hardly any fluctuations between differing scoring methods. The Decision Tree, Random
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Forest, Ada Boost, and Bagging Classifier algorithms produced positive results above the
95% threshold regardless of the scoring method. Unfortunately, the Naïve Bayes algorithm
consistently yielded low metrics (<95%) across each scoring method. The Logistic Regression
algorithm produced models that achieved successful metrics (>95%) in terms of accuracy
metrics; however, it also maintained poor results (<95%) in terms of precision, recall, and F1
score metrics across all scoring methods.
The CICIDS 2017 dataset yielded interesting metrics because it was the only dataset
that caused the Ada Boost algorithm to produce low metrics consistently. These low Ada
Boost metrics may have been due to the dataset’s size or possibly features selected for
training. Additionally, this dataset also generated highly consistent metrics between each of
the scoring method tests. The Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Bagging Classifier
algorithms all produced models that generated positive metrics above the 95% threshold.
However, the Naïve Bayes and Ada Boost algorithms regularly stayed below the 95%
threshold across all scoring methods.
The models trained using the CIDDS-001 dataset also maintained remarkably
consistent results between algorithms. The Decision Tree, Random Forest, Ada Boost, and
Bagging classifier algorithms achieved positive metrics (>95%) across all scoring methods.
However, the Naïve Bayes algorithm maintained low metrics (<95%) regardless of the
scoring method. The Logistic Regression algorithm achieved positive results (>95%) in the
accuracy metric; however, it also generated negative results in precision, recall, and F1 score
across all scoring methods.

81
Phase Two – Results
This second phase of research attempted to apply the trained ML models from the
previous phase and see how the theoretical models handle unseen network traffic. For this
phase of research, the raw PCAPs of the CICIDS 2017 dataset were utilized. The CICIDS
2017 dataset was used in the first phase for training a model. However, this same dataset was
also used in this second phase as a sort of control group and a known true value indicator for
flagged traffic predictions. It should be noted for clarification that the CICIDS 2017 dataset
was used in both phases of research. The first phase utilized the CSV data, which consisted of
PCAP traffic and manual input for labels, whereas the second phase utilized only the raw
PCAP traffic only which were then fed into the Zeek IDS for log generation. A second Python
script was utilized for this second phase as well. This second script imported the Zeek logs
along with the previously trained ML models. After parsing and mapping Zeek log fields to
the applicable features for each trained ML model, the script successfully produced a
prediction value of malicious traffic. This script allowed for previously trained ML models to
predict malicious traffic on unseen data. However, the accuracy of these results appears to
vary dramatically. The results are, again, divided up by trained dataset, ML algorithm, and
scoring method.

Phase Two – CICIDS 2017 – True Values

Packets
Normal

Percentage

2273097 0.80300

Malicious 557646

0.19699

Table 24: Phase Two – CICIDS 2017 – True Values
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Phase Two – Trained Models’ Predictions on CICIDS 2017 Raw Traffic
Model

Score Method

Malicious

Normal

Total

Flagged Traffic

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Decision Tree

Accuracy

1692378

426829

2119207

0.79859

Random Forest

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

2119207

0

2119207

1

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Decision Tree

Precision

2119207

0

2119207

1

Random Forest

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Bagging Classifier

Precision

426829

1692378

2119207

0.20141

Logistic Regression

Precision

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Random Forest

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

2119207

0

2119207

1

Table 25: Phase Two – KDD 99 Models – Predictions on CICIDS 2017 Raw Traffic
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Model

Score Method

Malicious

Normal

Total

Flagged Traffic

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

2080480

38727

2119207

0.98173

Decision Tree

Accuracy

38727

2080480

2119207

0.01827

Random Forest

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

Accuracy

38727

2080480

2119207

0.01827

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Naïve Bayes

Precision

2080480

38727

2119207

0.98173

Decision Tree

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Random Forest

Precision

38727

2080480

2119207

0.01827

Ada Boost

Precision

38727

2080480

2119207

0.01827

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

Precision

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

2080480

38727

2119207

0.98173

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Random Forest

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

F1 Score

38727

2080480

2119207

0.01827

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

1731105

388102

2119207

0.81686

Table 26: Phase Two – NSL-KDD Models – Predictions on CICIDS 2017 Raw Traffic
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Model

Score Method

Malicious

Normal

Total

Flagged Traffic

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

2119207

0

2119207

1

Decision Tree

Accuracy

2081422

37785

2119207

0.98217

Random Forest

Accuracy

2084743

34464

2119207

0.98374

Ada Boost

Accuracy

3451

2115756

2119207

0.00163

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

1

2119206

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

2119207

0

2119207

1

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Naïve Bayes

Precision

2119207

0

2119207

1

Decision Tree

Precision

38208

2080999

2119207

0.01803

Random Forest

Precision

2084403

34804

2119207

0.98358

Ada Boost

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

Precision

2119207

0

2119207

1

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

2119207

0

2119207

1

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

2119207

0

2119207

1

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Random Forest

F1 Score

2119194

13

2119207

0.99999

Ada Boost

F1 Score

3451

2115756

2119207

0.00163

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

2119207

0

2119207

1

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Table 27: Phase Two – UNSW-NB15 Models – Predictions on CICIDS 2017 Raw Traffic
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Model

Score Method

Malicious

Normal

Total

Flagged Traffic

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

531212

1587995

2119207

0.25067

Decision Tree

Accuracy

236062

1883145

2119207

0.11139

Random Forest

Accuracy

360301

1758906

2119207

0.17002

Ada Boost

Accuracy

783534

1335673

2119207

0.36973

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

369295

1749912

2119207

0.17426

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

8948

2110259

2119207

0.00422

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Naïve Bayes

Precision

531212

1587995

2119207

0.25067

Decision Tree

Precision

415476

1703731

2119207

0.19605

Random Forest

Precision

361007

1758200

2119207

0.17035

Ada Boost

Precision

783534

1335673

2119207

0.36973

Bagging Classifier

Precision

368940

1750267

2119207

0.17409

Logistic Regression

Precision

8948

2110259

2119207

0.00422

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

531212

1587995

2119207

0.25067

Decision Tree

F1 Score

400550

1718657

2119207

0.18901

Random Forest

F1 Score

360171

1759036

2119207

0.16996

Ada Boost

F1 Score

783534

1335673

2119207

0.36973

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

368985

1750222

2119207

0.17411

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

8948

2110259

2119207

0.00422

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Table 28: Phase Two – CICIDS 2017 Models – Predictions on CICIDS 2017 Raw Traffic
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Model

Score Method

Malicious

Normal

Total

Flagged Traffic

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Decision Tree

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Random Forest

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

Accuracy

30

2119177

2119207

1.42E-05

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

2119207

0

2119207

1

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0

2119207

2119207

0

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Decision Tree

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Random Forest

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

Precision

30

2119177

2119207

1.42E-05

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

Precision

2119207

0

2119207

1

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0

2119207

2119207

0

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Decision Tree

F1 Score

44

2119163

2119207

2.08E-05

Random Forest

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Ada Boost

F1 Score

30

2119177

2119207

1.42E-05

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

2119207

0

2119207

1

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0

2119207

2119207

0

Table 29: Phase Two – CIDDS-001 Models – Predictions on CICIDS 2017 Raw Traffic
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Phase Two – Discussion
Predictions
The results of Phase Two were the most surprising of this research. Despite the high
metric scores (>95%) yielded by the large majority of optimized and trained models, most of
them failed to obtain a score resembling that of the CICIDS 2017 labels. According to the
CICIDS 2017 labeled CSV data, roughly 19.7% of the total CICIDS 2017 raw PCAP traffic
should be considered malicious. Ideally, adequately trained models should reach a similar
target score with a +/- 5% range. Only 13 of the 105 trained models reached a score close to
the target value of 19.7%. This low number of successful models was even with the
acceptable range expanded to +/- 10%. Since only 13 models achieved their target scores, that
means that the other 92 models failed. Of the 13 successful models, 12 of those models were
trained using the CICIDS 2017 dataset, which means they were operating off previously
trained data. The 12 trained models produced off the CICIDS 2017 dataset yielded successful
results when trained via the Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Bagging
Classifier algorithms regardless of the optimization method. It makes sense for the models
trained using the CICIDS 2017 CSV data to yield better results than the models trained using
other datasets sets since all the CICIDS 2017 data was previously seen and the models were
fitted and optimized. The only successful model trained outside of the CICIDS 2017 dataset
was the model trained using the KDD 99 dataset, precision optimization, and Bagging
Classifier algorithm. This KDD 99, precision optimized, Bagging Classifier model managed
to obtain a score of 20.1% flagged malicious traffic. It is impressive that this particular model
achieved such highly accurate results; however, this particular model’s results may have just
been largely coincidental. There is certainly a possibility that if this unique model is applied
to a new prediction dataset, it will fail. There is no indication that this model achieved
accurate results due to any particular algorithm, dataset, or scoring method since all the other
models (not trained using the CICIDS 2017 dataset) failed.
The results of this phase were quite surprising. The large majority of models probably
failed due to overfitting or underfitting despite being optimized in the first phase. Overfitting
or underfitting is indicated by several of the models’ results that flag either 100% or 0% of the
CICIDS 2017 traffic. Additionally, another major factor that likely affected this phase’s
outcome was the selected features for training. As mentioned earlier, specific datasets only
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included particular labeled features for training models. Many unique dataset features were
dropped when mapping them to the Zeek connection logs’ available features. Lastly, another
major probable factor that resulted in many of these models’ failure was likely due to unseen
data. While machine learning should perform better than typical IDS anomaly detection, this
phase’s results indicate that standard machine learning still needs to be highly optimized and
tuned to operate on unseen traffic effectively. Deep learning is likely to perform better when
determining if new or unseen traffic is malicious due to the nature of the algorithms.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This section will review the significant findings, initially proposed research, and
conclusions for this research study. There were numerous challenges and setbacks
encountered throughout this research. As a result, certain aspects of the original proposal had
to be altered. Additionally, some of the results of this study were very surprising yet also
enlightening. It is hoped that this study’s resulting data and analysis can validate or assist
other industry professionals or academic researchers. Overall, the goals and intent of the
initially proposed research were successfully met. Some key findings and take-aways could
undoubtedly apply to real-world machine learning model development and IDS configuration.
There are numerous ways to expand upon this combined field of machine learning and
network security for future research and development.

Major Findings Review
Phase One
The results of Phase One yielded highly informative data. Interestingly enough, some
particular algorithms consistently underperformed during this phase of research. The linear
machine learning algorithms, such as the Logistic Regression and Stochastic Gradient
Descent algorithms, produced low metrics during optimization and model production. It can
be seen that this underperformance acted as a snowball effect. It could be argued that poor
optimization leads to inadequate model production and performance, leading to inaccurate
predictions. However, while these two algorithms performed inadequately, most other
algorithms did well to optimize and produce highly positive evaluation metrics.
This research phase also revealed that the optimization of parameters did not
significantly affect the metrics’ overall pass or fail categorization of the trained models. The
difference in scoring methods between datasets and algorithms never changed the overall
categorization with the threshold of 95% or higher in their respective scoring metrics. The
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optimization seemed to have the most considerable impact on the worst-performing
algorithms, such as Logistic Regression and Stochastic Gradient Descent. The produced
models with different optimization methods using these two underperforming algorithms
yielded highly fluctuant results; however, they still did never meet the threshold of 95% or
higher.
One last interesting observation from this phase is the one-off instance where the Ada
Boost algorithm underperformed. When the models were trained using the NSL-KDD dataset,
the Ada Boost algorithm yielded low scores regardless of the selected optimization method.
This underperformance by the Ada Boost algorithm may have been due to the dataset’s size or
possibly the selection of particular features interacting with this particular algorithm.

Phase Two
Phase Two produced the most surprising results of this research. Despite the largely
successful, optimized, and trained models, 92 of the 105 total models failed to predict
malicious traffic in unseen data accurately. Only 13 of the 105 models successfully predicted
traffic. However, 12 of the 13 models were previously trained using the CICIDS 2017 dataset,
meaning that they were making predictions based on previously trained and observed data.
The only model that successfully predicted malicious traffic within truly unseen data was the
model trained under the KDD 99 dataset while using the precision optimization method and
Bagging Classifier algorithm.
The failure of the 92 models may be due to several reasons. One primary reason may
be due to overfitting or underfitting of the models to their respective datasets. Overfitting and
underfitting are commonly encountered challenges in machine learning and occur when a
model is excessively or insufficiently trained using a particular dataset, respectively. Another
potential reason for these failed models may be the selection of mapped features between
datasets and Zeek log fields. One of the fields or features included in each of the datasets was
the IP address field. IP addresses were included features while training the models because
some of the selected algorithms may have utilized the frequency of communication between
IP addresses and used this to identify malicious traffic.
Regarding the algorithms themselves, some of these models may have failed simply
due to the nature of the selected algorithm. These algorithms’ effectiveness may dramatically
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change depending on the dataset’s size or the selection of particular features. As an example,
the Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm underperformed since the very beginning of this
research. Another factor that likely played a role in the failure of the 92 models is that the
trained models needed to drop unseen variables or terms to ingest new data and make a
prediction. The dropping of new variables likely had a significant impact while making
predictions, which is another known problem with standard machine learning.
Despite only 13 models accurately predicting new data, this research phase still met
one of this research’s primary goals. This phase acted as a valid proof of concept that an
organization could set up an automated process to continually produce or refine models based
on IDS logs to identify malicious traffic. This research’s particular setup may not have
included inline machine learning computations to deem individual packets as malicious or
innocuous as they pass through the wire. However, this research proved that there could be a
dedicated and offloaded machine learning IDS device operating off a span port that watches
network traffic and flags for anomalies. The Python scripts created for this research could
easily be modified to operate in a corporate environment and a more automated fashion.
Additionally, the scripts could be further configured such that if malicious traffic is identified,
an alert could be sent to a network administrator or security analyst to investigate the traffic
further.

Research Questions and Hypotheses Review
Research Question 1
How does the selection of a single network intrusion dataset impact machine learning models’
outcomes and performance when trained using multiple machine learning algorithms and
optimization methods?

Hypothesis 1
Not all machine learning models will achieve high accuracy when trained using any network
intrusion dataset.
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Research Question and Hypothesis 1 Analysis
This first hypothesis can be accepted based on the performance of the trained models
from Phase One. By grouping each set of models by individual dataset (seen in the tables
below), the data indicate that none of the groupings of models could achieve high accuracy,
specified as 95% or higher, across all algorithms and optimization methods. The KDD 99
dataset managed to reach the highest number of successful models, with 18 out of 21 models
(85.71%) yielding the desired accuracy threshold. The NSL-KDD and CIDDS-001 datasets
yielded 12 successful models (57.14%), and the UNSW-NB15 dataset yielded 15 successful
models (71.43%). The CICIDS 2017 dataset yielded the lowest number of successful models,
with 9 out of 21 models (42.86%) reaching the threshold. These results also show that the
major limiting factor for success was the machine learning algorithms. The Stochastic
Gradient Descent algorithm seemed always to fail to reach the desired accuracy threshold
across each dataset, even when optimized for accuracy.
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All Trained Models – Grouped by Dataset

Algorithm

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19895

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19037

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.15929

Decision Tree

Accuracy

0.99816

0.996

0.99824

0.99712

0.36601

Decision Tree

Precision

0.99812

0.99598

0.99814

0.99706

0.32635

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0.99816

0.99602

0.99822

0.99712

0.20516

Random Forest

Accuracy

0.99819

0.99603

0.99831

0.99716

2.472

Random Forest

Precision

0.99818

0.99602

0.9983

0.99715

2.49991

Random Forest

F1 Score

0.99818

0.99602

0.9983

0.99715

1.78166

Ada Boost

Accuracy

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

949.45873

Ada Boost

Precision

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

966.79733

Ada Boost

F1 Score

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

943.96914

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0.99816

0.99592

0.99831

0.99711

33.93054

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0.99816

0.99598

0.99829

0.99713

70.83681

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0.99814

0.99589

0.9983

0.99709

1.05218

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.43249

Logistic Regression

Precision

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.35421

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.42434

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0.80108

0.64298

0.50011

0.44508

0.67686

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.19012

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.18991

Table 30: KDD 99 Models
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Algorithm

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00726

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00478

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00491

Decision Tree

Accuracy

0.98613

0.98608

0.98616

0.98612

0.01268

Decision Tree

Precision

0.98741

0.98739

0.98741

0.9874

0.00858

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0.98647

0.98643

0.98649

0.98646

0.01002

Random Forest

Accuracy

0.98828

0.98831

0.98824

0.98827

3.8012

Random Forest

Precision

0.98815

0.98817

0.98811

0.98814

0.05314

Random Forest

F1 Score

0.98822

0.98825

0.98817

0.98821

0.81297

Ada Boost

Accuracy

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.7271

Ada Boost

Precision

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61126

Ada Boost

F1 Score

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61979

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.58591

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.87895

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.63036

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.01096

Logistic Regression

Precision

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00951

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00933

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00446

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00392

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0.54612

0.71213

0.55799

0.45311

0.00573

Table 31: KDD-NSL Models
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Algorithm

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00726

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00478

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00491

Decision Tree

Accuracy

0.98613

0.98608

0.98616

0.98612

0.01268

Decision Tree

Precision

0.98741

0.98739

0.98741

0.9874

0.00858

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0.98647

0.98643

0.98649

0.98646

0.01002

Random Forest

Accuracy

0.98828

0.98831

0.98824

0.98827

3.8012

Random Forest

Precision

0.98815

0.98817

0.98811

0.98814

0.05314

Random Forest

F1 Score

0.98822

0.98825

0.98817

0.98821

0.81297

Ada Boost

Accuracy

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.7271

Ada Boost

Precision

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61126

Ada Boost

F1 Score

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61979

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.58591

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.87895

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.63036

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.01096

Logistic Regression

Precision

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00951

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00933

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00446

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00392

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0.54612

0.71213

0.55799

0.45311

0.00573

Table 32: NSL-KDD Models
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Algorithm

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08435

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08946

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08273

Decision Tree

Accuracy

0.9917

0.9808

0.98154

0.98117

0.37921

Decision Tree

Precision

0.99187

0.98118

0.98195

0.98156

0.29828

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0.99126

0.97967

0.98066

0.98016

0.25876

Random Forest

Accuracy

0.99306

0.98372

0.98481

0.98426

1.49134

Random Forest

Precision

0.99303

0.98386

0.98449

0.98418

12.24554

Random Forest

F1 Score

0.99305

0.98386

0.98459

0.98422

1.38001

Ada Boost

Accuracy

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

466.55119

Ada Boost

Precision

0.98989

0.97491

0.97942

0.97715

778.32787

Ada Boost

F1 Score

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

480.33834

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0.99317

0.98403

0.98496

0.98449

19.65784

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0.97446

0.98575

0.89864

0.93638

1.08145

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0.99318

0.98397

0.98507

0.98452

54.13052

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35886

Logistic Regression

Precision

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35494

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.52767

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08537

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08048

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.09553

Table 33: UNSW-NB15 Models
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Algorithm

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09344

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09795

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.08759

Decision Tree

Accuracy

0.99318

0.98845

0.99007

0.98926

0.42589

Decision Tree

Precision

0.99309

0.98826

0.98997

0.98911

0.47588

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0.99318

0.98842

0.9901

0.98926

0.41032

Random Forest

Accuracy

0.99415

0.99032

0.99124

0.99078

20.96378

Random Forest

Precision

0.99415

0.99033

0.99122

0.99077

20.17999

Random Forest

F1 Score

0.99416

0.99029

0.99132

0.9908

18.56984

Ada Boost

Accuracy

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

723.04974

Ada Boost

Precision

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

734.92824

Ada Boost

F1 Score

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

735.96754

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0.9944

0.99115

0.99117

0.99116

176.10695

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0.9944

0.99113

0.99121

0.99117

171.72592

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0.9944

0.99116

0.99119

0.99117

107.24517

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.19176

Logistic Regression

Precision

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.16185

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.18086

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.12037

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.27912

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.08245

Table 34: CICIDS 2017 Models
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Algorithm

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.16439

Naïve Bayes

Precision

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.15782

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.13131

Decision Tree

Accuracy

0.99951

0.99877

0.99855

0.99866

0.50578

Decision Tree

Precision

0.99948

0.99869

0.99847

0.99858

0.37718

Decision Tree

F1 Score

0.9995

0.99873

0.99853

0.99863

0.31852

Random Forest

Accuracy

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

14.92514

Random Forest

Precision

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

40.93319

Random Forest

F1 Score

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

39.92271

Ada Boost

Accuracy

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1203.30446

Ada Boost

Precision

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1116.44332

Ada Boost

F1 Score

0.99852

0.99569

0.99627

0.99598

1051.30573

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

0.99959

0.99904

0.99872

0.99888

22.60481

Bagging Classifier

Precision

0.99956

0.99909

0.99851

0.9988

15.54522

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

0.99959

0.99903

0.99877

0.9989

22.53338

Logistic Regression

Accuracy

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.3716

Logistic Regression

Precision

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.35591

Logistic Regression

F1 Score

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.36495

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Accuracy

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.14127

Stochastic Gradient Descent

Precision

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13498

Stochastic Gradient Descent

F1 Score

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13185

Table 35: CICIDS-001 Models
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Research Question 2
How does the selection of a single machine learning algorithm impact machine learning
models’ outcomes and performance when trained using multiple network intrusion datasets
and optimization methods?

Hypothesis 2
Not all machine learning models will achieve high accuracy when trained using any machine
learning algorithm.

Research Question and Hypothesis 2 Analysis
The trained models’ yielded metrics from Phase One indicate that this second
hypothesis can also be accepted. When grouping each set of the models by individual machine
learning algorithm (seen in the tables below), the results show that only some of the sets of
models achieved the desired 95% accuracy scores across all datasets and optimization
methods. Interestingly enough, the Decision Tree, Random Forest, and Bagging Classifier
algorithms all yielded 15 out of 15 models that successfully reached the 95% accuracy
threshold across all datasets and optimization methods. Another interesting result of these
tests found that the Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm failed to produce any successful
models to reach the desired accuracy score; however, it should also be noted that this
algorithm yielded the best recall metrics, with 13 of the 15 models reaching 100% recall
scores. While the Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm yielded lower accuracy scores, it did
achieve perfect recall for some of its models, which corresponds to no false negative results.
The Ada Boost algorithm yielded 12 successful models (80%), the Logistic Regression
algorithm yielded nine successful models (60%), and the Naïve Bayes algorithm yielded three
successful models (20%). These results indicate that the major limiting factor for these
models was the selection of datasets. The optimization technique selected did not appear to
impact the evaluation metrics of the models significantly.
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All Trained Models – Grouped by Algorithm

Dataset

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Accuracy

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19895

KDD 99

Precision

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19037

KDD 99

F1 Score

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.15929

NSL-KDD

Accuracy

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00726

NSL-KDD

Precision

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00478

NSL-KDD

F1 Score

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00491

UNSW-NB15

Accuracy

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08435

UNSW-NB15

Precision

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08946

UNSW-NB15

F1 Score

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08273

CICIDS 2017

Accuracy

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09344

CICIDS 2017

Precision

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09795

CICIDS 2017

F1 Score

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.08759

CIDDS-001

Accuracy

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.16439

CIDDS-001

Precision

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.15782

CIDDS-001

F1 Score

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.13131

Table 36: Naïve Bayes Models

Dataset

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Accuracy

0.99816

0.996

0.99824

0.99712

0.36601

KDD 99

Precision

0.99812

0.99598

0.99814

0.99706

0.32635

KDD 99

F1 Score

0.99816

0.99602

0.99822

0.99712

0.20516

NSL-KDD

Accuracy

0.98613

0.98608

0.98616

0.98612

0.01268

NSL-KDD

Precision

0.98741

0.98739

0.98741

0.9874

0.00858

NSL-KDD

F1 Score

0.98647

0.98643

0.98649

0.98646

0.01002

UNSW-NB15

Accuracy

0.9917

0.9808

0.98154

0.98117

0.37921

UNSW-NB15

Precision

0.99187

0.98118

0.98195

0.98156

0.29828

UNSW-NB15

F1 Score

0.99126

0.97967

0.98066

0.98016

0.25876

CICIDS 2017

Accuracy

0.99318

0.98845

0.99007

0.98926

0.42589

CICIDS 2017

Precision

0.99309

0.98826

0.98997

0.98911

0.47588

CICIDS 2017

F1 Score

0.99318

0.98842

0.9901

0.98926

0.41032

CIDDS-001

Accuracy

0.99951

0.99877

0.99855

0.99866

0.50578

CIDDS-001

Precision

0.99948

0.99869

0.99847

0.99858

0.37718

CIDDS-001

F1 Score

0.9995

0.99873

0.99853

0.99863

0.31852

Table 37: Decision Tree Models
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Dataset

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Accuracy

0.99819

0.99603

0.99831

0.99716

2.472

KDD 99

Precision

0.99818

0.99602

0.9983

0.99715

2.49991

KDD 99

F1 Score

0.99818

0.99602

0.9983

0.99715

1.78166

NSL-KDD

Accuracy

0.98828

0.98831

0.98824

0.98827

3.8012

NSL-KDD

Precision

0.98815

0.98817

0.98811

0.98814

0.05314

NSL-KDD

F1 Score

0.98822

0.98825

0.98817

0.98821

0.81297

UNSW-NB15

Accuracy

0.99306

0.98372

0.98481

0.98426

1.49134

UNSW-NB15

Precision

0.99303

0.98386

0.98449

0.98418

12.24554

UNSW-NB15

F1 Score

0.99305

0.98386

0.98459

0.98422

1.38001

CICIDS 2017

Accuracy

0.99415

0.99032

0.99124

0.99078

20.96378

CICIDS 2017

Precision

0.99415

0.99033

0.99122

0.99077

20.17999

CICIDS 2017

F1 Score

0.99416

0.99029

0.99132

0.9908

18.56984

CIDDS-001

Accuracy

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

14.92514

CIDDS-001

Precision

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

40.93319

CIDDS-001

F1 Score

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

39.92271

Table 38: Random Forest Models

Dataset

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Accuracy

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

949.45873

KDD 99

Precision

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

966.79733

KDD 99

F1 Score

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

943.96914

NSL-KDD

Accuracy

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.7271

NSL-KDD

Precision

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61126

NSL-KDD

F1 Score

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61979

UNSW-NB15

Accuracy

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

466.55119

UNSW-NB15

Precision

0.98989

0.97491

0.97942

0.97715

778.32787

UNSW-NB15

F1 Score

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

480.33834

CICIDS 2017

Accuracy

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

723.04974

CICIDS 2017

Precision

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

734.92824

CICIDS 2017

F1 Score

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

735.96754

CIDDS-001

Accuracy

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1203.3045

CIDDS-001

Precision

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1116.4433

CIDDS-001

F1 Score

0.99852

0.99569

0.99627

0.99598

1051.3057

Table 39: Ada Boost Models
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Dataset

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Accuracy

0.99816

0.99592

0.99831

0.99711

33.93054

KDD 99

Precision

0.99816

0.99598

0.99829

0.99713

70.83681

KDD 99

F1 Score

0.99814

0.99589

0.9983

0.99709

1.05218

NSL-KDD

Accuracy

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.58591

NSL-KDD

Precision

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.87895

NSL-KDD

F1 Score

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.63036

UNSW-NB15

Accuracy

0.99317

0.98403

0.98496

0.98449

19.65784

UNSW-NB15

Precision

0.97446

0.98575

0.89864

0.93638

1.08145

UNSW-NB15

F1 Score

0.99318

0.98397

0.98507

0.98452

54.13052

CICIDS 2017

Accuracy

0.9944

0.99115

0.99117

0.99116

176.10695

CICIDS 2017

Precision

0.9944

0.99113

0.99121

0.99117

171.72592

CICIDS 2017

F1 Score

0.9944

0.99116

0.99119

0.99117

107.24517

CIDDS-001

Accuracy

0.99959

0.99904

0.99872

0.99888

22.60481

CIDDS-001

Precision

0.99956

0.99909

0.99851

0.9988

15.54522

CIDDS-001

F1 Score

0.99959

0.99903

0.99877

0.9989

22.53338

Table 40: Bagging Classifier Models

Dataset

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Accuracy

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.43249

KDD 99

Precision

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.35421

KDD 99

F1 Score

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.42434

NSL-KDD

Accuracy

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.01096

NSL-KDD

Precision

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00951

NSL-KDD

F1 Score

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00933

UNSW-NB15

Accuracy

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35886

UNSW-NB15

Precision

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35494

UNSW-NB15

F1 Score

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.52767

CICIDS 2017

Accuracy

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.19176

CICIDS 2017

Precision

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.16185

CICIDS 2017

F1 Score

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.18086

CIDDS-001

Accuracy

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.3716

CIDDS-001

Precision

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.35591

CIDDS-001

F1 Score

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.36495

Table 41: Logistic Regression Models
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Dataset

Scoring Method

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Accuracy

0.80108

0.64298

0.50011

0.44508

0.67686

KDD 99

Precision

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.19012

KDD 99

F1 Score

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.18991

NSL-KDD

Accuracy

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00446

NSL-KDD

Precision

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00392

NSL-KDD

F1 Score

0.54612

0.71213

0.55799

0.45311

0.00573

UNSW-NB15

Accuracy

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08537

UNSW-NB15

Precision

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08048

UNSW-NB15

F1 Score

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.09553

CICIDS 2017

Accuracy

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.12037

CICIDS 2017

Precision

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.27912

CICIDS 2017

F1 Score

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.08245

CIDDS-001

Accuracy

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.14127

CIDDS-001

Precision

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13498

CIDDS-001

F1 Score

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13185

Table 42: Stochastic Gradient Descent Models
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Research Question 3
How does the selection of a single optimization method impact machine learning models’
outcomes and performance when trained using multiple network intrusion datasets and
machine learning algorithms?

Hypothesis 3
Not all machine learning models will achieve high respective performance metrics when
trained using any optimization method.

Research Question and Hypothesis 3 Analysis
After reviewing the data from Phase One, this hypothesis can be accepted. It should be
noted that this is the only hypothesis in this study that compares multiple evaluation metrics,
namely accuracy, precision, and F1 score, based on the respective optimization technique.
The threshold for success for this hypothesis is a respective metric score of 95% or higher.
When evaluating this hypothesis, the models can be grouped by the selected optimization
method (seen in the tables below). The models optimized for accuracy yielded 23 out of 35
successful models (65.71%) that achieved a 95% or higher accuracy score. The models
optimized for precision yielded 21 successful models (60%) that achieved a 95% or higher
precision score. The models optimized for the F1 score yielded 20 successful models
(57.14%) that achieved a 95% or higher F1 score. The only consistent parameter for failure
across these models appears to be the models trained using the Stochastic Gradient Descent
algorithm, which never achieved the 95% threshold across any of the desired evaluation
metrics. Lastly, these results indicate that it may have been beneficial to exaggerate the
optimization methods to yield more variant models. This optimization variance could be
achieved by the following: add in additional parameters, increase the number of values tested
for each parameter, or further exaggerate the parameter values used for optimization.
However, it should be noted that increasing the number of tested parameter values during this
optimization process would exponentially increase the amount of time for optimization
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All Trained Models – Grouped by Optimization Method

Dataset

Algorithm

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Naïve Bayes

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19895

KDD 99

Decision Tree

0.99816

0.996

0.99824

0.99712

0.36601

KDD 99

Random Forest

0.99819

0.99603

0.99831

0.99716

2.472

KDD 99

Ada Boost

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

949.45873

KDD 99

Bagging Classifier

0.99816

0.99592

0.99831

0.99711

33.93054

KDD 99

Logistic Regression

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.43249

KDD 99

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80108

0.64298

0.50011

0.44508

0.67686

NSL-KDD

Naïve Bayes

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00726

NSL-KDD

Decision Tree

0.98613

0.98608

0.98616

0.98612

0.01268

NSL-KDD

Random Forest

0.98828

0.98831

0.98824

0.98827

3.8012

NSL-KDD

Ada Boost

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.7271

NSL-KDD

Bagging Classifier

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.58591

NSL-KDD

Logistic Regression

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.01096

NSL-KDD

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00446

UNSW-NB15

Naïve Bayes

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08435

UNSW-NB15

Decision Tree

0.9917

0.9808

0.98154

0.98117

0.37921

UNSW-NB15

Random Forest

0.99306

0.98372

0.98481

0.98426

1.49134

UNSW-NB15

Ada Boost

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

466.55119

UNSW-NB15

Bagging Classifier

0.99317

0.98403

0.98496

0.98449

19.65784

UNSW-NB15

Logistic Regression

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35886

UNSW-NB15

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08537

CICIDS 2017

Naïve Bayes

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09344

CICIDS 2017

Decision Tree

0.99318

0.98845

0.99007

0.98926

0.42589

CICIDS 2017

Random Forest

0.99415

0.99032

0.99124

0.99078

20.96378

CICIDS 2017

Ada Boost

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

723.04974

CICIDS 2017

Bagging Classifier

0.9944

0.99115

0.99117

0.99116

176.10695

CICIDS 2017

Logistic Regression

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.19176

CICIDS 2017

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.12037

CIDDS-001

Naïve Bayes

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.16439

CIDDS-001

Decision Tree

0.99951

0.99877

0.99855

0.99866

0.50578

CIDDS-001

Random Forest

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

14.92514

CIDDS-001

Ada Boost

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1203.30446

CIDDS-001

Bagging Classifier

0.99959

0.99904

0.99872

0.99888

22.60481

CIDDS-001

Logistic Regression

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.3716

CIDDS-001

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.14127

Table 43: Accuracy Models
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Dataset

Algorithm

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Naïve Bayes

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.19037

KDD 99

Decision Tree

0.99812

0.99598

0.99814

0.99706

0.32635

KDD 99

Random Forest

0.99818

0.99602

0.9983

0.99715

2.49991

KDD 99

Ada Boost

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

966.79733

KDD 99

Bagging Classifier

0.99816

0.99598

0.99829

0.99713

70.83681

KDD 99

Logistic Regression

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.35421

KDD 99

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.19012

NSL-KDD

Naïve Bayes

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00478

NSL-KDD

Decision Tree

0.98741

0.98739

0.98741

0.9874

0.00858

NSL-KDD

Random Forest

0.98815

0.98817

0.98811

0.98814

0.05314

NSL-KDD

Ada Boost

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61126

NSL-KDD

Bagging Classifier

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.87895

NSL-KDD

Logistic Regression

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00951

NSL-KDD

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.51387

0.51387

1

0.67888

0.00392

UNSW-NB15

Naïve Bayes

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08946

UNSW-NB15

Decision Tree

0.99187

0.98118

0.98195

0.98156

0.29828

UNSW-NB15

Random Forest

0.99303

0.98386

0.98449

0.98418

12.24554

UNSW-NB15

Ada Boost

0.98989

0.97491

0.97942

0.97715

778.32787

UNSW-NB15

Bagging Classifier

0.97446

0.98575

0.89864

0.93638

1.08145

UNSW-NB15

Logistic Regression

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.35494

UNSW-NB15

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.08048

CICIDS 2017

Naïve Bayes

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.09795

CICIDS 2017

Decision Tree

0.99309

0.98826

0.98997

0.98911

0.47588

CICIDS 2017

Random Forest

0.99415

0.99033

0.99122

0.99077

20.17999

CICIDS 2017

Ada Boost

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

734.92824

CICIDS 2017

Bagging Classifier

0.9944

0.99113

0.99121

0.99117

171.72592

CICIDS 2017

Logistic Regression

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.16185

CICIDS 2017

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.27912

CIDDS-001

Naïve Bayes

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.15782

CIDDS-001

Decision Tree

0.99948

0.99869

0.99847

0.99858

0.37718

CIDDS-001

Random Forest

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

40.93319

CIDDS-001

Ada Boost

0.99852

0.99571

0.99627

0.99599

1116.44332

CIDDS-001

Bagging Classifier

0.99956

0.99909

0.99851

0.9988

15.54522

CIDDS-001

Logistic Regression

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.35591

CIDDS-001

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13498

Table 44: Precision Models
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Dataset

Algorithm

Accuracy

Precision

Recall

F1 Score

Train Time

KDD 99

Naïve Bayes

0.97303

0.96586

0.94853

0.95689

0.15929

KDD 99

Decision Tree

0.99816

0.99602

0.99822

0.99712

0.20516

KDD 99

Random Forest

0.99818

0.99602

0.9983

0.99715

1.78166

KDD 99

Ada Boost

0.99794

0.99554

0.99804

0.99678

943.96914

KDD 99

Bagging Classifier

0.99814

0.99589

0.9983

0.99709

1.05218

KDD 99

Logistic Regression

0.96855

0.96973

0.93048

0.94854

0.42434

KDD 99

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80108

0.80108

1

0.88956

0.18991

NSL-KDD

Naïve Bayes

0.89173

0.89252

0.89246

0.89173

0.00491

NSL-KDD

Decision Tree

0.98647

0.98643

0.98649

0.98646

0.01002

NSL-KDD

Random Forest

0.98822

0.98825

0.98817

0.98821

0.81297

NSL-KDD

Ada Boost

0.98155

0.98154

0.98153

0.98154

15.61979

NSL-KDD

Bagging Classifier

0.98734

0.98742

0.98725

0.98733

0.63036

NSL-KDD

Logistic Regression

0.90648

0.90636

0.90653

0.90643

0.00933

NSL-KDD

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.54612

0.71213

0.55799

0.45311

0.00573

UNSW-NB15

Naïve Bayes

0.89293

0.78412

0.64256

0.68054

0.08273

UNSW-NB15

Decision Tree

0.99126

0.97967

0.98066

0.98016

0.25876

UNSW-NB15

Random Forest

0.99305

0.98386

0.98459

0.98422

1.38001

UNSW-NB15

Ada Boost

0.98971

0.97442

0.97912

0.97675

480.33834

UNSW-NB15

Bagging Classifier

0.99318

0.98397

0.98507

0.98452

54.13052

UNSW-NB15

Logistic Regression

0.97419

0.94521

0.93655

0.94082

0.52767

UNSW-NB15

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.87405

0.87405

1

0.93279

0.09553

CICIDS 2017

Naïve Bayes

0.85553

0.81139

0.68245

0.71751

0.08759

CICIDS 2017

Decision Tree

0.99318

0.98842

0.9901

0.98926

0.41032

CICIDS 2017

Random Forest

0.99416

0.99029

0.99132

0.9908

18.56984

CICIDS 2017

Ada Boost

0.92856

0.89923

0.86886

0.88291

735.96754

CICIDS 2017

Bagging Classifier

0.9944

0.99116

0.99119

0.99117

107.24517

CICIDS 2017

Logistic Regression

0.84409

0.77625

0.6702

0.70009

0.18086

CICIDS 2017

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.80256

0.80256

1

0.89047

0.08245

CIDDS-001

Naïve Bayes

0.90131

0.74686

0.88045

0.79145

0.13131

CIDDS-001

Decision Tree

0.9995

0.99873

0.99853

0.99863

0.31852

CIDDS-001

Random Forest

0.99963

0.99908

0.99893

0.999

39.92271

CIDDS-001

Ada Boost

0.99852

0.99569

0.99627

0.99598

1051.30573

CIDDS-001

Bagging Classifier

0.99959

0.99903

0.99877

0.9989

22.53338

CIDDS-001

Logistic Regression

0.95024

0.91176

0.79929

0.84416

0.36495

CIDDS-001

Stochastic Gradient Descent

0.89727

0.89727

1

0.94585

0.13185

Table 45: F1 Score Models
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Research Question 4
How does the performance of theoretical machine learning models change when tested in an
applied environment?

Hypothesis 4
The accuracy of theoretical machine learning models will perform significantly worse in an
applied environment.

Research Question and Hypothesis 4 Analysis
This fourth hypothesis can also be accepted as accurate. Of the 105 total trained
models, only 13 of those models were within the acceptable +/- 10% threshold of the target
true value for detecting malicious traffic. These 13 successful models and their results can be
seen in the table below. Additionally, 12 of the 13 successful models were trained using the
same CICIDS 2017 dataset, meaning that those models evaluated previously observed data
and did not even filter through truly unseen or new network traffic. Additionally, of the total
21 models trained using the CICIDS 2017 dataset, 9 of those 21 models (42.86%) failed to
accurately detect malicious traffic despite being previously trained using the exact dataset,
just in a different form. In the end, only a single model was able to flag malicious traffic on
completely unseen data accurately. These experiments’ results show that 92 of the 105 total
models performed worse in an applied environment than a conceptual environment, meaning
that 87.62% of the total models failed to identify malicious traffic correctly. Additionally,
removing the set of models trained using the CICIDS 2017 dataset shows 83 of the 84 models
(98.81%) failed to detect traffic on truly unseen network traffic accurately. The only
successful applied model utilized the KDD 99 dataset, Bagging Classifier algorithm, and
precision optimization. The other failed models indicate that the success of this individual
model may be largely coincidental. Excluding the non-CICIDS 2017 models, the results show
that none of the other models trained using the KDD 99 dataset, the Bagging Classifier
algorithm, or the precision optimization method yielded successfully applied models.
Reviewing all these failed models indicates a strong need to utilize a variety of algorithms,
datasets, and optimization methods during model development to yield an ideal model and
effectively solve the particular problem at hand.
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Successfully Applied Models

Dataset

Model

Score Method

Malicious

Normal

Total

Flagged Traffic

KDD 99

Bagging Classifier

Precision

426829

1692378

2119207

0.20141

CICIDS 2017

Naïve Bayes

Accuracy

531212

1587995

2119207

0.25067

CICIDS 2017

Decision Tree

Accuracy

236062

1883145

2119207

0.11139

CICIDS 2017

Random Forest

Accuracy

360301

1758906

2119207

0.17002

CICIDS 2017

Bagging Classifier

Accuracy

369295

1749912

2119207

0.17426

CICIDS 2017

Naïve Bayes

Precision

531212

1587995

2119207

0.25067

CICIDS 2017

Decision Tree

Precision

415476

1703731

2119207

0.19605

CICIDS 2017

Random Forest

Precision

361007

1758200

2119207

0.17035

CICIDS 2017

Bagging Classifier

Precision

368940

1750267

2119207

0.17409

CICIDS 2017

Naïve Bayes

F1 Score

531212

1587995

2119207

0.25067

CICIDS 2017

Decision Tree

F1 Score

400550

1718657

2119207

0.18901

CICIDS 2017

Random Forest

F1 Score

360171

1759036

2119207

0.16996

CICIDS 2017

Bagging Classifier

F1 Score

368985

1750222

2119207

0.17411

Table 46: Successful Models in Applied IDS Environment

Proposed Research Review
Successful Proposal Research Tasks
Overall, the primary goals of Phase One and Phase Two of this research were
successfully met. In Phase One, this research successfully optimized and trained machine
learning models trained on various datasets, algorithms, and scoring methods. Additionally,
Phase Two provided a valuable proof of concept that displayed the possibility of creating an
automated pipeline to apply machine learning models to review IDS logs and network traffic.
The second phase displayed successful imports of trained machine learning models and the
utilization of them to predict malicious traffic in unseen data, although not as accurately as
desired.
This research study successfully answered each of the research questions and
conclusively accept each of the hypotheses. These results showcase the need for utilizing a
comprehensive combination of algorithms, datasets, and optimization techniques when
training machine learning models. They also display which algorithms, datasets, and
optimization techniques yield models with the highest evaluation metrics in accuracy,
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precision, recall, and F1 score. Lastly, this study’s results strongly indicate that theoretical
machine learning models may perform substantially worse when applied in a real-world
environment.

Failed or Altered Proposal Research Tasks
There were a few deviations from the original proposal of this research. Initially, this
research attempted to alter the preprocessors of an IDS detection engine. This preprocessor
modification or creation did not occur within this research because, after investigating the
possibility, it appears that each preprocessor is protocol-specific and reviews particular packet
fields. IDS preprocessors are not intended for intense computation, let alone machine
learning. Also, depending on the programming language used to build the IDS, it may have
been necessary to manually code the machine learning algorithms since there may not have
been a publicly available library, like scikit-learn. Due to these reasons, going down the
preprocessor creation route would have been too time and effort-intensive to complete within
the proposed timeline. After investigating the feasibility of IDS preprocessor manipulation, it
appeared there were two other potential avenues to complete the goals of this research. The
second option involved creating an IDS plugin using the programming language of the
particular IDS. Due to similar concerns regarding preprocessor creation and the potential need
to code machine learning algorithms, this was not the desired route due to this proposed
research’s limited time. Finally, the third and final option involved a series of tools that could,
in theory, be easily set up as a pipeline. This option involved feeding raw network traffic into
an IDS, taking the logs and feeding them into Python scripts to produce machine learning
models, and then re-ingesting those trained models to predict unseen traffic. This final option
seemed to be the most practical option for this research since it still met the objectives while
still utilizing practical methods and tools.
The selection of machine learning algorithms also dramatically throughout the
research. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, numerous algorithms were tested and dropped
from this research. The algorithms tested and dropped include Support Vector Machine, K
Nearest Neighbor, Isolation Forest, Novelty Detection, and Outlier Detection. The primary
reason these algorithms were dropped is due to their high computation and resource
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requirements. When testing different algorithms, if a single model took longer than three days
to produce or errored out, it was dropped.
Another alteration to the proposed research was the inclusion of the IRG’16 dataset.
This dataset is massive as it is intended to replicate ISP network traffic. This IRG’16 dataset
incorporated numerous 10+ GB PCAP files. The merging, ingestion, and sampling of this
dataset would have significantly impacted the resource requirements and timeline of this
research.
The proposed evaluation metrics also changed throughout this research. A few metrics
were dropped for this research, namely False Alarm Rate, Specificity, and Negative Predictive
Value. While it would have been possible to calculate these manually, the scikit-learn module
did not include an easy method or function to obtain these metrics. Additionally, while
reviewing the literature, the most commonly used model evaluation metrics included the ones
used for this research - accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score.
One last alteration to the proposed research tasks was comparing machine learning
models to the standard IDS anomaly detection engine. The original plan was to set up the
Zeek IDS in anomaly detection mode, train the system using known “good” traffic, and test
how effectively the trained IDS handles unseen network traffic. This IDS anomaly detection
will act as a baseline to identify if machine learning models perform better than the standard
IDS anomaly detection engine. However, this IDS anomaly detection test did not occur in the
actual research. The CICIDS 2017 dataset was selected as the prediction and validation
dataset for comparing the trained models in an applied environment and observing their
detection of malicious traffic. The CICIDS 2017 dataset is publicly available online and
includes both labeled CSV and raw PCAP files. The raw PCAPs could easily be fed into the
Zeek IDS for anomaly detection training. However, the CICIDS 2017 dataset does not
perform proper grouping of known “good” or known “bad” network traffic in the PCAP files.
Therefore, unfortunately, the CICIDS 2017 PCAPs could not be split to properly train and test
the Zeek IDS.

112
Conclusions
Some significant conclusions were identified as a result of this research. First, this
study indicates a strong need to train ML models using various algorithms and datasets. A
researcher cannot simply select any algorithm or dataset and expect them always to generate
high-performing models. Second, optimizing models at least once is still highly
recommended. However, there may not be a need to test and compare multiple optimization
methods. Throughout the literature review, many of the researchers typically only optimized
for accuracy; the results of this research show that this may be a good enough practice since
the changing of optimization methods did not always yield significantly different models.
Lastly, this research showcases that theoretical ML models will most likely perform worse
when applied in an implemented environment.

Suggested Alterations
There were certain significant limitations identified after completing and reviewing
this research. Particular design decisions should be considered if this research were to be
modified and redone. The utilization of purely machine learning algorithms is a downside of
this research. These algorithms only operate on previously trained values and must
ignore/drop new values. Machine learning algorithms utilize previously seen values to make
predictions on newly ingested data, which could easily lead to inaccuracies. Deep learning
seems to alleviate this concern and is currently a significant field of study that may be applied
to this type of research.
Additionally, the source and destination IP addresses used for training may have
negatively impacted the models. As explained earlier, these fields or features were included
because specific machine learning algorithms will analyze and incorporate the frequency of
communication between devices to make a final categorization decision. Also related to the
features, this research only utilized a handful of features available between datasets and
matched them as best as possible to the Zeek connection logs. This feature mapping led to
inconsistent feature selection between datasets. Specific datasets had six features selected,
whereas others had ten features mapped to Zeek fields.
Also, it should be noted that the computational resources for this research could have
been better. While this research was conducted using DSU’s IA Lab online virtual
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environment. Five machines with 100 GB of RAM and 24 processing cores were set up and
utilized for this research. However, no graphics cards for machine learning computation were
included in this environment. The optimization of machine learning algorithms is a major
field of research and, after researching some of these published papers, the application of
graphics cards for model development could dramatically increase the speed of production.
This lack of graphics cards and low computation speed may have affected the selection of
machine learning models for this research since there was a three-day threshold before
dropping an algorithm for this research.
It was stated earlier while reviewing this study’s research questions and hypotheses,
but it would have been quite beneficial for this study to increase variance between trained
models by further expanding the optimization process. Adding in additional parameters,
increasing the number of values tested for each parameter, and further exaggerating the
parameter values used for optimization would have led to better optimized and variant models
that utilize different parameter values. The different optimization techniques did appear to
optimize 76 of the 105 models before model production successfully. However, many of the
optimized models ended up using the same parameters, thereby reducing variance between
models and their metric scores. The optimization process for this study took multiple days to
complete. Adding in additional parameters and parameter values would have exponentially
increased the optimization process due to the nature of the GridSearchCV function. However,
this would have proved beneficial for this study if it yielded highly variant models that
utilized uniquely optimized parameters.
Lastly, after further researching network patterns and trends, it has been found that the
large majority of modern network attacks are identified in the payload of a packet and thereby
require deep packet inspection. The exclusion of deep packet inspection (DPI) is a
considerable limitation of this research since the models exclusively focused on the packets’
metadata fields’ size and contents. Network attacks conducted within the payload are
application-layer attacks and highly unique to the network’s particular hosts. However, there
are reasons to include or exclude application-layer data in datasets for model development. In
academia, many of these network intrusion datasets are developed to be generalized enough
for other researchers to utilize. Application-layer data is highly unique network traffic that
other researchers may not be interested in using, so dataset developers may not wish to
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include this type of specialized traffic in their published dataset intended for academia.
However, the inclusion of DPI and application-layer data should absolutely be included for
model development within an applied enterprise network environment to train the model to
scan through this application data properly. Therefore, it makes sense for application-layer
data to be included when training ML models for applied network environments, but less so
for theoretical, proof-of-concept research in academia.

Recommendations for Enterprise Networks
The results of this research identify some essential suggestions for corporate networks
with enterprise environments that implement an IDS with machine learning capabilities. This
study shows that a model trained off a different dataset and then applied to new network
traffic will likely fail in terms of accuracy. Each network, especially enterprise networks, is
incredibly unique and has different expected device communication times, observed
protocols, open ports, and network segmentation. Despite published datasets attempting to be
generalized for others to utilize for research, these datasets are still too specialized in terms of
their available features, proportion and content of normal traffic, proportion and content of
malicious traffic, the total size of a dataset, collection data type (packet-based, flow-based,
hybrid), and their collection point on the network. Due to the extreme uniqueness of both
enterprise networks and published datasets, it is recommended for corporate environments to
utilize their own “known good” network traffic when training machine learning models.
Analysts could then extract the simulated attacks from public datasets and test the trained
models to identify specific simulated attacks. Additionally, even with these trained models, it
is highly suggested that analysts should continue to monitor and refine the model and
manually investigate flagged attacks. Over time, these models will become highly tuned to the
uniqueness of the corporate environment and should be able to identify malicious traffic
effectively. Additionally, with the customization of models, it should be possible to train the
models to implement deep packet inspection features that will scan for attacks within the
packet payload.
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Future Work
The results of this research yielded some exciting and unsuspecting results. Future
research in this combined field of network security and artificial intelligence may consider the
following suggestions to expand this research. This research would have benefitted from live
network polling or sampling to produce continuous Zeek logs. With that in mind, an actual
pipeline configuration of scripts or other dedicated software that automatically transfers data
between the IDS and Python scripts would benefit this research. Additionally, the Python
scripts in this research could have been combined into a single script workflow that could
operate continuously through scheduled tasking and network polling.
Additionally, the inclusion of deep learning techniques will be advantageous for
expanding this type of research. Deep learning models are harder to train due to their
complexity and time requirements; however, they are considered much more accurate and
better prepared to predict attacks on unseen data. There are already numerous security
researchers in industry and academia looking into the application of deep learning models.
Lastly, the application of machine learning could also be incorporated into other
security intelligence applications and services. Rather than merely analyzing and correlating
potential threats at the network level via an IDS device, several other security products could
utilize machine learning to identify threats. For example, Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) devices can act as a centralized logging system that can parse through
logs sent from numerous logging systems and individual host events across an entire network.
A SIEM with machine learning or deep learning capabilities may effectively identify new
threats by correlating every log and digital system’s events across an entire organization.
Additionally, machine learning could be applied to endpoint detection to categorize specific
processes, dynamic-link libraries (DDLs), connections, ports, or events as normal or
anomalous behaviors of an individual system.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: PHASE ONE PYTHON SCRIPT
'''
Jonah Baron
PhD Cyber Operations
Dakota State University
MLNIDS - Phase One
'''
import
import
import
import
import
import
import
import
import

os
sys
glob
time
numpy as np
pandas as pd
warnings
csv
bisect

import smtplib
import email.message
import email.utils
import joblib
from joblib import parallel_backend, Parallel
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
from sklearn.model_selection import GridSearchCV
from sklearn import preprocessing
from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler, MinMaxScaler, MaxAbsScaler, RobustScaler, Normalizer,
LabelEncoder
from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectPercentile, f_classif, RFE, SelectKBest, VarianceThreshold
from sklearn.decomposition import PCA
from
from
from
from
from
from

sklearn.naive_bayes import GaussianNB, MultinomialNB
sklearn.neighbors import KNeighborsClassifier, LocalOutlierFactor
sklearn.tree import DecisionTreeClassifier
sklearn.ensemble import AdaBoostClassifier, RandomForestClassifier, BaggingClassifier, IsolationForest
sklearn.svm import SVC, LinearSVC, OneClassSVM
sklearn.linear_model import LogisticRegression, SGDClassifier, RidgeClassifier

from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix, multilabel_confusion_matrix
from sklearn.metrics import precision_score, recall_score, f1_score, accuracy_score, roc_auc_score,
classification_report
hostname = "Windows"
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-1-KDD99'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-2-NSLKDD'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-3-UNSW'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-4-CICIDS'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-5-CIDDS'
def loadKDD99(datasetName):
#http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
print ('Loading dataset:', datasetName)
col_names = ['duration','protocol_type','service','flag','src_bytes',
'dst_bytes','land','wrong_fragment','urgent','hot','num_failed_logins',
'logged_in','num_compromised','root_shell','su_attempted','num_root',
'num_file_creations','num_shells','num_access_files','num_outbound_cmds',
'is_host_login','is_guest_login','count','srv_count','serror_rate',
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'srv_serror_rate','rerror_rate','srv_rerror_rate','same_srv_rate',
'diff_srv_rate','srv_diff_host_rate','dst_host_count','dst_host_srv_count',
'dst_host_same_srv_rate','dst_host_diff_srv_rate','dst_host_same_src_port_rate',
'dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate','dst_host_serror_rate','dst_host_srv_serror_rate',
'dst_host_rerror_rate','dst_host_srv_rerror_rate','label']
filename = os.path.join('KDD99', 'kddcup.data.csv')
trainset = pd.read_csv(filename, header=None, names = col_names)
filename = os.path.join('KDD99', 'corrected.csv')
testset = pd.read_csv(filename, header=None, names = col_names)
fullset = pd.concat([trainset, testset], ignore_index=True)
del trainset, testset
print ('Successfully read in dataset')
print (fullset.head())
print ('Fullset shape:', fullset.shape)
#LABEL EXTRACTION AND GROUPING
fullset = fullset.fillna(value='-')
print (fullset['label'].value_counts())
Y_labels = fullset['label'].copy()
Y_labels[Y_labels != 'normal.'] = 'malicious'
Y_labels[Y_labels == 'normal.'] = 'normal'
print ('Successfully grouped malicious features')
print (Y_labels.value_counts())
#FEATURE RENAMING AND DROPPING
filtered = ['duration', 'protocol_type', 'service',
'flag', 'src_bytes', 'dst_bytes']
fullset = fullset.filter(filtered)
fullset = fullset.rename(columns={'duration':'duration', 'protocol_type':'proto',
'service':'service', 'flag':'conn_state',
'src_bytes':'orig_ip_bytes', 'dst_bytes':'resp_ip_bytes'})
zeekpartial = ['duration', 'proto', 'service',
'conn_state', 'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_ip_bytes']
fullset = fullset.reindex(columns=zeekpartial)
#fullset = fullset.drop(['label'], axis=1)
#ENCODING, SCALING, SUBSET CREATION, AND FEATURE REDUCTION
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = transformBase(fullset, Y_labels, datasetName)
return X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test
def loadNSLKDD(datasetName):
#http://205.174.165.80/CICDataset/NSL-KDD/Dataset/
#https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/index.html
print ('Loading dataset:', datasetName)
col_names = ['duration','protocol_type','service','flag','src_bytes',
'dst_bytes','land','wrong_fragment','urgent','hot','num_failed_logins',
'logged_in','num_compromised','root_shell','su_attempted','num_root',
'num_file_creations','num_shells','num_access_files','num_outbound_cmds',
'is_host_login','is_guest_login','count','srv_count','serror_rate',
'srv_serror_rate','rerror_rate','srv_rerror_rate','same_srv_rate',
'diff_srv_rate','srv_diff_host_rate','dst_host_count','dst_host_srv_count',
'dst_host_same_srv_rate','dst_host_diff_srv_rate','dst_host_same_src_port_rate',
'dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate','dst_host_serror_rate','dst_host_srv_serror_rate',
'dst_host_rerror_rate','dst_host_srv_rerror_rate','label','unknown']
filename = os.path.join('NSL-KDD', 'KDDTrain+.txt')
trainset = pd.read_csv(filename, header=None, names = col_names)
filename = os.path.join('NSL-KDD', 'KDDTest+.txt')
testset = pd.read_csv(filename, header=None, names = col_names)
fullset = pd.concat([trainset, testset], ignore_index=True)
del trainset, testset
print ('Successfully read in dataset')
print (fullset.head())
print ('Fullset shape:', fullset.shape)
#LABEL EXTRACTION AND GROUPING
fullset = fullset.fillna(value='-')
print (fullset['label'].value_counts())
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Y_labels = fullset['label'].copy()
Y_labels[Y_labels != 'normal'] = 'malicious'
print ('Successfully grouped malicious features')
print (Y_labels.value_counts())
#FEATURE RENAMING AND DROPPING
filtered = ['duration', 'protocol_type', 'service',
'flag', 'src_bytes', 'dst_bytes']
fullset = fullset.filter(filtered)
fullset = fullset.rename(columns={'duration':'duration', 'protocol_type':'proto',
'service':'service', 'flag':'conn_state',
'src_bytes':'orig_ip_bytes', 'dst_bytes':'resp_ip_bytes'})
zeekpartial = ['duration', 'proto', 'service',
'conn_state', 'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_ip_bytes']
fullset = fullset.reindex(columns=zeekpartial)
#fullset = fullset.drop(['label', 'unknown'], axis=1)
#ENCODING, SCALING, SUBSET CREATION, AND FEATURE REDUCTION
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = transformBase(fullset, Y_labels, datasetName)
return X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test
def loadUNSWNB15(datasetName):
#https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/unsw-canberra-cyber/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15-Datasets/
print ('Loading dataset:', datasetName)
col_names = ['srcip', 'sport', 'dstip', 'dsport', 'proto', 'state',
'dur', 'sbytes', 'dbytes', 'sttl', 'dttl', 'sloss', 'dloss',
'service', 'Sload', 'Dload', 'Spkts', 'Dpkts', 'swin', 'dwin',
'stcpb', 'dtcpb', 'smeansz', 'dmeansz', 'trans_depth', 'res_bdy_len',
'Sjit', 'Djit', 'Stime', 'Ltime', 'Sintpkt', 'Dintpkt', 'tcprtt', 'synack',
'ackdat', 'is_sm_ips_ports', 'ct_state_ttl', 'ct_flw_http_mthd',
'is_ftp_login', 'ct_ftp_cmd', 'ct_srv_src', 'ct_srv_dst', 'ct_dst_ltm',
'ct_src_ltm', 'ct_src_dport_ltm', 'ct_dst_sport_ltm', 'ct_dst_src_ltm',
'attack_cat', 'Label']
path = os.path.join('UNSW-NB15', 'Full', '')
fnames = glob.glob(path + '*.csv')
fcontent = []
for fname in fnames:
fcontent.append(pd.read_csv(fname, header=None, names=col_names, dtype='str'))
fullset = pd.concat(fcontent, ignore_index=True)
del fcontent
print ('Successfully read in dataset')
print (fullset.head())
print ('Fullset shape:', fullset.shape)
#LABEL EXTRACTION AND GROUPING
fullset = fullset.fillna(value='-')
print (fullset['Label'].value_counts())
Y_labels = fullset['Label'].copy()
Y_labels[Y_labels != '0'] = 'malicious'
Y_labels[Y_labels == '0'] = 'normal'
print ('Successfully grouped malicious features')
print (Y_labels.value_counts())
#FEATURE RENAMING AND DROPPING
filtered = ['srcip', 'sport', 'dstip', 'dsport',
'proto', 'service', 'dur', 'sbytes',
'dbytes', 'Spkts', 'Dpkts']
fullset = fullset.filter(filtered)
fullset = fullset.rename(columns={'srcip':'id.orig_h', 'sport':'id.orig_p',
'dstip':'id.resp_h', 'dsport':'id.resp_p',
'dur':'duration', 'sbytes':'orig_ip_bytes', 'dbytes':'resp_ip_bytes',
'Spkts':'orig_pkts', 'Dpkts':'resp_pkts'})
zeekpartial = ['id.orig_h', 'id.orig_p', 'id.resp_h', 'id.resp_p',
'proto', 'service', 'duration', 'orig_pkts',
'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_pkts', 'resp_ip_bytes']
fullset = fullset.reindex(columns=zeekpartial)
#fullset = fullset.drop(['attack_cat', 'label'], axis=1)
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#ENCODING, SCALING, SUBSET CREATION, AND FEATURE REDUCTION
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = transformBase(fullset, Y_labels, datasetName)
return X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test
def loadCICIDS2017(datasetName):
#http://205.174.165.80/CICDataset/CIC-IDS-2017/Dataset/
#https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/index.html
print ('Loading dataset:', datasetName)
path = os.path.join('CICIDS2017', 'MachineLearningCSV', 'MachineLearningCVE', '')
fnames = glob.glob(path + '*.csv')
fcontent = []
for fname in fnames:
fcontent.append(pd.read_csv(fname))
fullset = pd.concat(fcontent, ignore_index=True)
fullset.columns = fullset.columns.str.strip()
print ('Successfully read in dataset')
print (fullset.head())
print ('Fullset shape:', fullset.shape)
#LABEL EXTRACTION AND GROUPING
fullset = fullset.fillna(value='-')
print (fullset['Label'].value_counts())
Y_labels = fullset['Label'].copy()
Y_labels[Y_labels != 'BENIGN'] = 'malicious'
Y_labels[Y_labels == 'BENIGN'] = 'normal'
print ('Successfully grouped malicious features')
print (Y_labels.value_counts())
#FEATURE RENAMING AND DROPPING
filtered = ['Destination Port', 'Flow Duration', 'Total Fwd Packets',
'Total Backward Packets', 'Total Length of Fwd Packets', 'Total Length of Bwd Packets']
fullset = fullset.filter(filtered)
fullset = fullset.rename(columns={'Destination Port':'id.resp_p', 'Flow Duration':'duration',
'Total Fwd Packets':'orig_pkts', 'Total Backward Packets':'resp_pkts',
'Total Length of Fwd Packets':'orig_ip_bytes', 'Total Length of Bwd
Packets':'resp_ip_bytes'})
zeekpartial = ['id.resp_p', 'duration', 'orig_pkts',
'resp_pkts', 'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_ip_bytes']
fullset = fullset.reindex(columns=zeekpartial)
#fullset = fullset.drop(['Label'], axis=1)
#ENCODING, SCALING, SUBSET CREATION, AND FEATURE REDUCTION
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = transformBase(fullset, Y_labels, datasetName)
return X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test
def loadCIDDS001(datasetName):
#https://www.hs-coburg.de/forschung/forschungsprojekte-oeffentlich/informationstechnologie/cidds-coburgintrusion-detection-data-sets.html
print ('Loading dataset:', datasetName)
filtered_cols = ['Duration','Proto','Src IP Addr','Src Pt','Dst IP Addr','Dst Pt',
'Packets', #'Bytes' not included due to naming convention like '10 M'
'Flows','Flags','Tos','class']
path = os.path.join('CIDDS-001', 'WISENT-CIDDS-001', 'CIDDS-001', 'traffic', 'OpenStack', '')
fnames = glob.glob(path + '*.csv')
fcontent = []
for fname in fnames:
fcontent.append(pd.read_csv(fname, usecols = filtered_cols))
fullset = pd.concat(fcontent, ignore_index=True)
print ('Successfully read in dataset')
print (fullset.head())
print ('Fullset shape:', fullset.shape)
#LABEL EXTRACTION AND GROUPING
fullset = fullset.fillna(value='-')
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print (fullset['class'].value_counts())
Y_labels = fullset['class'].copy()
Y_labels[Y_labels != 'normal'] = 'malicious'
print ('Successfully grouped malicious features')
print (Y_labels.value_counts())
#FEATURE RENAMING AND DROPPING
filtered = ['Duration', 'Proto', 'Src IP Addr', 'Src Pt',
'Dst IP Addr', 'Dst Pt', 'Packets']
fullset = fullset.filter(filtered)
fullset = fullset.rename(columns={'Duration':'duration', 'Proto':'proto',
'Src IP Addr':'id.orig_h', 'Src Pt':'id.orig_p',
'Dst IP Addr':'id.resp_h', 'Dst Pt':'id.resp_p',
'Packets':'orig_pkts'})
zeekpartial = ['duration', 'proto', 'id.orig_h', 'id.orig_p',
'id.resp_h', 'id.resp_p', 'orig_pkts']
fullset = fullset.reindex(columns=zeekpartial)
#fullset = fullset.drop(['class'], axis=1)
#ENCODING, SCALING, SUBSET CREATION, AND FEATURE REDUCTION
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = transformBase(fullset, Y_labels, datasetName)
#Utilize only 10% of full dataset (contained in X_test/Y_test) - Unique to CIDDS-001
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = train_test_split(X_test, Y_test, test_size = .10, random_state = 0)
return X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test
def transformBase(fullset, Y_labels, datasetName):
pathname = saveConfig(datasetName)
#DATATYPE CONVERSION TO STR/OBJECT
#print (fullset.dtypes)
col_names = list(fullset)
for col in col_names:
fullset[col] = fullset[col].astype('str')
#print (fullset.dtypes)
print ('Successfully converted dataframe column datatypes')
print (fullset.head())
#UNIQUE VALUES AND ENCODING
unique = fullset.values.ravel()
save = pathname + '_unique.joblib'
joblib.dump(unique, save)
enc = LabelEncoder()
enc.fit(np.unique(fullset.values))
save = pathname + '_encoder.joblib'
joblib.dump(enc, save)
fullset = fullset.apply(enc.transform)
print ('Successfully encoded data')
print (fullset.head())
#SCALING
scaler = StandardScaler()
scaler.fit(fullset)
save = pathname + '_scaler.joblib'
joblib.dump(scaler, save)
fullset = scaler.transform(fullset)
print ('Successfully scaled data')
#SUBSET CREATION
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = train_test_split(fullset, Y_labels, test_size = .10, random_state = 0)
print ('Successfully created subsets')
#FEATURE REDUCTION
print ('X_train shape:', X_train.shape)
print ('X_test shape:', X_test.shape)
pca = PCA(n_components='mle', svd_solver='full') #svd_solver='auto'
pca.fit(X_train)
save = pathname + '_pca.joblib'
joblib.dump(pca, save)
X_train = pd.DataFrame(pca.transform(X_train))
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X_test = pd.DataFrame(pca.transform(X_test))
print ('Successfully reduced features')
print ('X_train shape:', X_train.shape)
print ('X_test shape:', X_test.shape)
return X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test
def saveConfig(datasetName):
if datasetName == 'KDD Cup 1999':
pathname = os.path.join('KDD99', 'Output', 'KDD99')
if datasetName == 'NSL-KDD':
pathname = os.path.join('NSL-KDD', 'Output', 'NSLKDD')
if datasetName == 'UNSW-NB15':
pathname = os.path.join('UNSW-NB15', 'Output', 'UNSW')
if datasetName == 'CICIDS 2017':
pathname = os.path.join('CICIDS2017', 'Output', 'CICIDS')
if datasetName == 'CIDDS-001':
pathname = os.path.join('CIDDS-001', 'Output', 'CIDDS')
#return path, name
return pathname
def modelOutput(expected, predicted, modelName, datasetName):
accuracy = accuracy_score(expected, predicted)
precision = precision_score(expected, predicted , average='macro', labels=np.unique(predicted))
recall = recall_score(expected, predicted, average='macro', labels=np.unique(predicted))
f1 = f1_score(expected, predicted , average='macro', labels=np.unique(predicted))
class_report = classification_report(expected, predicted)
#returned = confusion_matrix(expected, predicted).ravel()
#print(cm)
#print(expected, predicted)
#print ('Labels not found in expected set:')
#print (set(expected)-set(predicted))
print ('=========================================')
print (datasetName, '|', modelName)
print ('=========================================')
print('Accuracy: %.3f' %accuracy)
print('Precision: %.3f' %precision)
print('Recall: %.3f' %recall)
print('F1 score: %.3f' %f1)
print('Classification report')
print(class_report)
print('****************************')
return accuracy, precision, recall, f1
def modelProduction(datasetName, X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test):
print ('\nProducing models...\n')
scoringMethods = ['accuracy', 'precision_macro', 'f1_macro']
for scoreMethod in scoringMethods:
clfs = getOptimized(datasetName, scoreMethod)
pathname = saveConfig(datasetName)
rows = []
for clf_name in clfs:
start = time.time()
print('Producing',clf_name)
clf = clfs[clf_name]
clf = clf.fit(X_train, Y_train)
predicted = clf.predict(X_test)
expected = Y_test
end = time.time()
trainTime = (end-start)/60
print ('Model training time: %.3f' %trainTime, 'minutes')
accuracy, precision, recall, f1 = modelOutput(expected, predicted, clf_name, datasetName)
rows.append([clf_name, accuracy, precision, recall, f1, trainTime, scoreMethod])
if clf_name == 'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB':
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modelSave = 'NB'
if clf_name == 'Decision Tree':
modelSave = 'DT'
if clf_name == 'Ensemble - Random Forest':
modelSave = 'RF'
if clf_name == 'Ensemble - Ada Boost':
modelSave = 'AB'
if clf_name == 'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier':
modelSave = 'BC'
if clf_name == 'Linear - Logistic Regression':
modelSave = 'LR'
if clf_name == 'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent':
modelSave = 'SGD'
saveName = pathname + '-' + scoreMethod + '-' + modelSave + '.joblib'
joblib.dump(clf, saveName)
#input('Press any key to continue...')
fields = ['Model', 'Accuracy', 'Precision', 'Recall', 'F1 Score', 'Time', 'Score Method', datasetName]
csvname = pathname + '-Models' + '-' + scoreMethod + '.csv'
with open(csvname, 'w', newline = '') as csvfile:
csvwriter = csv.writer(csvfile)
csvwriter.writerow(fields)
for row in rows:
csvwriter.writerow(row)
def getOptimized(datasetName, scoreMethod):
print ('Obtaining optimized model parameters...')
#ACCURACY SCORE OPTIMIZATION
if scoreMethod == 'accuracy':
if datasetName == 'KDD Cup 1999':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='gini',
max_features='log2', n_estimators=100),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=1000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'NSL-KDD':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='gini',
max_features='log2', n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=3000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=5, max_iter=1000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'UNSW-NB15':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='gini', max_features='sqrt'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='log2', n_estimators=100),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1, n_estimators=3000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=100,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'CICIDS 2017':
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clfs = {
#Updated - 10/14/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='gini',
max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=3000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'CIDDS-001':
clfs = {
#Updated 10/28/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=5, max_iter=100,
penalty='l2'),
}
#PRECISION SCORE OPTIMIZATION
if scoreMethod == 'precision_macro':
if datasetName == 'KDD Cup 1999':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='gini',
max_features='log2', n_estimators=100),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=1000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'NSL-KDD':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='gini', max_features='auto'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=100),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=3000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=3000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=5, max_iter=3000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'UNSW-NB15':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='sqrt'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=1,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=100),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=10, max_iter=100,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'CICIDS 2017':
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clfs = {
#Updated - 10/14/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='gini',
max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=1000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=1000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'CIDDS-001':
clfs = {
#Updated 10/28/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='log2', n_estimators=3000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=5, max_iter=100,
penalty='l2'),
}
#F1 SCORE OPTIMIZATION
if scoreMethod == 'f1_macro':
if datasetName == 'KDD Cup 1999':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='auto'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='gini',
max_features='sqrt', n_estimators=100),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=100),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=1000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'NSL-KDD':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='gini',
max_features='log2', n_estimators=1000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=3000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=5, max_iter=5000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'UNSW-NB15':
clfs = {
#Updated - 10/13/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='gini', max_features='log2'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='auto', n_estimators=100),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1, n_estimators=3000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=0.5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=3000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=0.1, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=1000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'CICIDS 2017':
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clfs = {
#Updated - 10/14/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='auto', n_estimators=1000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=3000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=15, max_iter=1000,
penalty='l2'),
}
if datasetName == 'CIDDS-001':
clfs = {
#Updated 10/28/2020
'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(criterion='entropy', max_features='log2'),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1, criterion='entropy',
max_features='auto', n_estimators=3000),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(learning_rate=1.5, n_estimators=5000),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1, max_features=5,
max_samples=0.5, n_estimators=1000),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(C=10, max_iter=2500, penalty='l2'),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1, alpha=5, max_iter=100,
penalty='l2'),
}
return clfs
def optimizeModels(datasetName, X_test, Y_test):
print ('\nOptimizing models...\n')
rows = []
scoringMethods = ['accuracy', 'precision_macro', 'f1_macro']
clfs = {
#'Naive Bayes - Gaussian NB' : GaussianNB(),
'Decision Tree' : DecisionTreeClassifier(),
'Ensemble - Random Forest' : RandomForestClassifier(n_jobs=-1),
'Ensemble - Ada Boost' : AdaBoostClassifier(),
'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier' : BaggingClassifier(n_jobs=-1),
'Linear - Logistic Regression' : LogisticRegression(),
'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent' : SGDClassifier(n_jobs=-1),
}
for scoreMethod in scoringMethods:
for clf_name in clfs:
print('Tuning', clf_name, 'for ideal', scoreMethod, 'score')
start = time.time()
if clf_name == 'Decision Tree':
param_grid = {'criterion' : ['gini', 'entropy'],
'max_features' : ['auto', 'sqrt', 'log2']
}
if clf_name == 'Ensemble - Random Forest':
param_grid = {'n_estimators' : [100, 1000, 3000, 5000],
'criterion' : ['gini', 'entropy'],
'max_features' : ['auto', 'sqrt', 'log2']
}
if clf_name == 'Ensemble - Ada Boost':
param_grid = {'n_estimators' : [100, 1000, 3000, 5000],
'learning_rate' : [0.5, 1, 1.5]
}
if clf_name == 'Ensemble - Bagging Classifier':
param_grid = {'n_estimators' : [100, 1000, 3000, 5000],
'max_features' : [0.5, 1, 5],
'max_samples' : [0.1, 0.5, 1]
}
if clf_name == 'Linear - Logistic Regression':
param_grid = {'penalty' : ['l2', 'l1', 'elasticnet'],
'C' : [0.1, 1, 10],
'max_iter' : [2500, 5000, 7500, 10000]
}
if clf_name == 'Linear - Stochastic Gradient Descent':
param_grid = {'alpha' : [5, 10, 15],
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'penalty' : ['l2', 'l1', 'elasticnet'],
'max_iter' : [100, 1000, 3000, 5000]
}
clf = GridSearchCV(clfs[clf_name], param_grid, pre_dispatch=3, n_jobs=-1, verbose=5, cv=5,
scoring=scoreMethod)
#with parallel_backend('threading'):
try:
clf = clf.fit(X_test, Y_test)
except:
subject = hostname + ' - Python Script Crash'
message = 'Python script crash for %s' %datasetName
sendEmail(subject, message)
end = time.time()
trainTime = (end-start)/60
rows.append([scoreMethod, clf_name, clf.best_params_, clf.best_score_, trainTime])
print ('=======================================')
print (datasetName)
print (scoreMethod)
print (clf_name)
print ('Model training time: %.3f' %trainTime, 'minutes')
print ('Best parameters:', clf.best_params_)
print ('Best score: %.5f' %clf.best_score_)
print ('=======================================')
print (clf.cv_results_)
#modelOutput(expected, predicted, clf_name, datasetName)
#input('Press any key to continue...')
pathname = saveConfig(datasetName)
csvname = pathname + '-ModelParams.csv'
fields = ['Score Method', 'Model', 'Best Parameters', 'Best Score', 'Time', datasetName]
with open(csvname, 'w', newline = '') as csvfile:
csvwriter = csv.writer(csvfile)
csvwriter.writerow(fields)
for row in rows:
csvwriter.writerow(row)
def sendEmail(subject, message):
from_email = #source email
password = #source email password credential
to_email = #destination alterate email
msg = '\r\n'.join([
'To: %s' %to_email,
'From: %s' %from_email,
'Subject: %s' %subject,
'', message])
server = smtplib.SMTP('smtp.gmail.com', 587)
server.ehlo()
server.starttls()
server.ehlo()
server.login(from_email, password)
server.sendmail(from_email, [to_email], msg)
server.quit()
def main():
scriptStart = time.time()
warnings.filterwarnings('always')
#sys.stdout = open('output.txt', 'w')
#sys.stderr = open('output.txt', 'w')
#pd.set_option('display.max_rows', 300)
#Parallel(n_jobs=-1)
for dataset in range(5):
if dataset == 0:
datasetName = 'KDD Cup 1999'
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = loadKDD99(datasetName)
if dataset == 1:
datasetName = 'NSL-KDD'
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = loadNSLKDD(datasetName)
if dataset == 2:
datasetName = 'UNSW-NB15'
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = loadUNSWNB15(datasetName)

130
if dataset == 3:
datasetName = 'CICIDS 2017'
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = loadCICIDS2017(datasetName)
if dataset == 4:
datasetName = 'CIDDS-001'
X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test = loadCIDDS001(datasetName)
print ('X_train shape:', X_train.shape)
print ('X_test shape:', X_test.shape)
#optimizeModels(datasetName, X_test, Y_test)
#modelProduction(datasetName, X_train, X_test, Y_train, Y_test)
scriptFinish = time.time()
elapsedTime = scriptFinish-scriptStart
subject = hostname + ' - Script Completed'
message = 'Elapsed runtime: %s' %elapsedTime
sendEmail(subject, message)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
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APPENDIX B: PHASE TWO PYTHON SCRIPT
'''
Jonah Baron
PhD Cyber Operations
Dakota State University
MLNIDS - Phase Two
'''
import
import
import
import
import
import
import
import
import

os
sys
glob
time
numpy as np
pandas as pd
warnings
csv
bisect

import smtplib
import email.message
import email.utils
import joblib
from joblib import parallel_backend, Parallel
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
from sklearn.model_selection import GridSearchCV
from sklearn import preprocessing
from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler, MinMaxScaler, MaxAbsScaler, RobustScaler, Normalizer,
LabelEncoder
from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectPercentile, f_classif, RFE, SelectKBest, VarianceThreshold
from sklearn.decomposition import PCA
from
from
from
from
from
from

sklearn.naive_bayes import GaussianNB, MultinomialNB
sklearn.neighbors import KNeighborsClassifier, LocalOutlierFactor
sklearn.tree import DecisionTreeClassifier
sklearn.ensemble import AdaBoostClassifier, RandomForestClassifier, BaggingClassifier, IsolationForest
sklearn.svm import SVC, LinearSVC, OneClassSVM
sklearn.linear_model import LogisticRegression, SGDClassifier, RidgeClassifier

from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix, multilabel_confusion_matrix
from sklearn.metrics import precision_score, recall_score, f1_score, accuracy_score, roc_auc_score,
classification_report
from parsezeeklogs import ParseZeekLogs #custom downloaded PyPI package
hostname = "Windows"
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-1-KDD99'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-2-NSLKDD'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-3-UNSW'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-4-CICIDS'
#hostname = 'Ubuntu-5-CIDDS'
def loadZeekLogs(datasetName):
zeekFile = os.path.join('Zeek', 'Final', 'CICIDS2017', 'conn.log')
zeekLogs = ParseZeekLogs(zeekFile, output_format='csv', safe_headers=False)
print(zeekLogs.get_fields())
predictionFile = os.path.join('Zeek', 'predictionset.csv')
with open(predictionFile,'w') as outfile:
outfile.write(zeekLogs.get_fields() + '\n')
for log in zeekLogs:
if log is not None:
outfile.write(log + '\n')
zeekfull = ['ts', 'uid', 'id.orig_h', 'id.orig_p', 'id.resp_h', 'id.resp_p',
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'proto', 'service', 'duration', 'orig_bytes', 'resp_bytes', 'conn_state',
'local_orig', 'local_resp', 'missed_bytes', 'history', 'orig_pkts',
'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_pkts', 'resp_ip_bytes', 'tunnel_parents']
if datasetName == 'KDD Cup 1999':
zeekpartial = ['duration', 'proto', 'service',
'conn_state', 'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_ip_bytes']
if datasetName == 'NSL-KDD':
zeekpartial = ['duration', 'proto', 'service',
'conn_state', 'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_ip_bytes']
if datasetName == 'UNSW-NB15':
zeekpartial = ['id.orig_h', 'id.orig_p', 'id.resp_h', 'id.resp_p',
'proto', 'service', 'duration', 'orig_pkts',
'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_pkts', 'resp_ip_bytes']
if datasetName == 'CICIDS 2017':
zeekpartial = ['id.resp_p', 'duration', 'orig_pkts',
'resp_pkts', 'orig_ip_bytes', 'resp_ip_bytes']
if datasetName == 'CIDDS-001':
zeekpartial = ['duration', 'proto', 'id.orig_h', 'id.orig_p',
'id.resp_h', 'id.resp_p', 'orig_pkts']
predictionset = pd.read_csv(predictionFile, usecols=zeekpartial)
print ('Successfully read in prediction dataset')
print (predictionset.head())
print ('Predictionset shape:', predictionset.shape)
return predictionset
def transformPrediction(predictionset, datasetName):
pathname = saveConfig(datasetName)
enc = joblib.load(pathname + '_encoder.joblib')
scaler = joblib.load(pathname + '_scaler.joblib')
pca = joblib.load(pathname + '_pca.joblib')
unique = joblib.load(pathname + '_unique.joblib')
#Transformations - datatype conversions, encoding, scaling, subset creation, feature reduction
print (enc)
print (scaler)
print (pca)
print (unique)
#ENSURE '-' IS SEEN IN ENCODER SCHEMA
enc_classes = enc.classes_.tolist()
bisect.insort_left(enc_classes, '-')
enc.classes_ = enc_classes
#DATATYPE CONVERSION TO STR/OBJECT
predictionset = predictionset.fillna(value='-')
#print (fullset.dtypes)
col_names = list(predictionset)
for col in col_names:
predictionset[col] = predictionset[col].astype('str')
#print (fullset.dtypes)
print ('Successfully converted dataframe column datatypes')
print (predictionset.head())
#ENCODING
predictionvalues = list(np.unique(predictionset.values.ravel()))
trainedvalues = list(np.unique(unique.tolist()))
remove = []
for value in predictionvalues:
if value not in trainedvalues:
remove.append(value)
predictionset.replace(to_replace=remove, value='-', inplace=True)
predictionset = predictionset.apply(enc.transform)
print ('Successfully encoded data')
print (predictionset.head())
#SCALING
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predictionset = scaler.transform(predictionset)
print ('Successfully scaled data')
#FEATURE REDUCTION
predictionset = pca.transform(predictionset)
print ('Successfully reduced features')
print ('Prediction set shape:', predictionset.shape)
scoringMethods = ['accuracy', 'precision_macro', 'f1_macro']
clfs = ['NB', 'DT', 'RF', 'AB', 'BC', 'LR', 'SGD']
rows = []
for scoreMethod in scoringMethods:
for clfName in clfs:
clfFile = '-' + scoreMethod + '-' + clfName + '.joblib'
clf = joblib.load(pathname + clfFile)
print (clf)
#print (clf.feature_importances_)
prediction = clf.predict(predictionset)
unique, counts = np.unique(prediction, return_counts=True)
#print (unique, counts)
print (np.asarray((unique, counts)).T)
if len(unique) == 1:
if unique[0] == 'normal':
flagged = 0
rows.append([clfName, scoreMethod, 0, counts[0], counts[0], flagged])
if unique[0] == 'malicious':
flagged = 1
rows.append([clfName, scoreMethod, counts[0], 0, counts[0], flagged])
if len(unique) == 2:
flagged = counts[0]/(counts[0]+counts[1])
rows.append([clfName, scoreMethod, counts[0], counts[1], (counts[0] + counts[1]), flagged])
print ('Flagged traffic: ', flagged)
fields = ['Model', 'Score Method', 'Malicious', 'Normal', 'Total', 'Flagged Traffic', datasetName]
csvname = pathname + '-Predictions.csv'
with open(csvname, 'w', newline = '') as csvfile:
csvwriter = csv.writer(csvfile)
csvwriter.writerow(fields)
for row in rows:
csvwriter.writerow(row)
def saveConfig(datasetName):
if datasetName == 'KDD Cup 1999':
pathname = os.path.join('KDD99', 'Output', 'KDD99')
if datasetName == 'NSL-KDD':
pathname = os.path.join('NSL-KDD', 'Output', 'NSLKDD')
if datasetName == 'UNSW-NB15':
pathname = os.path.join('UNSW-NB15', 'Output', 'UNSW')
if datasetName == 'CICIDS 2017':
pathname = os.path.join('CICIDS2017', 'Output', 'CICIDS')
if datasetName == 'CIDDS-001':
pathname = os.path.join('CIDDS-001', 'Output', 'CIDDS')
return pathname
def sendEmail(subject, message):
from_email = #source email
password = #source email password credential
to_email = #destination alter email
msg = '\r\n'.join([
'To: %s' %to_email,
'From: %s' %from_email,
'Subject: %s' %subject,
'', message])
server = smtplib.SMTP('smtp.gmail.com', 587)
server.ehlo()
server.starttls()
server.ehlo()
server.login(from_email, password)
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server.sendmail(from_email, [to_email], msg)
server.quit()
def main():
warnings.filterwarnings('always')
scriptStart = time.time()
for dataset in range(5):
if dataset == 0:
datasetName = 'KDD Cup 1999'
if dataset == 1:
datasetName = 'NSL-KDD'
if dataset == 2:
datasetName = 'UNSW-NB15'
if dataset == 3:
datasetName = 'CICIDS 2017'
if dataset == 4:
datasetName = 'CIDDS-001'
#LOAD ZEEK CONN LOG AND PREDICT
predictionset = loadZeekLogs(datasetName)
transformPrediction(predictionset, datasetName)
scriptFinish = time.time()
elapsedTime = scriptFinish-scriptStart
subject = hostname + ' - Script Completed'
message = 'Elapsed runtime: %s' %elapsedTime
sendEmail(subject, message)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF ZEEK CONNECTION LOG FIELDS
AND DATASET FEATURES
•

Zeek Connection Log - ts, uid, id, proto, service, duration, orig_bytes, resp_bytes,
conn_state, local_orig, local_resp, missed_bytes, history, orig_pkts, orig_ip_bytes,
resp_pkts, resp_ip_bytes, tunnel_parents, orig_l2_addr, resp_l2_addr, vlan,
inner_vlan, speculative_service

•

KDD 99 Dataset - duration, protocol_type, service, flag, src_bytes, dst_bytes, land,
wrong_fragment, urgent, hot, num_failed_logins, logged_in, num_compromised,
root_shell, su_attempted, num_root, num_file_creations, num_shells,
num_access_files, num_outbound_cmds, is_host_login, is_guest_login, count,
srv_count, serror_rate, srv_serror_rate, rerror_rate, srv_rerror_rate, same_srv_rate,
diff_srv_rate, srv_diff_host_rate, dst_host_count, dst_host_srv_count,
dst_host_same_srv_rate, dst_host_diff_srv_rate, dst_host_same_src_port_rate,
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate, dst_host_serror_rate, dst_host_srv_serror_rate,
dst_host_rerror_rate, dst_host_srv_rerror_rate

•

NSL-KDD Dataset - duration, protocol_type, service, flag, src_bytes, dst_bytes, land,
wrong_fragment, urgent, hot, num_failed_logins, logged_in, num_compromised,
root_shell, su_attempted, num_root, num_file_creations, num_shells,
num_access_files, num_outbound_cmds, is_host_login, is_guest_login, count,
srv_count, serror_rate, srv_serror_rate, rerror_rate, srv_rerror_rate, same_srv_rate,
diff_srv_rate, srv_diff_host_rate, dst_host_count, dst_host_srv_count,
dst_host_same_srv_rate, dst_host_diff_srv_rate, dst_host_same_src_port_rate,
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate, dst_host_serror_rate, dst_host_srv_serror_rate,
dst_host_rerror_rate, dst_host_srv_rerror_rate,

•

UNSW-NB15 Dataset - srcip, sport, dstip, dsport, proto, state, dur, sbytes, dbytes, sttl,
dttl, sloss, dloss, service, Sload, Dload, Spkts, Dpkts, swin, dwin, stcpb, dtcpb,
smeansz, dmeansz, trans_depth, res_bdy_len, Sjit, Djit, Stime, Ltime, Sintpkt,
Dintpkt, tcprtt, synack, ackdat, is_sm_ips_ports, ct_state_ttl, ct_flw_http_mthd,
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is_ftp_login, ct_ftp_cmd, ct_srv_src, ct_srv_dst, ct_dst_ltm, ct_src_ ltm,
ct_src_dport_ltm, ct_dst_sport_ltm, ct_dst_src_ltm, attack_cat, Label
•

CICIDS 2017 Dataset - DestinationPort, FlowDuration, TotalFwdPackets,
TotalBackwardPackets, TotalLengthofFwdPackets, TotalLengthofBwdPackets,
FwdPacketLengthMax, FwdPacketLengthMin, FwdPacketLengthMean,
FwdPacketLengthStd, BwdPacketLengthMax, BwdPacketLengthMin,
BwdPacketLengthMean, BwdPacketLengthStd, FlowBytes/s, FlowPackets/s,
FlowIATMean, FlowIATStd, FlowIATMax, FlowIATMin, FwdIATTotal,
FwdIATMean, FwdIATStd, FwdIATMax, FwdIATMin, BwdIATTotal,
BwdIATMean, BwdIATStd, BwdIATMax, BwdIATMin, FwdPSHFlags,
BwdPSHFlags, FwdURGFlags, BwdURGFlags, FwdHeaderLength,
BwdHeaderLength, FwdPackets/s, BwdPackets/s, MinPacketLength,
MaxPacketLength, PacketLengthMean, PacketLengthStd, PacketLengthVariance,
FINFlagCount, SYNFlagCount, RSTFlagCount, PSHFlagCount, ACKFlagCount,
URGFlagCount, CWEFlagCount, ECEFlagCount, Down/UpRatio,
AveragePacketSize, AvgFwdSegmentSize, AvgBwdSegmentSize, FwdHeaderLength,
FwdAvgBytes/Bulk, FwdAvgPackets/Bulk, FwdAvgBulkRate, BwdAvgBytes/Bulk,
BwdAvgPackets/Bulk, BwdAvgBulkRate, SubflowFwdPackets, SubflowFwdBytes,
SubflowBwdPackets, SubflowBwdBytes, Init_Win_bytes_forward,
Init_Win_bytes_backward, act_data_pkt_fwd, min_seg_size_forward, ActiveMean,
ActiveStd, ActiveMax, ActiveMin, IdleMean, IdleStd, IdleMax, IdleMin, Label,

•

CIDDS-001 Dataset - Date first seen, Duration, Proto, Src IP Addr, Src Pt, Dst IP
Addr, Dst Pt, Packets, Bytes, Flows, Flags, Tos, class, attackType, attackID,
attackDescription

